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ABSTRACT 
 
BETWEEN TURKISHNESS AND KURDISHNESS: SOCIAL COHESION OF 
CENTRAL ANATOLIAN KURDS 
 
Duran, Hazal. 
MA, Department of Modern Turkish Studies 
Supervisor: Prof. Mesut Yeğen 
September 2015, 125 pages 
 
This study tries to display patterns in the political, social and cultural lives of Central 
Anatolian Kurds and how these patterns and Kurdish identity are impacted by 
surrounding influences of Turkishness. In accordance with this purpose and to 
understand the roots of the existing Kurdish population in the region, the first phase 
of this study has examined the historical background of Kurdish settlement in Central 
Anatolia through the Imperial and Republican periods. In the second phase, semi-
structured interviews with Central Anatolian Kurds and non-structured interviews 
with researchers and members of foundations were conducted to demonstrate the 
possibilities and limitations of social interactions with other groups as well as within 
the Central Anatolian Kurdish community, which give clues about their 
cohesion/exclusion level. Field work held as a part of this study is framed by Paul 
Bernard’s classification of measuring cohesion in social, cultural, and political 
aspects under three dimensions named as 1) Recognition/Rejection: Dealing with 
experiences, feelings, expectations, preferences, and concerns about social relations; 
2) Belonging/Isolation: Touching upon shared values shaped by elements of ethnic 
contours; and 3) Legitimacy/Illegitimacy: Interest in relations with political and 
institutional foundations. The main argument of this study is that ethnic contours of 
Central Anatolian Kurds have been shaped by elements of Turkishness as well as 
Kurdishness, placing this group in-between two ethnicities. 
Key words: Central Anatolian Kurds, Central Anatolia, Kurdishness, social cohesion 
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ÖZ 
 
TÜRKLÜK VE KÜRTLÜK ARASINDA: ORTA ANADOLU KÜRTLERİNDE 
SOSYAL UYUM 
 
Duran, Hazal. 
MA, Modern Türkiye Çalışmaları Bölümü 
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Mesut Yeğen 
Eylül 2015, 125 Sayfa 
 
Bu çalışma Orta Anadolu Kürtlerinin sosyal, kültürel ve siyasal hayatındaki 
tekrarlayan motifleri ve bu motifler ile Kürt kimliğini kuşatan Türklüğün etkisine 
nasıl maruz kaldığını göstermeye çalışmaktadır. Bu amaç doğrultusunda ve 
bölgedeki Kürt nüfusun varlığının kökenlerini anlamak için, çalışmanın ilk 
aşamasında Orta Anadolu’da İmparatorluk ve Cumhuriyet dönemleri boyunca devam 
eden Kürt iskanının tarihsel arka planı incelenmiştir. İkinci aşamada, Orta Anadolu 
Kürtlerinin kendi toplulukları içerisindeki ve diğer topluluklarla arasındaki uyum ve 
dışlanmanın boyutu hakkında ipuçları veren sosyal etkileşimin imkanları ve 
sınırlılıklarını anlamak için, Orta Anadolu Kürtleriyle yarı yapılandırılmış, 
araştırmacı ve vakıf temsilcileriyle de yapılandırılmamış mülakatlar 
gerçekleştirilmiştir. Bu çalışmanın bir parçası olarak uygulanan saha araştırması, 
Paul Bernard’ın sosyal, kültürel ve siyasi alanlardaki uyumu ölçen ve üç boyut 
altında isimlendirilen sınıflandırmasına göre çerçevelendirilmiştir: 1) Tanıma/Ret: 
Sosyal ilişkiler hakkındaki deneyimler, hisler, beklentiler, tercihler ve endişeler ile 
ilgilenmektedir. 2) Aidiyet/İzolasyon: Etnik sınırların unsurları tarafından 
şekillendirilen ortak değerleri içermektedir. 3) Meşruluk/Gayrimeşruluk: Politik ve 
kurumsal kuruluşlarla olan ilişkilerle ilgilenmektedir. Bu çalışmanın temel argümanı, 
Orta Anadolu Kürtlerinde etnik sınırların Kürtlüğün unsurları tarafından olduğu 
kadar Türklüğün unsurları tarafından da şekillendirildiği, yani iki grup arasında bir 
yere konumlandırıldığıdır. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Orta Anadolu Kürtleri, Orta Anadolu, Kürtlük, sosyal uyum 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Kurdish Question in Turkey is one of the prominent issues discussed by scholars 
in terms of its political, economic, and social aspects. Scholars familiar with the 
subject are used to people mostly thinking of the Eastern part of Turkey when they 
hear the term “Kurds,” which leads to the association of the Kurdish Question with 
the specific region and the people living within its borders.The background of this 
perception falls within the Turkish State’s naming of the problem as “reactionary 
politics, tribal resistance, brigandage, provocation of foreigners, or regional 
backwardness.”1 Excluding from the Kurdish Question the daily lives of people 
living in the Western part of Turkey and instead restricting it to a specific area is a 
result of an effort to maintain distance between Kurds and “proper citizens” of the 
rest of the country. On the one side this distance aims to damage relationships 
between Kurds and the rest, while it also tries to ignore Kurds living in other parts of 
the country and subsequently make them unaware of their Kurdishness. This effort to 
perpetuate the unawareness of these people regarding their Kurdishness is called 
“assimilation” by even top government officials.2 Central Anatolian Kurds (CAK) 
are also a part of this exclusion and the targeted distancing of state politics affecting 
the political, economic, and social elements that make them Kurds. 
CAK have been living in the region for a long time. According to research dealing 
with the history of Asia Minor, Kurds have been living in the region since the 11th 
century, during the Byzantium era.3 Nevertheless, the settlement of the Kurdish 
population in the region as groups took place by the 15th century. The first traces of 
forced migration of the Kurds to the region became visible with the exile of nomadic 
tribes in the 16th century, especially during the sultanate of Selim the First. This era 
can be interpreted as the first milestone of the enforcement of Kurdish settlement in 
                                                 
1 Mesut Yeğen, Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2013), 222. 
2 Interview with Mesut Yılmaz, “Der Schlüssel Diegt in Bonn”, (The key lies in Bonn), Der Spiegel,  
accessed August 29, 2015, http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-8781958.html 
3 Claude Cahen, Osmanlılardan Önce Anadolu’da Türkler, (İstanbul: E Yayınları Tarih Dizisi, 1979), 
283. 
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the region. During the rest of the Ottoman administration, the Kurds were exposed to 
a settlement policy aimed at not only controlling them, but also promoting their 
adoption of a sedentary life. Especially policies of the CUP and the new Republic 
towards different ethnicities and religions, which aimed to create a homogenous 
society in terms of religion, ethnicity, and culture, finalized the distribution of CAK 
throughout the region in the first half of the 20th century.  The Kurds, Turks, Tatars, 
Circassians, and Balkan immigrants were the main subjects of the region and the 
“ethnicity engineering” oriented politics of the 20th century affected all of these 
communities. Turkish nationalism’s aim to create a “classless, unprivileged society” 
required distributing the Kurdish population in the Eastern part of Turkey as well as 
bringing Kurdish settlements in the West under the control of the Republic. In the 
final stage, the state imposed its definition of “ideal citizenship” on society through 
education in schools and in other public areas such as in newspapers and on the 
radio.   
In light of this information, this study examines the patterns in the political, social, 
and cultural life of CAK differentiating them not only from the rest of the region, but 
also from the Kurds living in other parts of the country. As the community living in a 
region where the effects of both Turkishness and Kurdishness are felt, CAK are 
affected by the multi-factorial characteristics of the region that are also contained 
within their lives. At this point, finding patterns in the political, social, and cultural 
life of CAK requires close examination of their experiences belonging to and living 
in urban-rural areas, their thoughts on the meaning of being a Kurd and its 
representation in daily life, their sense of (un)belonging to certain groups, their usage 
of Kurdish as a native language/second language, their relations with Kurds and non-
Kurdish communities (in marriages, the neighborhood, business life, etc.), their 
perception of political parties and institutions, their experienced/witnessed 
discrimination events, and so on. Proper answers to the questions raised by these 
issues will help to answer the main research question: What are the patterns in the 
political, social and cultural lives of CAK and how, if at all, are these patterns and 
CAK' Kurdish identity impacted by surrounding influences of Turkishness? Because 
a strong research question should be specific and limited by time and place, forming 
a good research question is very crucial for the success of the study. At this stage, 
three words are advisors of the researchers; what, how, and why. Preference for these 
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words changes the developmental, causal, comparative, or predictive nature of the 
study.4  As aforementioned, the main research question of this study is formed on the 
question of “what” and “how” enabling us to ascertain the effects of a certain 
element on another subject. In this case, it will help to gather more reliable 
information during the research. 
1.1. Reason for the Study 
A preliminary literature review of research about CAK proves the lack of academic 
work dealing with CAK in the fields of Sociology and Political Science. CAK are 
taken into consideration just in a few works generally approaching the issue as a part 
of History and transcribing official documents from the Empire and Republican 
periods without interpreting them within the context of relations between the state’s 
perception towards those belonging to different ethnicities, religions, and cultures 
and implementations towards them. The historical documents such as decrees, 
cadastral record books, and other public records are also important parts of this work 
enabling us to understand the background of gradually changing Kurdish settlements 
in the region according to different time periods. However, approaching social 
change in Central Anatolia (CA) specific to the Kurdish population in the region 
requires close examination of the current situation together with historical processes: 
the reasons for the first Kurdish settlements in the region, the approach of the 
administration towards the region during the Empire and Republican periods, the 
causative and methodological change of settlement policy over time and the general 
political, social, and cultural elements shaping the sociology of the existing Kurdish 
community in the region. Thus, existing literature needs to be handled with close 
research regarding the current situation. The lack of resources on the social 
conditions of CAK and the absence of a reflection of ethnic contours of them among 
historically based works is one of the prominent reasons for this study. Above all, 
this study will make important contributions to the literature of Kurdish studies by 
examining Central Anatolian Kurds from a perspective that did not previously attract 
attention. 
In order to evaluate positive contributions and negative aspects of existing literature 
and to understand which gap this study will try to fill, it will be useful to closely 
                                                 
4 Jennifer Mason, Qualitative Researching. (Second edition), (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 
2002), 18. 
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examine these works. However, due to the impossibility of examining positive and 
negative aspects of the entire literature in this chapter, prominent works dealing 
specifically with the subject or the pioneer work that made way for the formation of 
the limited literature on CAK should be handled. Except for archival documents, 
traces of CAK first played a part in diaries of researchers who had compiled their 
observations of Asia Minor, such as W. F. Ainsworth, William J. Hamilton, Georges 
Perrot, Frederick Burnaby, and William M. Ramsay. The observations of these 
researchers are very useful for gathering information about the details of Kurdish 
social life that is not available in official documents. Travel notes create pictures of 
the Kurds living in the region belonging only to the moment when the traveler was 
there; consequently, they cannot offer more detailed elements beyond these 
observations. As well as these notes, there are some works prepared from an analysis 
of official documents. The prominent work of this category is Cengiz Orhonlu’s 
Osmanlı İmparatorluğu‟nda Aşiretlerin İskânı, which functions as a primary source 
because it presents information on the settlement policy of Kurdish tribes in the 
region and the changing characteristics of settlement policy over the centuries. 
Another work formed by examining first hand resources belonging to Ottoman 
archives is Yusuf Halaçoğlu’s work titled XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı 
İmparatorluğu‟nun İskân Siyaseti ve Aşiretlerin Yerleştirilmesi. Both of these works 
offer valuable information regarding the reasons, methods, and outcomes of 
settlement policy, but, Yusuf Halaçoğlu’s study resembes Orhonlu’s one in many 
aspects which makes it far from being an original work. Also in his work, Halaçoğlu 
claims that members of Kurdish tribes were originally Turks (a claim that is very 
common) and continues to insist on the truth of this thought still today.5 This 
argument centered on the original Turkishness of Kurdish tribes is defended in other 
works and Ziya Gökalp’s Kürt Aşiretleri Hakkında Sosyolojik Tetkikler is among 
these works. It should not be ignored that the approach of these works addresses a 
wider perception: the state’s “defensive-nationalist perspective” trying to create a 
homogeneous society.6 Consequently, while on the one hand these works are crucial 
                                                 
5 Yusuf Halaçoğlu claims that 30% of existing Kurdish tribes were originally Turkish ones according 
to cadastral record books of the 1500s. “Halaçoğlu, 'Yüzde 30' demiş,” Radikal, August 20, 2007. 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/halacoglu_yuzde_30_demis-823375.  
6 Murat Somer, “Defensive- vs. liberal-nationalist perspectives on diversity and the Kurdish conflict: 
Europeanization, the internal debate, and Türkiyelilik,” New Perspectives on Turkey 32 (2005): 76. 
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in the case of handling first hand resources, on the other hand they contain 
problematic information raising a question mark harming their objectivity. 
In addition to these works based on first hand archival documents and prepared in a 
method suitable to academia, there are some other works that should not be 
disregarded in the case of CAK, even if they are inappropriate to academic studies. 
As a leading study among non-academic works, Rohat Alakom‘s Orta Anadolu 
Kürtleri can be interpreted as an inclusive study based on almost all works on the 
issue. Nonetheless, this work has a lack of objectivity in its emotional narrative and 
its lack of references to claims, which, especially in some parts, remain to be proven. 
Like Rohat Alakom’s work, Seyyah Kandemir’s Ankara Vilayeti and Halil İbrahim 
Uçak’s Tarih İçinde Haymana were also prepared in a way inconsistent with 
academic literature, and a confusing presentation of information in these works is 
common due to the absence of a regular narrative form.  
Last but not least, one of the most important studies on CAK is conducted by CAK 
living in abroad. In 1997, a group of Kurdish refugees mostly living in Germany and 
Sweden started to publish a quarterly journal focusing on the history and social 
structure of CAK. This journal began publication with the slogan: “Journal of 
Politics, Art, and Culture of the Central Anatolian Kurds: Bîrnebûn”. In the preface 
of the first issue, the editorial board commented that by publishing this journal, they 
aimed to strengthen the identity of being CAK and investigate peculiarities of that 
identity.7 Also, due to a lack of research and academic work, the difficulties of 
investigating Kurds living in this region were well known by the writers of the 
journal.8  CAK were living in a sphere surrounded by Turkish groups and one of the 
aims of this journal was a better understanding of their cultures. In the first issues, 
the journal included articles both in Kurdish and Turkish. Nonetheless, the number of 
articles in Kurdish rose over time. This might have arisen from the facility of 
learning Kurdish in Europe during the 1990s and 2000s in comparison with Turkey.9 
Even if articles published in the journal provide valuable information about CAK, 
they somehow insufficient because of lack of objectivity. 
                                                 
7 Editorial, “Çıkarken,” Bîrnebûn 1 (1997): 2. 
8 Nuh Ateş, “Batı Kürtleri Gerçekliği ve Çözüm Perspektifleri Üzerine Sesli Düşünceler,”Bîrnebûn 1 
(1997): 7. 
9 Amir Hassanpour et al., “Kürtlerin Eğitilmemesi: Kürtler açısından Durum (1)”, Online Journal of 
Bosphorus University Literature Club, accessed August 29, 2015. 
http://www.bued.boun.edu.tr/turik.asp?id=66 
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As aforementioned, while historical information based on some works is problematic 
due to their subjectivity in academic manner and their lack of social aspects of CAK, 
non-academic works paying attention to social observation also have some problems 
with regards to objectivity and relaying information in chronological order. The 
importance of studies incorporating qualitative research and historical facts in the 
examination of this group arises from the gap in studies. Thus, this study aims to fill 
the gap in academia on CAK without ruling out existing social, political, and cultural 
features. 
1.2. Methodology of the Study 
Before selecting a research methodology, as a Kurdish-origin person from the region 
I was aware that my closeness could be problematic for the objectivity of this 
research. Obviously, neutrality is an irrevocable issue as it is a determinant for 
ethical issues of the subject. Neutrality basically means “the proper distance between 
researcher and subjects that minimizes bias [… ]. Thus, the objective researcher is 
seen as scientifically distant, that is, as someone who is not influenced by, and does 
not influence the study”.10 To avoid these kinds of obstacles, detachment of the 
researcher from the subject should be kept in mind to be able to avoid unconscious 
manipulation of data.11  If not, the reliability and objectivity of the research may 
come under question.   
A researcher determined to overcome the problem of neutrality and willing to 
conduct research has to choose the right methodology enabling this person to 
complete the work. At this point, an inevitable question appears in mind: Qualitative 
or quantitative? For this research, a qualitative methodology will be used because of 
its appropriateness to the subject.  Qualitative methodology enables the researcher to 
explore a “wide array of dimensions of the social world, and understandings, 
experiences, and imaginings of the participants, the ways that social processes, 
institutions, discourses or relationships work, and the significance of the meanings 
that they generate”.12  As it is seen, the qualitative research methods deal with the 
social part of life that is not possible, except in some situations, to measure. Since the 
                                                 
10 Laura Krefting, “Rigor in Qualitative Research: The Assessment of Trustworthiness,” The 
American Journal of Occupational Therapy 45 (1991): 217. 
11 J. Lofland and L.H. Lofland, Analyzing Social Settings:  A Guide to Qualitative Observation and 
Analysis, (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1984), 34. 
12 J. Mason, op. cit., 1. 
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qualitative research method is seen as “soft, and even not scientific, it helps to 
provide quite social analyses in social sciences”.13 Case study, visual methods 
ethnography, participatory inquiry, interpretive analysis, participant observation, 
interviewing, and grounded theory are among sub-methods of qualitative research.  
As the main research question of this work is “What are the patterns in the political, 
social and cultural lives of CAK and how, if at all, are these patterns and CAK' 
Kurdish identity impacted by surrounding influences of Turkishness?”, daily life 
experiences, thoughts, perceptions, senses, preferences, and relations are parts of the 
research. In light of these points, the interviewing method is chosen to collect data 
during the research.  
Interviewing is a methodology consisting of a conversation with a purpose and 
knowledge from the interviews to relate them with the research topic. As seen, it is a 
well-based, preplanned, and regular method to collect data. Especially if a person is 
interested in gathering certain knowledge beyond emotions, the interviewing method 
is more successful.14 To avoid ethical problems, interviewing, like other methods, 
must include important points such as objectivity, neutrality, and direct engagement 
to the subject. While conducting interviews, the researcher should be careful and not 
forget the aim of the research. At the end of research, the researcher gets data from 
“activities, behaviors, actions, conversation, interpersonal interactions, organizational 
or community process, or any other aspect of observable human experience” forming 
the core of field notes.15 
The interviewing method can be detailed in terms of the “number and length of 
interviews, the appropriateness and breadth of the interview sample given the goals 
of the study, the types of questions asked, the level of transcription detail, the 
practices taken to ensure transcript accuracy, and the resultant number of pages of 
interview transcripts”.16 Qualitative interviewing may be a one-to-one interaction or 
                                                 
13 Sylvia Gherardi and Barry Turner, Real Men Don’t Collect Soft Data, (Trento: University of Trento 
Press, 1987), 5. 
14 J. Lofland and L.H. Lofland, op. cit., 20. 
15 M. Q. Patton, Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods (third edition), (Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage Publications, 2002), 2. 
16 Sarah J. Tracy, “Qualitative Quality: Eight ‘Big-Tent’ Criteria for Excellent Qualitative Research,” 
Qualitative Inquiry 16 (2010): 842. 
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a group interview. The preplanned questions can be changed, especially during 
discussions.17  
Before examining how these methodologies were used in this study, the research 
design should be closely examined. At the first step, after deciding to study CAK, the 
formulation of a narrower research question was the first step to be fulfilled. After 
that, literature on CAK consisting of public records, decrees, cadastral record books, 
reports, research books, journals, and diaries were reviewed to evaluate the 
weaknesses and strengths of existing literature. In light of this information, the 
research question was refined to study the subject more efficiently. Classifying study 
materials and conducting research were other important stages that enabled 
successful completion of the research. As aforementioned, interviewing was used as 
a method to collect data from the field. One of the most crucial stages of this study 
was conducting interviews, which enabled access to first-hand information from the 
field. To be able to gather experiences, thoughts, senses, preferences, perceptions, 
and relations of informants, fifteen semi-structured in-depth interviews were 
conducted with CAK. The duration of face-to-face interviews varied between 
approximately half an hour and one and a half hours. All interviews were recorded 
on tape and transcribed. In the beginning of all interviews, the permission of 
informants was orally obtained, because Istanbul Sehir University Committee of 
Academic Honesty does not need written permission for interviews and oral 
permission is enough to be able to use the data received from interviews. In addition 
to semi-structured interviews with 15 people based on a pre-prepared questionnaire, 
non-structured interviews were also held with the board of directors of The 
Association of Culture and Solidarity of Central Anatolian Kurds (KOMKURD-AN, 
Orta Anadolu Kürtleri Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği), The Association of Social 
Cooperation and Solidarity for Haymanaians (Haymanalılar Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve 
Kültür Derneği) and some researchers working on the subject as a part of field 
research. Due to concerns of directors and researchers, interviews with these 
individuals were not recorded and just were noted on paper. Their permission for 
using data gathered from them was also obtained orally. 
                                                 
17 J. Mason, op. cit., 62. 
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As a target group for the semi-structured in-depth interviews, individuals between 
the ages of 18 and 60 representing both genders - 8 women and 7 men - found with 
the help of the snowball sampling technique according to specified categories were 
chosen. While the main sampling strategy was being formed, some important 
questions such as “What work do I want my sample to do? What is the wider 
universe or population from which I wish to sample? What is the nature of my 
existence in this universe or population?” were kept in mind to collect reliable data.18 
Additionally, this research required the restriction of informants’ residences to urban 
areas in order to reliably learn the level of relation and cohesion between Kurds and 
other groups. Furthermore, gathering reliable information from Kurds living in rural 
areas would have been difficult because of the rarity of their communication with 
people coming from different ethnic, social, and cultural backgrounds. The focus of 
this research is therefore comprised of Kurds from Haymana and Polatlı (Ankara) 
still living in these two provinces or in the city center and from Kulu (Konya) and 
Çiçekdağı (Kırşehir), but living in the center of Ankara. While 11 interviews were 
conducted with Kurds from Haymana and Polatlı provinces, 4 interviews were held 
with Kurds from the provinces of Kulu and Kırşehir. There are three reasons why the 
number of informants from Haymana and Polatlı is higher than the other two 
provinces. First, Haymana and Polatlı are two regions in CA that have an important 
Kurdish population identified with it. Second, as a Kurdish person from Haymana 
and living in the center of Ankara, the difficulty to access Kurds in other regions 
prompted me to stay in this region. Third, because the number of interviews would 
be just 15, I preferred not to diversify this group with people living in other parts of 
CA, which would have made it more difficult to find patterns in their lives. 
Additionally, because the adaptation of Kurds to urban life is among the points to be 
measured, nearly half of the informants also had life experiences in rural areas. The 
questions addressed to informants were composed of six dimensions, which are 
migration (urban-rural life experiences), identity, native language, social life, 
discrimination, and political/institutional behavior. Each of these dimensions have 
sub-questions, which enabled me to learn the level of social cohesion/exclusion of   
CAK in the region by concretization and adaptation of Paul Bernard’s classification 
about the theory of social cohesion comprising belonging/isolation, 
                                                 
18 J. Mason, op. cit., 13. 
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legitimacy/illegitimacy, and recognition/rejection. The duration of time during which 
these 15 semi-structured interviews were conducted was from 16th June to 2nd August 
2015, while non-structured interviews were held from 17th May until 3rd August 
2015.  
After transcribing the interviews and preparing notes from non-structured interviews, 
the issue of analyzing the data came to the forefront. During analysis of this data, the 
Nvivo software program was used to organize and classify raw data for analysis. As 
a part of this process, Nvivo also aided the issue of coding. In light of Paul Bernard’s 
theory and questionnaire of this study, significant points from collected data were 
organized. 
After all these stages, during the writing process of this study, regular interviews 
with my advisor were held to finalize the study with necessary requirements. 
Because of the difficulty of writing in English without mistakes, assistants of The 
Academic Writing Center at Istanbul Sehir University reviewed grammar and the 
content of the study.  
1.3. Limitations of the Study 
The first obstacle of this study emerged during the literature review when I realized 
there are some important works comprising sociological and regional aspects of 
CAK in the German language. Especially some works of geologist Wolf-
Dieter Hutteroth, which were not translated into English, made it impossible to 
examine them as a part of this study. Hutteroth’s close examination of Kurdish 
villages in terms of their settlement layouts with the relation of villages belonging to 
Turks, Tatars, Circassias, and other immigrant groups could be compatible with the 
aim of my research question. Additionally, there were some other German works not 
translated into English focusing on the geographical settlement of villages in Asia 
Minor and their sociological dimensions. Thus, the first obstacle came to the 
forefront during the literature review. 
The political situation dominating the period while I was conducting my fieldwork is 
another obstacle I had to face. It was hard to communicate with people before the 
June 7th election due to the probability of being provoked and the unnatural results 
that aroused from the effects of political discourses used by political parties. Because 
of this reason, the informants were contacted after the elections, which created the 
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obligation of simultaneously completing interviews in a short period. Furthermore, 
even after the elections, a re-arising conflictual environment in Turkey made it 
difficult to gather unhesitant answers from informants. Especially questions 
regarding political/institutional behaviors distracted some people, which I observed 
in their reactions and understood from their gestures. Even some people whom I 
wanted to interview rejected my request because they perceived this study as an 
investigation into current political issues.  
Last but not least, another obstacle that might impact the success of this study arises 
from individual restrictions belonging to my educational background and personality. 
As an MA candidate having a bachelor degree in International Relations and 
currently studying in the program of Modern Turkish Studies, it was the first time I 
did field research as a part of my studies. I must admit I learned about opportunities 
and limitations of fieldwork during this study. Nonetheless, a series of focus groups 
on the Alewi Issue in Turkey, in which I participated with the SETA Foundation 
immediately before this study, provided important experience for me, without which 
I strongly believe the quality of this study would have been lessened. In addition to 
obstacles arising from my educational background, personality characteristics of 
mine also impacted the fieldwork. As a more introverted person, I felt I had a 
problem communicating with people, especially individuals I had not met before, 
which inhibited me from engaging them in further discussion during the interviews. 
Even if I tried my best, I have to admit that another person more familiar with field 
study and more comfortable during the interviews might gather more comprehensive 
data. 
1.4. Organization of the Study 
This study is organized in five chapters. As an introduction chapter, Chapter One 
examines the main issues regarding the reason, methodology, limitations, and 
organization of the study as well as stressing the research question and secondary 
issues motivating the study. Chapter Two draws a theoretical framework for the 
study based on the debates of social integration/cohesion in the literature by stressing 
similarities and differences between them. As a part of this chapter, the evolution of 
the term of social cohesion apart from theory on social integration and limitations 
and the possibilities of examining CAK in light of Paul Bernard’s approach to social 
cohesion will be handled. Chapter Three elaborates on the historical background of 
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CAK by focusing on the changing settlement motivations of the Kurdish population 
in the region during both Imperial and Republican periods and the perception of the 
administration towards CAK that affected implementations and policies towards the 
region and determined the level of social, political, and cultural cohesion between 
CAK, other groups, and the authorities. Chapter Four includes the field research 
results from semi-structured in-depth interviews with people from the region and 
non-structured interviews with representatives of associations and researchers, 
providing valuable data for the measurement of social cohesion of CAK. Prominent 
issues revealed after analysis of the interview results are examined concordantly with 
the theoretical framework of the study. As a conclusion, Chapter Five aims to 
evaluate the general levels of social cohesion of CAK as a result of this study, 
stresses problematic areas concerning social cohesion of CAK and offers some 
concrete suggestions that may create positive impacts on their current situation.  
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CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY 
 
Which elements bond societies together? Do identities, common values, or 
institutions have this function? How important are loyalism and commitment as a 
part of this system of values? As potentially important elements, how should these 
abstract concepts be evaluated in research when trying to determine their 
contributions to social cohesion/exclusion? While examining the social cohesion of 
CAK, answers to these questions will be useful to gather information about contours 
of ethnic identity among CAK: How do they identify themselves in their daily lives? 
How do they differentiate themselves from their non-Kurdish neighbors and fellows? 
What are their perceptions towards the state? What are their views about political 
parties and institutions? Do they have any linkage with Kurds living in Eastern 
Anatolia where their ancestors lived once upon a time?  All of these questions are 
quite important to answer our research question: What are the patterns in the 
political, social and cultural lives of CAK and how, if at all, are these patterns and 
CAK' Kurdish identity impacted by surrounding influences of Turkishness? 
In light of these questions, this chapter aims to provide a theoretical framework for 
understanding social cohesion/exclusion of CAK in case of their political, social and 
cultural relations with social groups and institutions. As the first step, the evolution 
of the theory of social integration in the 20th century and different approaches 
towards its concepts will be examined. As an important phenomenon, the emergence 
of the concept of social cohesion and how it differs from social integration will be 
handled. In this section, the reasons why social cohesion is conceptualized as a 
narrow-scoped relation occuring between social groups on the micro level while 
social integration is described as a more comprehensive term examining state-society 
relations on the macro level will be discussed. Specifying elements of social 
cohesion, prominent aspects such as equality, freedom, solidarity, and mutuality and 
how they are handled by scholars will be analyzed in detail to introduce the 
theoretical framework suitable for the study.  
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It also should be emphasized that Turkishness and Kurdishness are perceived as 
abstract concepts depending mostly on the difference in native languages in this 
study. This limitation arises from the state’s differentiation of these terms by 
bringing native language to the forefront. While looking back through population 
censuses held in the early Republican period, it can be realized that the state’s 
description of Kurdishness had depended on this issue.  Furthermore, it should be 
noted that Turkishness and Kurdishness are also seen as a sociological fact  and a 
part of people’s description of themselves, not just as a part of the native language. In 
other words, all informants express that they establish relations with social groups 
without denying their Kurdishness, even if it is sometimes not very effective. It also 
should be emphasized that Kurdishness is not seen as a concept dependent on 
assumptions about their identity; it is rather perceived as an element, of which the 
study tries to understand it’s role in social relations. To serve this purpose, the theory 
of social cohesion is chosen to answer the research question rather than the theory of 
identity. 
2.1. The Evolution of the Theory of Social Integration and its Units 
As an important phenomenon in the theory of social integration and social cohesion, 
an inversion of the works on this issue reflect the general characteristics of the 
topic’s changing elements. Especially after the 1980s, with the rise of globalization 
and neoliberalism, economic inequality has increased in direct proportion to 
economic growth and a sharpened competitive environment has weakened the social 
state. All of these developments and their connections to each other have created a 
new atmosphere in which social cohesion has lost its power on societies.19 
Auspiciously, this loss has allowed states to focus on the issue of social cohesion 
more than before. Globalization and new elements in the world order caused 
international organizations such as the EU and non-governmental organizations to 
care about the issue more than before.20 Increasingly, expanding work on social 
integration and cohesion makes way for widening meanings while at the same time 
creating new discussions.  
                                                 
19Ralf Dahrendorf, Frank Field and Carolyn Hayman, Report on Wealth Creation and Social Cohesion 
in a Free Society, (London: Commission on Wealth Creation and Social Cohesion, 1995), 38. 
20Wolfgang Bosswick, Doris Lüken-Klaßen and Friedrich Heckmann, Integration of Migrants: 
Contribution of Local and Regional Authorities, (Dublin: European Foundation for the Improvement 
of Living and Working Conditions, 2006), 2. 
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In social theory, Emile Durkheim is the first prominent thinker dealing with social 
integration. He was more concerned with the direct bounds between the 
transformation of social order and the lack of social integration. According to his 
thoughts, after the differentiated and individualized social order came to the 
forefront, providing social integration in society became an issue.21 Especially the 
new economic and social order through the end of the 19th century dissolved the 
effects of institutions as providers of social integration. At that point, Durkheim 
implies that with obligatory organic solidarism - arising from the needs of 
individuals - the loss of social integration in societies might be restrained. While 
making a comment on the differences in social relationship between groups and 
individuals, Durkheim uses suicides as an example to concretize his thoughts and 
categorize them according to their reasons in traditional and modern (individual-
oriented) societies. Even if there are different reasons for committing suicide, one of 
the remarkable reasons for it depends on the complexity of forming social ties in 
individual oriented societies.22 At this point, from the eye of Durkheim, individuals’ 
ties with society that are dependent on moral values control individuals from 
committing suicide. 
Durkheim’s concentration on social integration and the important question of 
debating the probability of providing social integration in a new social order at the 
end of the 19th century paved the way for further research on social integration. One 
of the prominent researchers working on the issue was Talcott Parsons, who worked 
specifically on how social integration shaped a new order during the 1950s and after. 
Parson understands the importance of the new order in light of capitalism, pluralism, 
and liberalism shaping the postwar era.23 According to him, social integration 
requires a hidden consensus formed by values of the new era: democracy, pluralism, 
social, political, and civil rights. As seen in both Durkheim’s and Parson’s thoughts 
on social integration, both of them see moral values and human beings as the main 
motivating source for social integration. However, there was a gap in promoting 
social integration for both state and societal levels because of difficulties in 
promoting social integration in that form. This gap would be filled with further 
                                                 
21Ian Gough and Gunnar Olofsson, “Introduction: New Thinking on Exclusion and Integration,” in 
Capitalism and Social Cohesion: Essays on Exclusion and Integration, ed. Ian Gough and Gunnar 
Olofsson (London: Macmillan Press, 1999), 2. 
22Thomas J. Scheff, “A Concept of Social Integration,” Philosophical Psychology 20 (2007), 580. 
23Ian Gough and Gunnar Olofsson, op. cit. 2. 
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research by the 1960s and social integration would start to be conceptualized by that 
time. 
Post 1968, research of social integration was based on new social movements, 
subcultural elements and mass media, elements gaining popularity in that period. 
Concentrating on a busy agenda of world developments, academics did not concern 
themselves with forming a theoretical framework for social 
integration/differentiation theories.24 Academic studies were based on field research 
and had a feature of anthropological studies. Nevertheless, David Lockwood’s 1964 
article, titled “Social integration and system integration,” produced a systematic 
framework for the theory of social integration. Lockwood formed a framework both 
for system integration and social integration. According to him, individuals and 
social groups should be included more in analyzing the concept of social integration. 
In other words, both groups ignore the relationship between the parts (institutions) 
and actors.25 While Lockwood was trying to understand how social change is 
internally generated in a society, he explains the mistake of normative functionalists 
and Marxist conflict theorists. According to Lockwood’s thoughts, both normative 
functionalists and conflict theorists failed to evaluate social and system integration. 
Normative functionalists failed to understand reasons of social change related to 
functional incompatibility between institutional order and its material elements, 
because they attached too much importance to moral elements.26 Also, conflict 
theorists could not establish a mutual relation between social change and system 
integration. The Marxist approach to conflict theory was problematic, because it 
overlooked the institutional axis in which the social system is differentiated. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, the theoretical context of social integration was more 
diversified and held in detail by scholars such as Jurgen Habermas (1973), Anthony 
Giddens (1984), and Nicos Mouzelis (1991).27 Habermas continued to use 
Lockwood’s agency (part)/system classification by evaluating social 
                                                 
24 Ibid. 3. 
25 David Lockwood, “Social Integration and System Integration,” in Social Change: Explorations, 
Diagnoses, and Conjectures, ed. George K. Zollschan and Walter Hirsch, (New York: Schenkman 
Publishing, 1976), 376-377. 
26 Ibid. 382. 
27 Ian Gough and Gunnar Olofsson, op. cit. 13. 
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orientations/actions from the system and its functional requirements.28 In his case, he 
classifies social order from two points of view, one of which is social integration 
based on “a normatively secured or communicatively achieved consensus.”29 
Contrary to Lockwood, Habermas did not believe in a bond between social and 
system integration. For him, system integration deals with the economic and political 
institutional sphere while social integration can be examined through other 
communicative areas.30 Thus, these two agency (part)/system classifications are 
incomparable.  
 
When it comes to Giddens, the theory of social integration significantly changed. For 
Giddens, social integration is defined as: “regularized ties, interchanges or 
reciprocity of practices between either actors or collectivities.”31 On the other side, 
his understanding of system integration is not related to agency/system classification, 
but is defined as: “reciprocity between actors or collectivities across extended time-
space, outside conditions of co-presence.”32 Giddens maintains social/system 
integration at respective micro/macro levels by unpopularizing the normative-
functionalist distinction of Lockwood. Nonetheless, Mouzelis has criticized Gidden’s 
differention of time-presence issues between social and system integration by giving 
as an example agreements between heads of states, which exceed time and presence 
through the possibility of affecting the future. 
 
One of the important developments in conceptualizing social integration was 
providing new definitions of social integration. However, all of the scholars working 
on the theory of social integration did not converge on an exact definition. Thus, 
while trying to figure out basic elements forming social integration, one should be 
aware of the different approaches to the issue. It is obvious that a prominent 
difference and turning point in the works of social integration came to light with the 
rise and differentiation of social integration/social cohesion. The concepts of social 
integration and social cohesion are paired together in social works while emphasizing 
                                                 
28 Nicos Mouzelis, “Social and System Integration: Lockwood, Habermas, Giddens”, Sociological 
Review 31 (1997), 114. 
29 Ibid. 114. 
30 Ibid. 116. 
31 T. Jansen, N. Chioncel, and H. Dekkers, “Social cohesion and Integration: Learning Active 
Citizenship,” British Journal of Sociology of Education 27 (2006), 191. 
32 Mouzelis, op. cit. 116. 
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differences and similarities between them. While social integration was approached 
as a concept mostly showing representation and presentation of values belonging to a 
group by another one, social cohesion generally implies a relationship between social 
groups, which are equal in many aspects. In other words, while the concept of social 
integration is more concentrated on relations on the state-society level, social 
cohesion pays attention to relations between two groups. Also, the concept of social 
integration holds integration as a systematic unit in contrast to social cohesion, which 
considers individuals and social groups.33 These differentiations should be examined 
in detail to understand differences in these concepts.  
The one who first differentiated between social integration and cohesion in a 
framework was Lockwood. Differences of social integration and cohesion were held 
in Lockwood’s later work examining relations between integration and class 
formation. For Lockwood, the elements forming social integration were determinant 
in class formation. In other words, social integration, which has as its primary 
reference point for the analysis the complex unity of democratic, market, and welfare 
state relations shaping the rights of political, civil, and social citizenship, establishes 
a framework for class formation.34 Inequalities in class and status result whether 
there is social cohesion or exclusion. As in his previous work, Lockwood emphasizes 
the effects of moral values, which he names moral resources. The non-existence of 
moral resources, referring to “advantages conferred by social standing and social 
networks, command of information, and general know-how, including the ability to 
attain one's ends through the activation of shared moral sentiments,” can damage 
social cohesion and cause social exclusion.35As it is seen in Lockwood’s perception 
about social integration and cohesion, integration forms elements that shape the way 
for social cohesion/exclusion. Thus, in Lockwood’s case, social integration is a more 
comprehensive term. 
Another important differentiation between social integration and cohesion arises 
from debates insisting on the assimilative effects of social integration. In this 
approach, social cohesion is discussed in relation to the question of coexistence in 
                                                 
33 Betül Duman, Osman Alacahan, and Mustafa Kemal Bayırdağ, Sosyal Kaynaşma Bağlamında Kürt 
Meselesi, TÜBİTAK Project 2012, 27. 
34 David Lockwood, “Civic Integration and Class Formation,”The British Journal of Sociology 47 
(1996), 532. 
35 Ibid. 537. 
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multi-ethnic and multi-cultural societies, while social integration is used to examine 
the relation between locals and migrants belonging to different ethnic, cultural and 
religious roots.36 Assimilation mostly happens in majority-minority classifications, in 
which the majority can aim to force assimilation by exercising control over the basic 
elements of a minority, such as language, religion or endangering physical presence 
of a minority through deportation, population transfer, or even genocide.37 
Assimilation usually is implemented by state institutions and the ideology behind it. 
For example, as the first nation state, France insisted on political unity and an 
inclusive theory and practice of citizenship, which was implemented by schools, the 
army, the church, unions, and political parties and subsequently destroyed political, 
social, and cultural diversity.38 At the present time, interpreting social integration as 
assimilation continues. As a part of social integration, the term “loyalty” comes into 
prominence as an indicator proving the existence of integration: 
While different citizens would develop different emotions towards their community, all that is to 
sustain it and can legitimately be expected of them all is a basic concern for its integrity and 
well-being; what one might call patriotism or political loyalty. They might criticize the 
prevailing form of government, institutions, policies, values, ethos and dominant self-
understanding in the strongest possible terms, but these should not arouse unease or provoke 
charges of disloyalty so long as their basic commitment to dialogue is not in doubt.39 
In the case of social integration, the loyalty of citizens is perceived as a declaration 
of their commitment to states and their institutions. Especially in the case of labor 
migrants, political refugees and other asylum seekers, social integration is used as a 
process integrating “them” to be like “us” through cultural adaptation, such as 
ensuring their knowledge of and loyalty to the constitution, adequate knowledge of 
the language of that society, integration into that society, and a commitment to the 
state, which could be interpreted as cultural assimilation.40 Actually, successful 
integration requires mutual relations and commitment to self-fulfillment. In that case, 
developing a sense of belonging necessitates “equally valuing and cherishing to the 
ones wanted to be integrated in all their diversity and reflecting this in its structure, 
                                                 
36 Betül Duman, Osman Alacahan, and Mustafa Kemal Bayırdağ, op. cit. 39. 
37 Hans van Amersfoort, “‘Minority’ as a Sociological Concept,” in Selected Studies in International 
Migration and Immigrant Incorporation, ed. Marco Martiniello and Jan Rath, Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press, 2010, 198. 
38 William Rogers Brubaker, “Introduction to Immigration and The Politics of Citizenship in Europe 
and North America,”in Selected Studies in International Migration and Immigrant Incorporation, ed. 
Marco Martiniello and Jan Rath, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010, 212. 
39 Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 342. 
40 Michael Samers, “Immigration, ‘Ethnic Minorities’, and ‘Social Exclusion’ in the European Union: 
a Critical Perspective,” Geoforum 29 (1998): 133. 
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policies, conduct of public affairs.”41 In other words, social integration should be 
handled as a mutual process to prevent its turning into assimilation of a group by 
another dominating culture. Furthermore, when the process of social integration 
prescribes a mutual relation at an equal level without restraining diversity, it shows 
more features of cohesion. In the case of Kurds in Turkey, the enforcement of 
cultural-linguistic homogeneity to create a new identity for those seen as prospective 
suspects was highly crucial for the sake of state ideology and its institutions. Thus, 
the policy of mutuality could not be implemented by the Turkish state.42 However, 
Kurds and other ethnic groups establish contacts on a societal level in the case of 
developing mutual relations in schools, jobs, and social life (marriages, neighbor 
relations, daily life interactions, etc.). Both theories of social integration and 
cohesion are therefore valid in the case of Kurds in Turkey. 
Just as supporters claim social integration as an accelerator of the assimilation 
process, there are also some counter arguments insisting on social integration’s 
positive contributions to interaction and cooperation. From the European Unions’ 
point of view, social integration that “originated from conscious and motivated 
interaction and cooperation of individuals and groups refers to the inclusion of 
individuals in a system, the creation of relationships among individuals and their 
attitudes towards the society.”43 Furthermore, scholars who advocate the positive 
side of social integration include the existence of fundamental judiciary and social 
protection, discrimination laws, distribution of resources, housing policy and law and 
order as examples of social integration’s connective power; this contrasts with 
scholars showing a tendency to perceive social integration as a part of the 
assimilation process.44 However, in social integration, the possibility of protecting 
elements belonging to cultural diversity, such as language, traditions and literature, 
remains a question that has not been answered clearly. In this case, the theory of 
social cohesion concentrating more on the exposure of cultural elements comes into 
prominence. 
                                                 
41 Bhikhu Parekh, op. cit. 342. 
42 Murat Somer, op. cit. 76. 
43 Wolfgang Bosswick, Doris Lüken-Klaßen and Friedrich Heckmann, op. cit. 2. 
44 Betül Duman, Osman Alacahan, and Mustafa Kemal Bayırdağ, op. cit. 41. 
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2.2. The Theory of Social Cohesion in Light Of Reciprocity  
The theory of social cohesion came to light with the evolution of works on social 
integration. These two different concepts are still seen as interchangeable definitions; 
even the aforementioned differences come to light in levels of communication. 
Social cohesion is a unique definition that can be adapted to different conditions 
arising from its flexibility.45Academic works on the theory of social cohesion have 
become popular since the 1990s by efforts of prominent scholars such as Regina 
Berger-Schmitt, Ade Kearns, Ray Forrest, Joseph Chan, Bhikhu Parekh, Paul 
Bernard and Jane Jenson.These scholars associate social cohesion with different 
dimensions, such as equality, mutuality, welfare, and solidarity. 
The concept of equality/inequality is a very popular dimension of the term held by 
scholars. The conspicuous property of social cohesion differentiating it from 
integration shows up in its requirement of equality that is interrelated with social 
order and its acceptance in society. Without recognition of social equality, referring 
to social cohesion will become difficult as is stated: 
The two analytical perspectives on social cohesion that we have pursued have thus led us to the 
same two-fold conclusion. First, that equality is an essential element of the democratic social 
order, linked to liberty and solidarity in a dialectical relationship. Second, that this dialectic 
cannot be maintained in the dynamism of its totality and its contradictions unless it operates on 
two levels, which are themselves in a dialectical relationship: on the one hand, a formal level on 
which the fundamental equality of all members of society is affirmed with regard to recognition, 
inclusion and the legitimacy of conflict-resolution institutions; and on the other hand, the 
substantial level on which those who want to freely engage in social debates forge unifying 
values and seek social justice.46 
As it is seen, in addition to equality, mutuality of social relations and their 
improvement are essential subjects in social cohesion. While the existence of social 
cohesion signifies the nonexistence of social exclusion, it also adds mutual 
acceptance of the values that create it such as social bonds, equal political, economic, 
and social rights creating equal citizenship rights, mutual recognition and inclusion. 
The importance of social cohesion increased as works associated it with social 
welfare and solidarity. Especially works on these dimensions of social cohesion 
came into prominence with gaining popularity of the term by policy makers. The 
positive correlation between social cohesion and economic growth paved the way for 
the perception of social cohesion as a source of wealth and economic development. 
                                                 
45 Ibid. 5. 
46 Paul Bernard, Social Cohesion: A Critique, (Ottowa: CPRN, 1999), 23. 
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Also, a lack of social cohesion that damages civic engagement and solidarity in a 
society can cause an increase in the social expenditures budget.47  These 
determinations also created a new means of interrelating social cohesion with 
economic, social, and political issues in the context of being a strong state. 
Additionally, the perception claiming the positive effect of social cohesion on 
political stability and security was considered important especially following the 
cases of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. These examples led to an increase 
in the number of works on Canada, Australia, and European Union countries 
including different ethnic groups and immigrants.  
It should be noted that although there is now a remarkable literature on social 
cohesion, there is no exact definition of social cohesion. As a supranational 
organization containing a sizable population of immigrants, refugees and asylum-
seekers belonging to different ethnic and cultural groups, the EU pays quite a lot of 
attention to the concept of social cohesion and makes a comprehensive definition 
including dimensions of social cohesion. According to the definition made by the 
Council of Europe, social cohesion is “the capacity of a society to ensure the welfare 
of all its members, minimizing disparities and avoiding polarization.”48 The general 
aim of the Council is to find the best way to foster diversity by creating an enriching 
atmosphere and preventing conflict between diversified social units and groups. As a 
part of preventing conflict, polarization cannot be allowed. In response to critics who 
insist on the assimilation and standardizing effects of social cohesion, the Council 
declares full respect towards the autonomy of the private sphere and bounding 
individuals around the circle of solidarity.49 In other words, sustainability of 
individuality in an atmosphere where social bonds are powerful is the main aim of 
the Council in light of social cohesion. Being successful in this aim requires taking 
the actions outlined in the table: 
 
                                                 
47 Regina Berger-Schmitt, “Considering Social Cohesion in Quality of Life Assessments: Concept and 
Measurement,” Social Indicators Research 58 (2002): 405. 
48 European Commission, A new strategy for Social Cohesion, Revised strategy for Social Cohesion 
approved by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, 2004, 3. 
49 Ibid. 13. 
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Table 2.1. : Necessary Actions for Providing Social Cohesion in the Eye of the 
Council of Europe50 
Clarifying and maintaining the essential role of 
the State and other public bodies 
The State, a guarantor of human rights and 
participatory democracy, protect 
vulnerable groups at risk of social 
exclusion. Also the state restores a 
sufficient degree of equity in the 
distribution of wealth through mechanisms 
of solidarity such as redistributive taxation 
and social security. 
Integrating the social dimension into economic 
life 
Commitment to eliminate poverty and to 
achieve sustainable development, sound 
macro-economic policies which led 
equality of opportunity to everyone, 
providing economically sustainable social 
protection, access to employment for all, 
social responsibility of economic actors. 
Developing a new ethic of social responsibility Developing the sense of mutual 
responsibility and interdependence, 
rebuilding a sense of society, of belonging, 
of commitment to shared social goals. 
Supporting families and encouraging family 
solidarity 
Being supportive of families and other 
networks and relationships which bring 
individuals together into wider circles of 
solidarity, supporting families in fulfilling 
their functions, providing the rights and 
dignity of children or elderly people in 
need of care. 
Encouraging participation in civil society Creating a favourable environment for 
encouraging charitable, sports and cultural 
associations, together with organisations 
for children and young people; recognising 
and providing support on non-
governmental organizations. 
 
As seen, providing social cohesion requires according both state institutions and 
tools among diversified social, economic, political, and cultural societies. It is not 
                                                 
50 European Commission, op. cit. 8. 
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enough to prepare a legal framework for the adaptation of state institutions, but 
cultural adaptation of social structure is also required for cohesion. Regarding this 
point, some concepts, such as multiculturalism, come to the forefront as high demand 
mediators between state-society levels to get both sides used to social cohesion. Even 
if some academics look with suspicion upon multiculturalism, some theorists see it as 
a compulsory point. As Parekh implies, multiculturalism works as a hidden mediator 
between different groups in the same society: 
A multicultural society cannot be stable and last long without developing a common sense of 
belonging among its citizens. The sense of belonging cannot be ethnic or based on shared 
cultural, ethnic and other characteristics, for a multicultural society is too diverse for that, but 
political in nature and based on a shared commitment to the political community. Its members 
do not directly belong to each other as in an ethnic group, but through their mediating 
membership of a shared community, and they are committed to each other because they are all 
in their own different ways committed to the community and bound by the ties of common 
interest and affection. Although they might personally loathe some of their fellow members or 
find their lifestyles, views and values unacceptable, their mutual commitment and concern as 
members of a shared community remain unaffected.51 
Parekh’s emphasis on a commitment to a shared community in everyway possible is 
an important point to be able to live in a diversified country. In this manner, the 
autonomy of individuals and groups can be maintained by developing common living 
spaces and common values holding it together. However, even the Council of Europe 
is aware of concerns that present growing multiculturalism as a threat to traditional 
identities.52 In another work, The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, Parekh examines 
the problematic sides of the perception of multiculturalism in the judicial system, 
education system, media, cultural institutions, health system, welfare regime, labor 
market, migrant and refugee policies, political system, and social institutions; he 
draws attention to deficiencies regarding how misperceptions of multiculturalism 
pave the way for discrimination and racism.53 The effect of multiculturalism, whether 
as a connective or discriminative concept, is a much debated issue, especially 
between supporters of nation states, who stress the requirement of a common identity 
to bond society together, and multicultural pluralists, who support the creation of a 
new form of citizenship isolated from nationality.54 All of these kinds of debates 
related to the aforementioned dimensions of social cohesion give way for examining 
social cohesion at all points and detailing the classsification of its aspects. 
                                                 
51 Bhikhu Parekh, op. cit. 341. 
52 European Commission, op. cit. 4. 
53 Betül Duman, Osman Alacahan, and Mustafa Kemal Bayırdağ, op. cit. 23. 
54 William Rogers Brubaker, op. cit. 220. 
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2.3. A Close Examination of the Theory of Social Cohesion 
After examining basic features of the theory of social cohesion and the base of its 
differentiation from the concept of social integration, a further close examination of 
its elements is essential to understand social cohesion in the political, economic, and 
socio-cultural fields. Different theoretical frameworks and classifications developed 
for social cohesion should be suitable for gathering what is involved in and excluded 
from different perspectives through establishing an outline for it in different fields. 
It has been stressed before that different points of view differently denotate the 
concepts of social cohesion and integration, including assimilation, absorption, 
acculturation, accommodation, incorporation, inclusion, participation, cohesion-
building, enfranchisement, toleration, anti-discrimination, and so on.55 Furthermore, 
theorization about social cohesion also carries these traces of different perceptions; in 
each theory, some features are brought to the forefront while others are disregarded.  
As one of the first further detailed classifications of social cohesion, Berger-Schmitt 
conceptualizes social cohesion as a part of the quality of life in political, economic, 
and social spaces of daily life and evaluates its existence through social relations, 
interactions, and its ties with the concepts of the inequality dimension and the social 
capital dimension.56 “The strength of social relations, networks and associations; a 
sense of belonging to the same community and the ties that bind, in terms of shared 
values, a common identity and trust among members; equal opportunities; the extent 
of disparities, social cleavages and social exclusion” in a society form a base for the 
concept of social cohesion.57 While Berger-Schmitt emphasizes the role of social 
capital in the concept of social cohesion, she designates three different dimensions, 
which are: 1) social relations and activities within primary social groups and 
associations; 2) quality of social relations in terms of shared values, feelings of 
affiliation, solidarity and trust; and 3) quality of institutions in terms of their 
functioning, efficiency, reliability, credibility and stability.58 In the case of the non-
existence of one or several of these dimensions, the effect of social exclusion as an 
inverse concept of social cohesion increases. From the point of the European Union, 
                                                 
55 Adrian Favell, “Integration and Nations: The Nation-State and Research on Immigrants in Western 
Europe,” in Selected Studies in International Migration and Immigrant Incorporation, ed. Marco 
Martiniello and Jan Rath, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010, 373. 
56 Regina Berger-Schmitt, op. cit. 403. 
57 Ibid. 406. 
58 Ibid. 409-411. 
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even if social exclusion is mostly understood from the economic perspective, such as 
the unfair distribution of income, it also points out that it is in the “multidimensional 
nature of the mechanisms that individuals and groups are excluded from taking part 
in the social exchanges.”59 Like social cohesion, the term social exclusion has strong 
ties with economy. 
In another study, Chan asserts that social cohesion is an ever-changing concept, 
which varies according to people (decision makers, policy analysis’s, and scholars), 
conditions, time, and dominating problems.60 If a problem arises from ethnic conflict, 
policy makers try to provide social cohesion by adapting institutions to create a 
living space enabling cohabitation. Nonetheless, if the problem is based on an unfair 
distribution of income, they take measures towards overcoming this problem. For 
Chan, a decent definition for social cohesion is: “Social cohesion is a state of affairs 
concerning both the vertical and the horizontal interactions among members of 
society as characterized by a set of attitudes and norms that includes trust, a sense of 
belonging, and the willingness to participate and help, as well as their behavioral 
manifestations.”61 Chan’s definition’s distinction from the others is the creation of 
vertical and horizontal levels for actors of social cohesion. Chan clarifies these actors 
with the vertical line refering to the relationship between state and society and the 
horizontal line referring to communication among different individuals and groups in 
society.62 As aforementioned, in the case of Central Anatolian Kurds, Chan’s 
distinction of actors according to their interactions is quite useful, because of its 
contribution for handling the subject not only on a state-society level, but also on the 
individual and group level. When examined more closely, the perception of Chan’s 
dependence on social cohesion classifies the term according to its objectivity and 
subjectivity as well as its units of actors. While objectivity indicates that components 
of social cohesion, such as “people’s actual participation,” “cooperation,” and 
“helping behavior,” can be measured, subjectivity refers to more concrete elements, 
such as feelings of trust, a sense of belonging and the willingness to help.63 Chan’s 
                                                 
59 Andrea Brandolini, On Applying Synthetic Indices of Multidimensional Well Being: Health and 
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60 Joseph Chan, Ho-Pong To and Elaine Chan, “Reconsidering Social Cohesion: Developing a 
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274. 
61 Joseph Chan, Ho-Pong To and Elaine Chan, op. cit. 290. 
62 Ibid. 290. 
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classification dependent on both the unity of actors and subjectivity/objectivity is 
classified as follows: 
Table 2.2. : Measuring social cohesion: a two-by-two framework64 (Chan’s 
classification) 
 Subjective component 
(People’s state of mind) 
Objective component 
(Behavioural 
manifestations) 
Horizontal dimension 
(Cohesion within 
civil society) 
 
 
 
 
 
Vertical dimension 
(State-citizen cohesion) 
 
 
-General trust with 
fellow citizens 
-Willingness to cooperate 
and help fellow citizens, 
including those from 
“other” social groups 
-Sense of belonging 
or identity 
-Trust in public figures 
-Confidence in political 
and other major social 
institutions 
-Social participation and 
vibrancy of civil society 
-Voluntarism and 
donations 
 
-Presence or absence of 
major inter-group 
alliances or cleavages 
-Political participation 
(e.g. voting, political 
parties etc.) 
 
The complexity of Chan’s classification arises from the complication, concretization 
and measurement of terms such as ‘trust,’ ‘willingness,’ ‘sense of belonging,’ 
‘identity,’ ‘voluntarism,’ and so on. Chan also is aware of this complexity and gives 
sample questions to measure social cohesion in both horizontal and vertical 
dimensions. Furthermore, Chan reveals that vertical measurement of social cohesion 
is easier than in the horizontal dimension due to the convenience of asking direct 
questions such as: “How much trust or confidence do you have with the following 
personalities and institutions;” “How often did you participate in signing petitions, 
strikes, demonstrations;” or “How often did you vote in legislative council and local 
council elections?”65 However, it is much more difficult to calculate trust, 
                                                 
64 Joseph Chan, Ho-Pong To and Elaine Chan, op. cit. 294.  
65 Ibid. 297.  
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willingness to cooperate and help, and sense of belonging or identity by asking 
simple and direct questions. Because of this, a methodology of observations, in-depth 
interviews and detailed research are required to gather reliable information. Chan 
points out another complicated issue in the measurement of social cohesion: Does the 
existence of trust, willingness, sense of belonging and other elements in a society 
refer to the presence of social cohesion? According to Chan, more important than the 
existence of these elements is that they provide inter-ethnic social ties, which means 
social cohesion. If these elements are effective just within ethnic groups and do not 
contribute to inter-ethnic relations, it is hard to speak of social cohesion.66 
Elaborating on Chan’s classification of vertical/horizontal dimensions requires 
concentration on the quality of questions that should be asked for an evaluation of 
social cohesion within state-society and civil society. In this context, Kearns and 
Forrest’s evaluations on social cohesion that focus on functions of the neighborhood 
in relationship between social cohesion and social capital present valuable 
information. In their classification, social cohesion is composed of five domains: 
common values and a civic culture; social order and social control; social solidarity 
and reductions in wealth disparities; social networks and social capital; and place 
attachment and identity.67 Each of these domains has sub-domains intending to 
determine how strong social cohesion is in a society. Differently from Chan, Kearns 
and Forrest do not classify in terms of units of actors. Their methodology is based on 
just elements of social cohesion. This concentration gives them an opportunity for 
the elaboration of abstract concepts such as: 
Table 2.3. : The domains of social capital and appropriate neighbourhood policies to 
support them68 
Domain Description Local Policies 
Empowerment 
 
 
 
That people feel they have a voice 
which is listened to, are involved in  
Providing support to 
commu- nity groups; giving 
local people  
 
                                                 
66 Ibid. 292. 
67 Ray Forrest and Ade Kearns, “Social Cohesion, Social Capital and the Neighbourhood,” Urban 
Studies 38 (2001): 2130. 
68 Ray Forrest and Ade Kearns, op. cit. 2141. 
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Table 2.3. : continued 
 
 
 
Participation 
 
 
 
 
Associational activity and 
common purpose 
 
 
 
Supporting networks and  
Reciprocity 
 
 
 
 
 
Collective norms and values 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Trust 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Safety 
 
 
 
 
 
Belonging 
 processes that affect them; 
can themselves take action to 
initiate changes 
 
That people take part in social and 
community activities; local events 
occur and are well attended 
That people co-operate with one 
another through the formation of 
formal and informal groups to 
further their interests 
That individuals and organisations 
co-operate to support one another 
for either mutual or one-sided 
gain; an expectation that help 
would be given to or received 
from others when needed 
That people share common  
values and norms of behaviour 
 
 
 
 
That people feel they can trust 
their co-residents and local 
organisations responsible for 
governing or serving their area 
 
 
 
That people feel safe in their 
neighbourhood and are not 
restricted in their use of public 
space by fear 
 
 
That people feel connected to their 
co-residents, their home  
area, have a sense of belonging to 
place  
the place and its people 
‘voice’; helping to provide 
 solutions to problems; giving 
local people a role in policy 
processes 
Establishing and/or supporting 
local activities and local 
organisations; 
publicising local events 
 
Developing and supporting 
networks between  
organisations in the area 
 
Organisations which develop 
ideas of community support; 
good neighbour award schemes 
 
 
 
Developing and promulgating an 
ethos which residents recognize 
and accept; securing harmonious 
social relations; promoting 
community interests 
 
Encouraging trust in their 
relationships with each other; 
delivering on policy promises; 
bringing conflicting groups 
together 
 
Encouraging a sense of safety in 
residents; involvement in local 
crime 
prevention; providing visible 
evidence of security measures 
Creating, developing and/or 
supporting a sense of belonging 
in residents; 
boosting the identity of a place 
via design, street furnishings, 
naming 
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While Kearns and Forrest give details about the domains of social cohesion, they 
come to this conclusion by looking at social cohesion in small areas like 
neighborhoods. They used results of a survey on neighborhoods in West-Central 
Scotland and Britain to test their classification’s result. The distinctive feature of 
their work arises from their suggestions of providing social cohesion in local areas. 
They believe these local areas could be experimental fields for large-scale 
implementations. Social cohesion of poor people in poor urban neighborhoods is a 
suitable example for politically, economically, and culturally disadvantaged and 
excluded groups and individuals. Because for Kearns and Forrest, investigating 
macro processes for social cohesion may fail to notice social cohesion in daily life 
practices and micro areas.69 Actually, there are some works using quantitative 
methods for calculating social cohesion and exclusion in macro areas, such as the EU 
member countries. However, works based on the results of surveys regarding 
household income and living conditions could not measure social cohesion in socio-
cultural areas.70 Looking through social phenomenons especially in restricted areas 
requires more than results of surveys and undetailed interviews. In this case, Kearns’ 
classification of domains belonging to social cohesion and advice regarding 
providing social cohesion in local areas is quite useful to examine the social cohesion 
of the Kurdish population in Central Anatolia, especially with regards to institutional 
cohesion and trust.  
Chan’s classification depending on the unit of actors and Kearns and Forrest’s 
concept considering domains of social cohesion in local areas allow for preparing a 
framework to investigate the social cohesion of Central Anatolian Kurds. However, 
additional research comprehends the main aspects of social cohesion and classifies 
them in a more systematic way. Jenson’s definition of social cohesion according to 
five dimensions tries to establish a framework for major interrelations, both at the 
state-society level as well as regarding individual and group relations. That is why 
Jenson’s classification can be implemented at both the macro and micro levels. 
Jenson’s five dimensions are given as follows: 
                                                 
69 Ray Forrest and Ade Kearns, op. cit. 2128. 
70 See Christopher T. Whelan and Bertrand Maître. “Vulnerability and Multiple Deprivation 
Perspectives on Economic Exclusion in Europe: A Latent Class Analysis,” European Societies 7 
(2005): pp. 423-450. 
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1. Belonging vs. isolation: This dimension is related to shared values and a 
sense of identity that allows people to feel committed. 
 
2. Inclusion vs. exclusion: This dimension is related to economic institutions 
and especially one central institution of modern societies, the market. 
 
3. Participation vs. non-involvement: This dimension is related to joining 
political actions, such as advocacy groups, political parties, unions, and governments. 
 
4. Recognition vs. rejection: This dimension is related to citizens’ feeling that 
others accept them, and recognize their contributions. 
 
5. Legitimacy vs. illegitimacy: This dimension is related to the existence of 
formal or informal, public or private institutions acting as mediators.71 
 
Interestingly, Jenson’s detailed five dimensional classification indicates social 
cohesion and exclusion together in the same context. The absence of the above-
mentioned elements suggests social exclusion in that specific unit of examination. 
For Jenson, both social cohesion and exclusion are terms related to each other, but 
powerful dominance of either does not imply the absolute absence of the other one.  
Regarding this point, Jenson considered whether too much concentration on social 
cohesion may create an exclusive atmosphere in which inclusion might refer to 
exclusion.72 For both terms, extremism may create a complication for either cohesion 
or exclusion. Jenson’s classification substantially insists that social 
cohesion/exclusion are not ill-defined terms and that their context differs according 
to conditions such as time, place, and actors. Because of this, while some conditions 
are determinative of social cohesion/exclusion, both social cohesion/exclusion can be 
determinative on the environment. In other words, social cohesion can be both a 
dependent and an independent variable that changes according to conditions: 
 
 
                                                 
71 Please see Jane Jenson, Mapping Social Cohesion: The State of Canadian Research (Ottowa: CPRN 
Study, 1998). 
72 Regina Berger-Schmitt, op.cit. 406. 
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VARIOUS FACTORS                                                                    SOCIAL 
COHESION 
 
                                                          Factors such as: 
                                               globalization and new technologies 
                                                              diversity 
                                                            community 
 
 
SOCIAL COHESION                                                                        VARIOUS 
OUTCOMES 
                                                        Outcomes such as: 
                                        economic performance and well-being 
                                                                 health 
                           participation rates and legitimacy of democratic institutions 
Figure 2.1. : Social Cohesion as a Cause and Effect73 
 
There are some other scholars who share the same opinion with Jenson’s thoughts 
claiming social cohesion both as a reason and a cause. Lars Osberg investigates the 
relation between economic processes such as health, the well being of children, 
macroeconomic performance, voluntary activity, and the role of community 
institutions, investment and regional development. He claims a virtuous circle 
between economic processes and social cohesion: 
If societies with more social cohesion are able to produce more, that additional output will make 
it easier to resolve distributional conflicts, and a “virtuous circle” or positive feedback loop of 
more cohesion / more cooperation / more output / more cohesion may become established. 
Conversely, the economic costs to less social cohesion and less cooperation will mean there is 
less total output to share, which will tend to heighten distributional conflict and may set up a 
“vicious circle” in which lower output reinforces lower cohesion.74 
A two-sided relationship network between economic processes and social cohesion 
can be observed in political and cultural cohesion, too. Paul Bernard, who elaborates 
Jenson’s classification, believes that the interrelatedness of elements of social 
                                                 
73 Jane Jenson and Caroline Beauvais. Social Cohesion: Updating the State of the Research (Ottowa: 
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74 Lars Osberg, The Economic Implications of Social Cohesion (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
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cohesion provide equality, freedom, and solidarity. Because of his insistence on these 
issues, Bernard prepares a new classification based on Jenson’s five dimensions of 
social cohesion, but adds a sixth dimension, equality/inequality, which, according to 
him, is absent in Jenson’s classification. 
Table 2.4. : Typology of the dimensions of social cohesion75 
Character of the relation 
Spheres of activity 
Formal Substantial 
Economic  (2) Insertion / Exclusion (6) Equality / Inequality 
Political (5) Legitimacy/ 
Illegitimacy 
(3) Participation / 
Passivity 
Sociocultural (4) Recognition / 
Rejection 
(1) Belonging / Isolation 
 
More than adding a new dimension to Jenson’s classification, Bernard categorizes 
these dimensions into three spheres of activities according to their formal or 
substantial characters nearly the same as Chan’s objective/subjective categorization 
aforementioned. Bernard also claims indefiniteness of social cohesion depending on 
its changing characteristics. For him, social cohesion is a hybrid quasi-concept, based 
on its two-faced concept: 
I say hybrid because these constructions have two faces: they are, on the one hand, based, in part 
and selectively, on an analysis of the data of the situation, which allows them to be relatively 
realistic and to benefit from the aura of legitimacy conferred by the scientific method; and they 
maintain, on the other hand, a vagueness that makes them adaptable to various situations, 
flexible enough to follow the meanderings and necessities of political actions from day to day.76 
While Bernard insists on the relativity and flexibility of social cohesion, he also sees 
three major issues - equality, freedom, and solidarity - as minimum requirements for 
the constitution of social cohesion. Prescription of a cyclical relation among these 
three issues causes “unipolar distortion” when one of these three units does not 
function. Uniformity, enforcement and tyranny can emerge in the case of the absence 
of one of these issues.77 For example, unlimited freedom that is not balanced by 
equality and solidarity creates unipolar distortion, especially in economic areas. 
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Nonetheless, contradictorily, these issues can damage each other if they are not 
balanced. Liberty can threaten equality, and as a result of it solidarity in personal 
relations can be harmed.78 Moreover, uncontrolled equality can turn liberty into 
uniformity and create an atmosphere disadvantaged for solidarity. Thus, a “golden 
proportion” for each of these elements is required for providing social cohesion. 
In the case that two of these elements are dominant together, the absence of the third 
element results. Bernard classifies this situation in three dimensions. The first 
dimension is the liberty-equality axis, called ‘inclusive democracy,’ the second is the 
equality-solidarity axis, called ‘participatory democracy,’ and the third one is the 
liberty-solidarity axis, called ‘pluralistic democracy.’79 Inclusive democracy 
indicates a welfare state. Even if there is a free market and equal opportunities for 
everyone, there is no solidarity among individuals and groups. Inclusive democracy, 
in that case, “always lives under the threat of a race to the bottom insofar as more 
deregulated countries, and the United States in particular, exert fiscal pressure on 
their competitors in an increasingly globalized market.”80 When it comes to 
participatory democracy, even if equality-solidarity is common as in Scandinavian 
countries, there is tension between these two poles, such as the continuum of a 
gender-based segmentation of the labor market arising from family policies 
promoting children’s education. For Bernard, pluralistic democracy is the ideal 
option because of the function of solidarity in neoliberal societies in eliminating 
inequality. Cultural diversity - an increasingly unavoidable reality of modern times - 
should be taken into consideration and it can succeed in pluralistic democracy. 
Additionally, “exalting solidarity while focusing on respect for differences and 
failing to call on the State to implement social rights, common to all citizens, can 
only lead in one direction: that the responsibility for each community's welfare be 
taken on by its members and their relations.”81 The balance between the two 
elements is conceptualized as “fragile bipolar equilibria.” Even if this concept 
presents a healthy environment in the case of social cohesion, a balanced relation 
between all three dimensions is required for social cohesion to function without a 
problem. 
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For the case of CAK, Bernard’s classification based on Jenson’s five dimensional 
categorizations is quite useful to obtain sound results. For the purpose of this study, 
despite Bernard’s multi-dimensional classification, the categorization of the 
theoretical framework is only put into practice for three dimensions due to the desire 
to examine cohesion in just social, cultural, and political areas. The framework that 
will be the basis of this study for examining the social cohesion of CAK is classified 
into the following three categories: 
A. Recognition / Rejection: This dimension refers to whether existing social 
relations, experiences, and feelings in an environment depend on tolerance and 
respect for diversity. Recognition requires interaction between different social groups 
without destruction of aspects making them different from each other, as in the case 
of belonging to a particular ethnic, religious or cultural community and having active 
dialogue. It requires mutual relations and interactions to not become assimilative. 
Solidarity among people from the neighborhood or region; the existence of relations 
exceeding religion/ethnicity/class, such as friendship, marriage or cooperation; the 
presence of multiculturalism; and an absence of discrimination are major domains 
showing the existence of either recognition or rejection. 
B. Belonging / Isolation: This dimension refers to shared values and a sense of 
identity between different social groups and individuals that create engagement and 
feeling safe in relations. Developing shared values without losing identity among 
different religion/ethnicity/class is required for having a sense of belonging. Also, a 
feeling of being part of the same community on an equal level with other elements 
while at the same time protecting social bonds with one’s own groups - such as 
ethnic identity and language - is necessary to the dimension of belonging. Otherwise, 
the situation can result in the isolation of different groups from the society without 
developing common values. 
C. Legitimacy/ Illegitimacy: This dimension refers to whether existing public and 
private institutions provide satisfactory democracy and equal services for different 
social groups without discriminating against anyone. The right to use political and 
institutional rights; trust in political parties, public systems (education, social 
security, health, judicial, etc.), local institutions (municipalities, governorships), and 
other organizational structures; participation in social organizations (membership in 
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NGOs, etc.); and participation in political organizations (membership in industrial 
unions, political parties, trade bodies, etc.) implies whether there is legitimacy to 
provide an atmosphere that paves the way for social cohesion. 
        The framework of this study will be formed within the context of the 
abovementioned three dimensions to aid in the examination of patterns in the 
political, social and cultural lives of CAK and how these patterns and CAK' ethnic 
contours are impacted by surrounding influences of Turkishness. In light of these 
three dimensions, the possibilities and limitations of being a Kurd in CA will be 
observed. 
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CHAPTER III 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF CENTRAL ANATOLIAN KURDS 
 
 A close examination of the established relations between Kurds in CA with 
administrative and other groups in the region enables the examination of patterns in 
the social, cultural, and political life of CAK within the context of their cohesion 
with or exclusion from administrative units as well as other groups in the region. An 
overview of how these dimensions of relationships were established is necessary to 
understand current dynamics shaping the structure of the region in the case of Kurds. 
Thus, the effects of settlement policy on the population structure and geography 
might be one of the most prominent dimensions that will be closely examined. At 
this point, it can be understood from the historical background of CAK that 
especially by the 15th century the administration tried to form mechanisms aimed to 
centralize governmental units throughout the Empire; uncontrolled Kurdish tribes in 
the region were also affected by this policy. Nonetheless, the Celali Rebellions 
paradoxically caused chaos and this lack of control made way for decentralization 
that lasted approximately two centuries. Additionally, the population structure of the 
region showed a change in every period because of dominating new dimensions will 
be held in detail. Especially by the 19th century, the administration used more 
organized and effective tools during the settlement of CAK and other new groups 
coming to the region such as Tartars, Circassians, and Balkan immigrants. In other 
words, the population structure fundamentally changed under totally different 
dimensions. Therefore, the administration needed more organized tools such as laws, 
regulations, and codes to implement a systematic settlement policy. During the CUP 
administration and following the Republican period, this systematic settlement policy 
turned into a kind of social engineering process. All of these processes will be useful 
to understand elements shaping structure of the region today. 
3.1. Where is the Central Anatolian Region? 
The region mostly described as “Inner Anatolia,” “Central Anatolia,”, and  “Western 
Anatolia”  throughout history was not entitled with a specific name in the official 
Ottoman administration system. Ottomans classified its territory as the Rumeli and 
38 
 
Anadolu provinces (beylerbeyliği). In 1362, Edirne was announced as the capital of 
Rumeli. Subsequently, in 1391, Ankara was declared the center of the Anatolian 
region.82 These provinces were governed with a similar division of power. The sultan 
appointed a governor (beylerbeyi) who had administrative power and the kadi (kadi) 
represented legitimate power. As newly-formed provinces were established, the 
boundaries of the state expanded. By the end of the 16th century, the number of 
provinces reached thirty-two.83 Furthermore, sanjacks (sancak), smaller 
governmental units forming provinces, could be transformed into new provinces. 
Ankara is one such example of a sanjack that later became a province. After its 
establishment as the center of the Anatolian province, it was announced a sanjack in 
1461. By 1841, it was conditioned as a new province.84 
With the expansion of lands and the increase in population, the CA region hosted 
important provinces. The frequently changing structure of the Ottoman territories’ 
borders caused alterations in administrative units, too. In the 16th century, CA 
consisted of six provinces: Kara-Hisâr-ı Sâhib, Kangırı, Ankara, Bolu, Kastamonu, 
and Karaman.85 Each of these provinces was composed of 5 to 24 sanjacks and was 
responsible for paying taxes and providing military service. In the Republican Era, 
the boundaries of CA were specified as a geographical unit and named ‘Inner 
Anatolia’ in 1941.86 Nonetheless, the categorization of these geographical regions 
did not result in the formation of strict administrative units. For instance, some 
districts belonging to Ankara, Çankırı and Çorum in administrative issues are instead 
part of the Black Sea region.87 Moreover, uncertainty of the Ottoman provinces’ 
                                                 
82 Tahir Sezen, Osmanlı Yer Adları  (Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 
2006), preface. 
83 Halil İnalcık, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu: Klasik Çağ (1300-1600) (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 
2003), 109.  
84 Tahir Sezen, op.cit., p. 29. 
85 Enver Çakar, “Kanuni Sultan Süleyman Kanunnamesine Göre 1522 Yılında Osmanlı 
İmparatorluğu’nun İdari Taksimatı,”Fırat Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi 12 (2002): 272-274. 
The following provinces consisted of sanjacks: Kara-Hisâr-ı Sâhib: Kaza-i Kara-Hisâr: Sandıklu-
Bolvadin- Şühûd- Oynaş-Yarçınlu, Kangırı: Kaza-i Kangırı: Tosya-Kargu-Mîlân-Kurşunlu-Çerkeş-
Koç-Hisâr-Karı-Bazarı-Kal‘acık, Ankara: Kaza-i Ankara: Ayaş-Çubuk-Yaban-Âbâd-Bacı –Yörük-
Murtâza-Âbâd, Bolu: Kaza-i Bolu: Mudurnu-Kıbrûz-Konrapa-Mengen-Mendirekli-Yörük -Yörük-i 
Bolu ma‘a-Çeharşenbih-Gerede-Cağa-Taraklu-Borlu-Amasra-Viranşehir -Aklağan Yenicesi-Yorunes, 
Kastamonu: Kaza-i Kastamonu-Sinob-Boy-Âbâd-Turhân-Taş Köprü-Küre –Tatay-Arâc-Hoş-Alây-
Göl-Yörük- Ayandon, Vilâyet-i Karaman: Kaza-i Konya-Larende-Niğde-Ereğli-Kayseriyye-Kara-
Hisârcıklu-Ak Saray-Kuş Hisâr-Gülnâr- Ak Şehir-İshaklu-Virân Beğ- Ilgun-Seydi Şehri-Ermenâk-
Çimen ili- Mût-Orta Köy-Ürgüb- Karı Taş- Eski il- Turgud ili-Zengicek- Ala Dağ-Anduğu 
86 Ali Özçağlar, “Türkiye’de Yapılan Bölge Ayrımları ve Bölge Planlama Üzerindeki Etkileri,” 
Coğrafi Bilimler Dergisi 1 (2003): 12. 
87 Ibid. 14.  
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borders made it difficult to strictly classify territories as regions. Thus, the regions’ 
borders during the Empire and Republican era are not obvious due to differences in 
administrative and geographical classification. With an examination of the Kurdish 
population in CA, this work will refer to the main settlement areas of this group 
during the Ottoman and Republican periods. The area mainly includes Ankara, 
Kırşehir, Konya, Kayseri, Yozgat, Aksaray and Nevşehir. 
 
Map 3.1. : Settlement areas in CA (Today)88 
3.2. The Roots of the Kurdish Population in Central Anatolia 
The first presence of the Kurdish population in CA is cited as occurring in different 
periods according to different archival documents. According to some researchers 
working on the causes of migration to Anatolia, the first Kurdish migration wave to 
CA arose from a need for Kurds to leave their living areas due to the effects of wars 
                                                 
88 Suat Dede, “From Nomadism to Sedentary Life in Central Anatolia: The Case of Rişvan 
Tribe:1830-1932” (Master Thesis, İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University Department of History, 2011), 
43. 
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in the 11th century. Like Turks, Kurds came to the Anatolian region from Kurdistan 
and Khorasan at the same period.  As a result of the first Kurdish migrations, 
‘Germiyanoğulları Seigniory’ was established.89   Ibni Batuta’s Vakayiname is one of 
the documents supporting the argument claiming Germiyanoğulları as a Kurdish 
seigniory and proving its Kurdishness.90 In mentioning the Sultan of Anatolian 
Seljucks’ use of people of different seigniories to repress the uprisings of Turks, such 
as the Baba Ishak Rebellion, Batuta refers to these seigniories as consisting of “Turks 
and Germiyans.” Thus, this can be considered an argument that the seigniories 
consisted of Kurds as well, if they were not all Turks. However, it is clear that there 
should be some other evidence showing Kurdishness of the Germiyanoğulları 
Seigniory. Germiyanoğulları, settled first in Malatya and then Kütahya, was used 
during the struggle between Seljuk’s and Moghuls to protect the borders of Western 
Anatolia. During the Moghul Invasions, while Turks migrated to the center of 
Western Anatolia, it is understood from some memories belonging to that period that 
Kurds also migrated to this region.91 Even if the Kurdishness of Germiyans is not 
clear, it can be assumed that there were some kinds of individual Kurdish settlements 
in Western Anatolia during the Moghul invasions. Thus, the first Kurdish presence of 
the region can be traced back to the 11th century. 
The first official proven presence of a Kurdish population in the region occurred in 
1463, as evident in the oldest document about Kurdish villages that were formed 
under the Sultanate of Mehmet the Conqueror.92 The Cadastral Document Book of 
Ankara’s Shires dated H. 867 (AD.1463) provides valuable information about the 
administrative units of Ankara at that time. The Sanjack of Ankara consisted of 11 
administrative districts93 and Yaban Ovası, later called Yabanabad, was one of these 
districts. Today, Yabanabad district refers to the region between Kızılcahamam and 
                                                 
89 Claude Cahen, op. cit. 283. 
90 V. Gordlevski, Anadolu Selçuklu Devleti (Ankara: Onur Yayınları, 1988), 272. 
91 Rohat Alakom, Orta Anadolu Kürtleri (İstanbul: Evrensel Basım Yayın, 2004), 32. 
92 Emine Erdoğan, “Ankara‘nın Bütüncül Tarihi Çerçevesinde Ankara Tahrir Defterleri‘nin Analizi” 
(PHD Dissertation, Gazi Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2004), 24. According to the author, 
the first official document from Murat I about Ankara cannot be found in the archives. Thus, we 
cannot know whether there was a Kurdish village before 1463 or not. 
93 Ahmet Nezihi Turan, Yabanabad Tarihini Ararken (Kızılcahamam-Çamlıdere): XV. Yüzyıldan XIX. 
Yüzyıla Bir Genel Tasvir ve Tahlil Denemesi (Ankara: Kızılcahamam Belediyesi Yayınları, 1999), 24.  
In 1463, these districts were called taallukat or vilayet. In 1523, they were re-organized and called 
kaza. In 1463, the districts of Ankara were Bacı, Çubuk, Kasaba, Karacabey, Mürted Ova, Binari İli, 
Yaban Ovası, Şorva, Mudrıb, Uruş, and Ayaş.  
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Çamlıdere.94 According to this cadastral document, there were two Kurdish 
populated villages named “Kürtler Köyü” and “Kuzköy” within the boundaries of 
Yabanabad district in 1463. The Kurdishness of these villages can be comprehended 
from the expression in the cadastral document book: “Kürtler and Kuzköy villages, 
consisted of Kurdish population.”95 Thus, the official historical presence of the 
Kurdish population in the region can be dated to the 15th century. 
It is obvious that there could have also been other Kurdish settlements in CA during 
the 15th century. However, there is confusion about whether the title of Kurds refers 
to the Kurdishness of these villages or not. Some sources classifying ethnic groups in 
Turkey in different periods categorize some tribes and communities as Turks even 
though they bear the name of Kurd and speaking Kurdish.96  However, during this 
study it should be taken into consideration that the non-existence of Kurdish 
ethnicity was one of the main arguments for a Turkish state after its foundation. 
Evidence of this argument was circulated through some institutions and can be seen 
in some academic works. Thus, these kinds of classifications were not always 
prepared according to objective criteria. From the official document from 1463, the 
Kurdishness of these two villages in CA can be ensured. In addition to these two, 
there were also some other villages carrying the name of Kurds in that era. These 
villages were: 
 
                                                 
94 Ahmet Nezihi Turan, ıbid. 24. 
95 “Kürtler ve Kuzköy, karye-i mezkurenin ehli Kürtlerdir” Both Ahmet Nezihi Turan and Rohat 
Alakom take Kürtler Köyü as a unique example of the Kurdish population according to this data. 
Nonetheless, it is obvious that Kuzköy is also a Kurdish village. Probably, they bring Kürtler village 
in the forefront because of its name. Ahmet Nezihi Turan, ıbid., p.  93; Rohat Alakom, op.cit.,, p. 35. 
However, while Turan includes the transcription of Ottoman archival documents from  AD 1463, 
1523-30 and 1571/72, he gives the names of these villages as Kürtler-Kuzköy. (p.138) Thus, these 
villages could be the same. 
96 One of the best examples of this confusion can be seen in Cevdet Türkay’s work titled Osmanlı 
İmparatorluğu’nda Oymak, Aşiret ve Cemaatler. He classifies tribes such as Kürdî-i Kebîr, 
Kürdikânlu, Kürd Mehmedlü, Kurmanc, and Kürtkânlu as Turcomans. (113). The same situation can 
be seen in some other documents, such as Cengiz Orhonlu’s work Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda 
Aşiretlerin İskanı. He considers Karaca-Kürd and Kürdilî-Kebir troops as Turcomans in Sivas (71) 
Kürd Mehmedlü and Karaca-Kürd groups are also classified as Turcomans in XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı 
İmparatorluğu’nda Aşiretlerin Yerleştirilmesi by Yusuf Halaçoğlu (76). As a field survey, Avni 
Candar’s Memleket Tetkikleri: Ankara’dan Kırşehir’e categorizes them as Turkish tribes (30). Both 
Cengiz Orhonlu and Yusuf Halaçoğlu used Cevdat Türkay’s classification based on Ottoman archival 
sources.  Orhonlu classified the population of Anatolia as Yuruks, Arabs, Turcomans, Turcoman-
Ekrads, Nomadic Ekrads, Persian Ekrads, and Circassians. However, showing Kurdish tribes as 
Turkish ones was a general tendency in the Republican era; please see İsmail Beşikçi, Doğuda 
Değişim ve Yapısal Sorunla (Göçebe Alikan Aşireti) (Ankara: Doğan Yayınevi, 1969) 
42 
 
The Year of Cadastral Document Book     Name of the Village       Place 
1463                                                            Kürtler Köyü                  Yabanabad 
1466                                                            Kürtler Köyü                   Beyşehir 
1476                                                            Kürtler Köyü                   Aksaray 
1584                                                            Kürtler Köyü                   Larenda: 
Karaman 
1584                                                            Kürtler Köyü                   Akşehir97 
As is seen in official documents and secondary sources interpreting data from these 
original documents, the reasons for the first Kurdish settlements in the region are not 
clearly evident. Even if there is some information about the existence of Kurdish 
populations and some of their areas of residence, as stated above, their settlement 
process in the region before the 16th century cannot be analyzed due to a lack of 
required data. However, as far as it is interpreted, the first settlements seem to be the 
result of migration waves from the East because of the Moghul invasions and a 
chaotic atmosphere there. With the beginning of the 16th century, political 
developments in the Empire would then further shape settlements of Kurds in the 
region. 
3.3. Centralization vs. Decentralization: Kurdish Tribes in the 16th, 17th, and 
18th Centuries 
Understanding the causes of the state’s implementation of centralist policies and their 
results requires examining the social, economic and political changes in the Empire 
from the beginning of the 14th century. First, it should be understood that the 
Ottoman Empire tried to establish institutions of the state beginning in the 14th 
                                                 
97 Rohat Alakom gathers the names of these villages from works on cadastral document books in the 
16th century. He uses the following sources to prove the existence of the Kurdish villages he lists: 
Uske, Orta Anadolu’da İlk Kürt Yerleşim Bölgesi, internet for Beyşehir; İbrahim Hakkı Konyalı, 
Abideleri ve Kitabeleri ile Niğde-Aksaray Tarihi, vol. I-III (İstanbul, 1974), 523 for Aksaray; Osman 
Gümüşçü, XIV. Yüzyıl Larenda(Karaman) Kazasında Yerleşme ve Nüfus (Ankara: Türk Tarih 
Kurumu, 2001), 63 for Karaman; Süreyya Faruqi, Osmanlı’da Kentler ve Kentliler (İstanbul: Tarih 
Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1994), 241 for Akşehir. I checked all of these sources to see whether they are 
reliable and objective. Except the first source about Beyşehir, I controlled all of the other documents. 
Other than the first source on Beyşehir, these academic works are based on translations of archival 
documents. Thus, it is obvious that these villages holding ‘Kurd’ in their name existed. However, 
there is no information about whether they had a Kurdish population or not.  
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century. This new administrative system of the Empire aimed to accommodate new 
conditions, such as population growth and territorial expansion, as well as provide 
state authority. Before the centralization of the state, a multi-tribal structure, the 
nonexistence of land property, and a non-hierarchical system were the dominant 
elements of the state.98 The state even tried to control the mobility of population and 
finances; however, these control mechanisms aimed at achieving increased 
centralization of the state somehow instead caused decentralization of the state by 
leading to revolts and economic crisis. 
By the second half of the 14th century, the Ottoman administrative system had 
attained a centralist structure through the establishment of judgment (kadılık), timar 
and financial systems. This centralist structure of the state took its final form during 
the sultanate of Mehmed the Conqueror.99 The state officials aimed to control 
decentralist elements in the borders of the Empire, of which tribes were one of the 
most prominent examples. Starting with Mehmed II, efforts were made to adopt 
leaders of tribes into regional administrative systems by giving them responsibilities 
as administrators. Kurdish tribes also took part in this policy. For example, leaders of 
Kurdish tribes on the border between the Empire and Dulkadir Principality were 
appointed as sanjack beyi, but some of them had tax exemption.100 This means that 
even if the state officials tried to control these Kurdish tribes, they still lived in an 
autonomous system. Their responsibility to the state required only the provision of 
soldiers. That is why these sanjacks were called hükümet.101 It can be interpreted that 
while the state tried to establish a centralist structure, the Kurdish tribes were still 
beyond the reach of this policy in the Eastern part of the Empire. Nonetheless, Kurds 
in CA were affected by the centralist policies of the state during that era. From this 
point, we can assume that the state shaped the confines of this policy guardedly and 
tried to prevent any negative effects of the policy.  
At this point, the settlement policy of the Empire became more of an issue related to 
understanding the settlement of Kurdish tribes in Anatolia. Settlement policy and 
                                                 
98 Kemal Karpat, Osmanlı Nüfusu 1830-1914 (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2003), 12. 
99 Halil İnalcık, “Türk-İslam Devletlerinde Devlet- Kanun Geleneği,” İslamiyat 4 (1998): 31.  
According to Halil İnalcık, the centralization of the state extends until the period of Orhan I. He 
established regulations for collecting taxes. Thus, efforts for  centralization of the state can be seen as 
existing nearly from the foundation of the Empire.  
100 Yaşar Yücel, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Desantralizasyona (Adem-i Merkeziyet) Dair Genel 
Gözlemler,” Belleten 38 (1974): 661. 
101 Ibid. 669. 
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centralization were directly related to each other and neither of them could be 
achieved without the other. It occurred sometimes in a natural way while frequently 
being put into action according to state policy. While the state was being established, 
individuals - mostly dervishes - colonized free spaces while migrating to the West 
and these migration waves resulted in newly established residential areas. As a state 
dependent on agricultural activities, it was very important for the Empire to ensure 
the continuance of agricultural production. Additionally, forced migrations to newly 
established areas contributed to the economic growth and Islamization of these 
regions.102 By the 18th century, the state more professionally implemented the 
settlement policy and formed a framework for the settlement of different groups. 
CAK and their living areas also were affected by it.  
The state’s main motivations to implement this policy for these groups resulted from 
concerns about probable conflict between these groups and growing states with 
boundaries that were extending day by day. New state regulations during the 
transition from the state to the Empire needed immediate adaptation to the new 
structure. Nomadic groups and tribes used to live in unrestrained conditions and state 
authority could not be enforced among them because of their traditional life styles. 
Recently conquered lands suitable for agricultural activities were considered 
appropriate to adopt for sedentary life.103 
Understanding the main motivations of the settlement policy requires closely 
examining the dominating political atmosphere of the era. In the Ottoman case, the 
16th century was the century of long and successive wars. These wars forced 
officials to concentrate on emerging developments beyond their borders. Responsible 
for paying taxes to cover the expenses of wars, the people of the Anatolian region 
suffered from economic crises. One of the impacts of the economic crises was the 
new emergence of uprisings in Anatolia at the beginning of the 16th century. The 
uprisings, called the Celali Rebellions, subsequently shaped the internal structure of 
the Ottoman Empire for almost two centuries. While the state was expanding its 
borders across Europe and the East, these rebellions forced the state to deal with 
internal problems at the same time. These rebellions caused the state to lose time in 
                                                 
102 Ömer Lütfi Barkan, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Bir İskân ve Kolonizasyon Metodu Olarak 
Sürgünler,” İÜİFM 11 (1951): 530. 
103 Cengiz Orhonlu, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Asiretlerin İskâni (İstanbul: Eren Yayıncılık ve 
Kitapçılık, 1987), 39-47. 
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implementing centralist policies throughout the Ottoman territories. While the 
Empire tried to centralize its territorial units through the settlement of nomadic 
groups on the one hand, rebellions as a result of current conditions created exactly 
the opposite situation on the other hand.  
The Celali Rebellions first impacted Eastern Anatolia during the 16th century and 
extended its effects into CA by the end of this century.104 As a result of the economic 
crises throughout the Empire, bandits and individual eskiyas became dominant in 
Central and other parts of Anatolia. While the Empire tried to control these bandits, 
they continued to be very effective for almost two subsequent centuries. These 
bandits mostly consisted of armed people who were supported at first by the Empire 
due to the probability of these groups’ positive contribution to maintaining control of 
Anatolia. However, the gun was pointed at the wrong target, and these groups instead 
harmed order in Anatolia.105 CA was one of the regions in which these groups were 
active in almost all parts. For example, in the province of Ankara there were some 
prominent bandits such as Sarı Handan, Şah Bey, Hersekoğlu Ahmed, Abdi, 
Mehmed, Budak, Yardım, Sarı Memi, Hasan Kethuda and Cıldanoğlu in the 
beginning of the 17th century.106 These kinds of bandits were effective in other 
provinces of the regions such as Kayseri, Afyon, and Konya in the same period. 
From the most central to the smallest villages, all parts of the region were under the 
impact of the Celali Rebellions. 
These rebellions resulted not only in the delay of the centralization of the Empire, but 
also changed its economic, social, and demographic structure. While the rebellions 
throughout the Empire’s territories were continuing, the Ottoman population was in 
changing process. On the one hand, the Ottoman territories had enlarged, which had 
caused an increase in population. On the other hand, internal revolts resulted in the 
abandonment of Anatolian villages.107 Even if the abandonment of villages was 
prohibited by the state under certain regulations, people had to ignore the rules under 
such an exceptional situation. In this period, Ankara consisted of six districts: 
                                                 
104 Mustafa Akdağ, “Celali İsyanlarından Büyük Kaçgunluk 1603- 1606:  I,” Ankara Üniversitesi 
Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi 3 (1964): 11. 
105 Karen Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization (New York: 
Cornell University Press, 1997): 32. 
106 Mustafa Akdağ, op.cit. 21. 
107 Cengiz Orhonlu, op.cit. 31. 
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Kasaba, Çubuk, Murtazabad, Ayaş, Yabanabad, and Bacı.108 The Celali Revolts and 
their destruction caused the villagers of Ankara’s towns to leave their villages. For 
example, all 36 of Haymana’s villages were abandoned in the beginning of the 17th 
century.109 In total, two thirds of Central Anatolian villages were abandoned.110  As 
an emerging condition, while villages were abandoned due to a deficiency of 
economic activities, new taxes, and the increased pressures of rebels in the village, 
the center of the provinces were settled by immigrants.111 Indeed, the situation in the 
center was not very different than that in the villages; most neighbourhoods in the 
center of Ankara were burned.112 The difficulty of providing state authority in the 
center and districts forced the state officials to make new decisions. According to an 
official record dated AD 1599, tradesmen in Ankara were authorized to protect 
people against rebels.113 Thus, because of the Celali Rebellions, the authority of the 
Empire decreased throughout the lands. 
Actually, before the emerging uprisings in Anatolia, the Empire had already started 
to implement settlement policies for nomadic groups. Demographic changes in CA 
were also rooted in pressures of political power during Yavuz Sultan Selim’s 
sultanate during which Kurds in Eastern Anatolia were forced to leave their living 
spaces. The struggle between Yavuz and Shah Ismail brought the Shiah Question to 
the forefront in the 16th century. Kurdish tribes were directly impacted by Yavuz’s 
repression towards the Alewis. For example, the most populated Kurdish tribe in CA, 
the Şeyhbizin, came to the region from the East in the beginning of the 16th century 
and settled around Haymana and Konya.114 This tribe’s settlement could be the first 
                                                 
108 As Özer Ergenç indicates, Kasaba today refers to the neighbourhood of Elmadağ-Kalecik; Çubuk 
refers to the same place; Murtazabad contains the territories around Ayaş; Mürted indicates the lands 
between today’s Ayaş and Ankara; Ayaş comprises the lands between Ayaş and Beypazarı; and Bacı 
was situated around the neighbourhood of Haymana.  
109 Yusuf Halaçoğlu, 18.Yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu‟nun İskân Siyaseti ve Aşiretlerin 
Yerleştirilmesi (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 
2006): 34. 
110 Mustafa Akdağ, op.cit. 46. 
111 Yusuf Halaçoğlu, op.cit. 34 
112 Mustafa Akdağ, op.cit. 49. 
113 Yaşar Yücel, op.cit. 685. 
114 Please see Cevdet Türkay, Başbakanlık Arşivi Belgelerine göre Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Oymak 
Aşiret ve Cemaatler (İstanbul: Tercüman Yayınları, 1979). The Şeyhbizin Tribe came to CA from 
Iraq, Muş, Malazgirt, Varto, Elazığ, Palu, Erzincan, Gümüşhane, Bayburt, and Diyarbakır. Ziya 
Gökalp claims that Şeybizin Kurds were Sorani.  According to some researchers, the name of 
Şeyhbizin probably comes from Iraq’s Bazeyan region.  For more information about this tribe, please 
see Halil İbrahim Uçak, Tarih İçinde Haymana (Haymana: Haymanalılar Yardımlaşma ve Tanışma 
Derneği, 1986), 151. 
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pre-planned and far-reaching Kurdish migration to the region.115 One of the possible 
reasons for a rise in the population of the province of Ankara after the second half of 
the 16th century could be the forced settlement of tribes in CA. According to archival 
documents, at the end of the 16th century the population of Ankara province 
increased by almost 82%.116 When this information is taken together with the 
duplication of the number of houses in Haymana from 1523 to 1571, the results of 
the intense migration waves to the region can be better understood.117 
Before the settlement of the Şeybizin tribe, Haymana already had hosted a great 
number of nomadic tribes. During the 16th century, Haymana consisted of two parts 
and was called “taife” until the 19th century, when it started to be called “kaza.” Like 
the rest of the Empire, Haymana provided a living space to nomadic tribes. In the 
16th century, more than 60% of the total population of Haymana was nomadic and 
lived mostly in rural areas.118 Because of this, Haymana was the first-called “taife” in 
Ankara province and involved the biggest number of nomadic tribes.119 However, 
from cadastral documents it is also clear that Haymana was directly connected to the 
center of Ankara.  The people of Haymana belonged to the kadi of Ankara and all of 
their trials were held there.120 It means that there was still a kind of centralist 
structure. 
After the end of the Celali Revolts, the state took precautions against new uprisings 
by implementing forced settlement policies. Throughout the Empire, nomadic tribes 
were forced to adopt a sedentary life to restore order after the uprisings. Especially 
after 1691, orders from Istanbul were sent to governors of the provinces to settle 
these nomadic groups.121 These groups were settled in both existing areas and in 
empty lands. The settlement of nomadic groups had the characteristic of exile due to 
                                                 
115 Mark Sykes, “The Kurdish Tribes of the Ottoman Empire,” The Journal of The Royal 
Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 38 (1908) p. 481.  
116 Emine Erdoğan, op. cit. 2004, 107. Even if an increase in the population of Ankara province can be 
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population migrating to the region cannot be measured. For a detailed research of population change 
in Ankara during the 17th century please see: Özer Ergenç, p. 59. 
117 Ibid. 107. 
118 Ibid. 123.  
119 Emine Erdoğan, “Ankara Yörükleri: 1463, 1523/30 ve 1571 Tahrirlerine Göre,”OTAM (Ankara 
Üniversitesi Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi 18 (2005): 123. 
120 Hülya Taş, XVII. Yüzyılda Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, Ankara, 2006, p. 19. 
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the Empire’s preferred methodology.122 For instance, some Kurdish tribes, such as 
Batılu (Badıllı) and Cemkanlu, were forced to migrate from Eastern and 
Southeastern Anatolia to Rakka, a Syrian province. However, some members of 
these tribes also migrated to areas around Ankara.123 It can be assumed that these 
population movements led to changes in the traditional lifestyles of nomadic tribes 
and contributed to the migration of Kurds to CA.  
Investigating the causes of Kurdish population movements in CA requires a multi-
dimensional point of view to see the different reasons behind these movements. As it 
is told, while the Ottoman population was rising from the beginning of the 14th 
century on the one hand, the lands of the Empire were a stage for fundamental 
changes. Newly-emerging territories and agricultural areas belonging to them were 
targets of the settlement policy for economic, social, and political reasons. 
Meanwhile, rising tensions on the Anatolian side caused the internal migration of the 
Kurdish population in Central and Eastern Anatolia. When it comes to the 19th and 
20th centuries, the settlement of Kurdish populations in CA is better documented and 
more systematically implemented. 
3.4. Systematization of the Settlement Policy: 19th Century 
The 19th century is a very important period in the case of the settlement of the 
Kurdish population in CA. Actually, approximately one million Kurdish people as 
well as other groups throughout the Empire were subjects of the settlement policy 
due to continuous wars and big losses of territory, which also shaped the Empire’s 
social structure.124 Additionally, although before this century the settlement of 
Kurdish tribes was dependent on more provisional decrees and special resolutions, 
settlement was approached more systematically and professionally by introducing a 
law regarding nearly all nomadic groups in the 19th century. What is interesting in 
this century is that while the state tried to have nomadic groups adopt a sedentary 
                                                 
122 Yusuf Halaçoğlu, op.cit. 116. 
123 Ibid. 116. Even if Halaçoğlu accepts these groups as Yuruks, these groups are accepted as Kurdish 
tribes. For one of the works accepting these tribes as Kurdish ones, please see Mark Sykes’s 
aforementioned article. 
124Kemal Karpat says the Kurdish population in the Ottoman Empire was approximately 1.5 million in 
the 1880s. See Kemal Karpat, op.cit. 98. Compared with the 16 million population in Asian territories 
of the Ottoman Empire, this number is more meaningful. However, it should be kept in mind that 
population censuses in the Empire had been held according to the religion of different groups. Thus, 
these are estimated numbers.  
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life, it paradoxically also decentralized units of the Empire by empowering local 
governments.125 
The methodology of settlement policy in the 19th century also held different 
characteristics compared to the previous centuries. During the 18th century, Kurdish 
nomadic tribes further adopted sedentary life through their settlement in existing 
villages together with permanent residents mostly consisting of Turks.126 As a part of 
the homogenizing process, the Empire again attempted to implement this policy later 
on. However, the settlement of an increasing population required the establishment 
of new agricultural and living spaces. While at least two-thirds of Central Anatolian 
villages were established during the 19th century, nine-tenths of today’s agricultural 
areas also started as agrarian zones at the same time.127 It can be said that today’s 
administrative units were formed in the 19th century.  
 
   
Map 3.2. : Kurdish and Muhacir villages founded in the second half of the 19th 
century128  
                                                 
125 In the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire tried to increase its effects on local governments.  
Developments in transportation and telgraph systems, the assignment of governors from İstanbul and 
the establishment of a tax farming (iltizam) system led to the empowerment of the centralist structure. 
However, with the announcement of the Rescript of Gülhane, the Empire placed emphasis on local 
governments and municipalities. Nonetheless, while the state tried to control the local units, it 
strengthened the state as well. For more information please see İlber Ortaylı, Tanzimat’tan 
Cumhuriyet’e Yerel Yönetim Geleneği, Hil Yayınları, İstanbul, 1985. 
126 Suat Dede, op.cit.  65. 
127 Wolf-Dieter Hütteroth, “The Influence of Social Structure on Land Division and Settlement in 
Inner Anatolia,” in Turkey: Geographic and Social Perspectives. Ed. Peter Benedict et. al. (Leiden: E. 
J. Brill, 1974), 21.  
128 Suavi Aydın, et al., Küçük Asya‟nın Bin Yüzü: Ankara, (Ankara: Dost Kitabevi Yayınları, 2005), 
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*Tatar villages, *Noghai villages, *Bosnian villages, *Circassian villages, *Kurdish 
villages 
 
The settlement of these nomadic tribes and immigrants can be interpreted as 
professional and pre-planned due to the settlement zones and the mixture of different 
ethnic groups. Both tribes and Balkan immigrants were settled either around existing 
living spaces or newly established villages in which they had to live together.129 To 
contribute to agricultural production, villages were established on uncultivated lands. 
This strategy allowed both nomadic groups and immigrants to get used to their new 
living areas. However, because of the lack of forming a proper settlement law, as 
would be done in the 20th century, these living spaces could not be made regular 
villages. Nevertheless, the perception towards putting the settlement policy in order 
set a framework for laws and other regulations and formed a basis for policy in the 
20th century. 
The empire also used another tool to control nomadic tribes in the 19th century: 
education. During the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II, the Imperial School for Tribes 
(Aşiret Mektebi) was founded in Istanbul for the education of the sons of leading 
tribal notables. This was a policy that aimed to raise loyal tribal leaders to control 
tribes in the future. However, it also attracted attention as a project of “taming” tribes 
and the school was closed in 1909.130 
Before the 19th century, some Kurdish tribes in the region had adopted sedentary life 
through provisional decree. For example, the Tabanlı Tribe was settled near Ankara 
in the 18th century, but members of this tribe did not abandon their traditional 
behaviors and lifestyle.131 Thus, one of the aims of governors was for these nomadic 
tribes to socially and culturally embrace sedentary life. As a result of this mentality, 
governors responsible for the settlement of tribes were appointed throughout the 
region. Nomadic tribes that normally changed their living spaces and migrated to 
summer and winter pastures had to stay in a single region. This was put into practice 
by new laws, regulations, and the founding of new institutions. 
                                                 
129 Wolf-Dieter Hütteroth, op.cit. 24. 
130 Eugene L. Rogan, “Asiret Mektebi: Abdulhamid II's School for Tribes (1892-1907),”  
International Journal of Middle East Studies vol. 28 ( 1996): 83.   pp. 83-107 
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As one of the most remarkable examples of these laws, the Code of 1842 related to 
the prevention of migration was the first mass-effective decision of the 19th century 
about nomadic groups. As a result of this code, nomadic groups could not migrate to 
another province even for their use as summer and winter quarters.132 Brutal force 
could be used against groups protesting this code if necessary. Also, densely 
populated tribes were redistributed in different areas, as occurred in the cases of the 
Rışvan, Reyhanlı, and Avşar tribes.133 These tribes were settled around Amasya, 
Sivas, Konya, and Kayseri. People willing to work in agriculture were supported by 
allocating farms. In other words, while these groups adopted a sedentary lifestyle, 
their contribution to agricultural production and payment of taxes was also taken into 
consideration. Not only was the settlement of these groups cared about, but great 
importance was also attached to their getting used to social and economic life. 
Through the migration waves in the second half of the century, extensive agricultural 
areas of Ankara were opened for the settlement of emigrants. Based on agricultural 
production reports, Haymana’s agricultural products met the needs of the whole 
province from the beginning of the 16th century.134 Following the 19th century, 
emigrants were settled in agricultural areas and the state offered them new fields, 
enabling their contribution to agricultural production. Thus, the capacity of the 
region’s agricultural production rose over time. However, against all obligations, 
some of Kurdish tribes still maintained their traditions in the late periods as Xalikan 
tribe using CA as summer pasture while living in Cukurova region during winters.135  
 
All of these developments require considering the settlement policy within the 
context of all other instruments used to enforce these groups mostly living in feudal 
structure to sedentary life. After a while, as an indicator of this consideration, The 
Land Code of 1858 that standardized the land system across the Empire was 
announced and private landownership was made possible. Even if there is a general 
tendency to evaluate this land code as a protection mechanism of the rights of 
peasants due to the abolition of land collectives by one person, it was not successful 
due to the lack of clarity regarding the difference between public and private 
                                                 
132 Yusuf Halaçoğlu, op.cit. 7.  
133 Ibid. 8.  
134 Özer Ergenç, 16. Yüzyılda Ankara ve Konya (Ankara: Ankara Enstitüsü Vakfı Yayınları: 1995),  
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property.136 Also, the prohibition of an orderly distribution of lands to peasants was 
broken by landowners’ purchase of these lands from peasants.137 Thus, this code 
made landowners the official owners of lands, which gave them the right to own 
private property while peasants remained unaware of how to register to own land.  
 
In addition to legal developments, tension between settled groups and local peasants 
led to chaos in CA as well as in the rest of the Empire. The power of social and 
ethnic diversity as a determining factor in the daily lives of people in the region 
increased in the 19th century. While permanent peasants lived in and on the edge of 
mountains, nomadic and seminomadic Turks, Kurds, and Balkan migrants were the 
main groups of the region. By this century, CA amplified its multi-cultural and multi-
ethnic structure due to its changing population. Nonetheless, it is obvious from 
different archival documents that this diversity and changing population balance also 
caused tension between different groups. One of the groups suffering from this 
tension was the Kurdish population assimilated to sedentary life. According to a 
document from 1830, tension between settled people and the nomadic Rişvan tribe, 
for example, increased due to the tribe’s migration during the harvest time. 
Additionally, while they migrated to their winter settlements, settled peasants living 
along their migration path were bothered because of their migration.138 Thus, one of 
the reasons for nomadic groups’ adoption of a sedentary life might have been 
complaints about nomadic groups documented in similar archival documents. These 
“vagabond” groups, mostly called “ekrâd eşkıyâ,” were charged with damaging 
crops, dispossessions, and even assaulting others with an intent to rape. 139 Even if 
there are some cases affirming this discourse, it is also clear that it was used to 
legalize the settlement of all nomadic tribes as a crucial requirement for the 
centralization of the state. 
 
 
 
                                                 
136 E. Attila Aytekin, “Agrarian Relations, Property and Law: An Analysis of the Land Code of 1858 
in the Ottoman Empire,” Middle Eastern Studies 6 (2009): 946. 
137 M. Macit Kenanoğlu, “Mîrî Arazi,” Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi 30 (2014), accessed 
August 29, 2015. http://www.islamansiklopedisi.info/dia/ayrmetin.php?idno=300159. 
 
138 Suat Dede, op.cit. 37. 
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Map 3.3. : Ethnic Situation in Ankara in the 19th Century140    
* Alevi villages, *Abdal villages, *Afşar villages, *Cerit villages, *Kargın villages, 
*Barak villages, * Old Armenian villages and regions of Kurdish tribes 
 
Indeed, settlement policy became compulsory in the 19th century due to migration 
especially from the Balkans as a result of the wars occurring there. While on the one 
side attempts were made to adapt nomadic groups to a sedentary life, Balkan 
immigrants started to continuously come to Anatolian lands and the issue of 
settlement for them came to the fore. This migration began with the immigration of 
the Tartars after the 1828-1829 Ottoman Russian War and continued with the 
Circassians and Balkans especially after 1877-1978 Ottoman-Russian War. For 
example, after the 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian War, approximately 1 million 
immigrants from Rumeli migrated to Anatolian territories.141 The Empire opened its 
doors for immigrants from the Balkans. According to the 1857 Decree, the 
                                                 
140 Suavi Aydın, op.cit. Maps. 
141 According to analysis based on archival documents, during the 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian War, 
474.389 people came to Anatolia from the Balkans. This number reached to 1 million in 1897.  For 
more information please see: Bilal Eryılmaz, Osmanlı Devletinde Gayrimüslim Tebaanın Yönetimi 
(İstanbul: Risale Yayınları, 1996), 15. 
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immigrants were exempt from military service and the payment of taxes, and 
agricultural fields were given to them.142 As a result of these migration waves, the 
total percentage of the Muslim population in the Empire rose from 59.6% in the 
1820s to 76.2% in the 1890s.143 These developments altered the ethnic and 
demographic structure of the Empire and paved the way for dominance of “being a 
Muslim” in politics both in the Empire and the Republic. 
 
The ethnic structure of CA also entered a period of change as a result of the 
migration waves of Crimean Tatars. According to the reports of embassies, 
approximately 26 thousand immigrants from the Balkans and Crimean Tatars came 
to Ankara in 1880.144 A group of these immigrants were settled in villages within the 
boundaries of Polatlı and Haymana.145 Also, there were some other villages in 
Gölbaşı and Şereflikoçhisar. Thus, a new ethnic factor started to dominate the region.  
Table 3.1. : Population of Haymana by years146 
 
 
Officials began to take the issue of settlement more seriously and the Commission 
for the Settlement of Immigrants (İskân-ı Muhacirin Komisyonu) was founded to 
properly settle these immigrants from Circassia and Balkans.147 Officials responsible 
                                                 
142 Kemal Karpat, op.cit. 53. The immigrants could hold these fields until they left their living areas. 
They could not own these unless they lived on this territory for twenty years.  
143 Fuat Dündar, İttihat ve Terakki’nin Müslümanları İskan Politikası (1913-1918) (İstanbul: İletişim 
Yayınları, 2001), 56. 
144 Kemal Karpat, op.cit. 111. 
145 Suavi Aydın, op.cit. 216. These villages are Karayavşan, Karakaya, Taşpınar, Eski Polatlı, 
Karakuyu, Toydemir, Karapınar, Tatlıkuyu, Üçpınar in Polatlı; Ahırlıkuyu, Çayraz, Çingirli in 
Haymana. 
146 The table is taken from Aysun Benlioğlu Yalçın, “XIX. Yüzyıl Ortalarında Haymana Vilayeti’nin 
Haymanateyn Kazası’nın Sosyal ve İktisadi Durumu” (Master Thesis, Gazi University Institute of 
Social Sciences, Department of History, 2009), 33. The author found this data in the Annual Books of 
Ankara (Ankara Salnameleri) present in the Ottoman Archives. 
147 This institution was first founded for immigrants from the Balkans and other parts of Rumeli. 
However, especially after amendments in 1914, this institution concentrated on the issue of tribal 
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for implementing the rules of settlement were even appointed to the provinces.148 
These initiatives of the Ottoman officials indicate their perception of the importance 
of controlling population movements in the Empire contrary to their previous 
practices that had depended mostly on temporary decisions. When the transformation 
of this institution to General Directorate of Tribes and Immigrants (Aşair ve 
Muhacirin Müdüriyet-i Umumiyesi) in 1914 and its survival in the Republican era is 
considered, the validity of this comment is further strengthened.      
3.5. Central Anatolian Kurds in Westerners’ Eyes: Diaries of Anatolian 
Travellers  
In addition to archival documents, decrees, and laws, the diaries of researchers 
coming from the West to the region in the 19th century are among the most 
important resources regarding CAK during this time. Asia Minor had captured the 
attention of travelers during the Imperial time and continued its popularity during the 
Republican period. The observations of these explorers show valuable information 
apart from official data.  
The English explorer W.F. Ainsworth is one of the most prominent researchers, who 
made valuable contributions to the literature on CA. One of his works, Travels and 
Researches in Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, Chaldea and Armenia, comprises notes of 
his travels from 1835 to 1838 and is published in two volumes. In the first volume 
recording his travel from İstanbul to Malatya, Ainsworth shares observations of his 
travels through CA and especially through Haymana, the place he describes as a 
“living space of Turks and Kurds.”149 His observations and comments on Haymana 
contain important information about social life in the 19th century. According to his 
notes, some of Haymana’s Kurdish villages, such as Gökçepınar, still maintained 
their nomadic style of life.150 Also, Kurdish peasants of Koçhisar had a nomadic 
lifestyle and mostly lived in tents.151 He implies that at that time, some of the 
Kurdish groups were disobedient to the rules and even killed some local people in 
the region.152 From his observations, it can be understood that the villages of the 
Kurds and Turks were very close to each other and that there were some events that 
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149 William Francis Ainsworth, Travels and Researches in Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, Chaldea and 
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increased the tension between them. His memoirs regarding Kurds living near 
Ankara state the fact that Kurdish nomadic tribes were still in a transition period 
from a nomadic lifestyle to sedentarization. Tensions between Kurds and Turks 
imply that the transition period was not quite easy for either side. 
Nearly in the same period as Ainsworth, an American traveller, William J. Hamilton, 
also visited the Anatolian territories. In the second volume of his travel book entitled 
Researchers in Asia Minor, Pontus, and Armenia and published in 1842, Hamilton 
mentions Kurdish groups maintaining their traditional lifestyle in CA. When he talks 
about Kurdish groups living near Ankara, he claims that there is not a large number 
of Kurdish people living in the region except in Haymana. Contrary to other parts of 
the region, Haymana contained very many Kurdish nomadic tribes mostly living in 
tents. He describes Kurds he met in the region as follows: 
The Kurds are a quite different race of people, and speak a different language; they have their 
own chiefs and leaders, and lead a thoroughly independent life. They likewise have no villages, 
and cultivate no land, but breed horses and keep large flocks. They invariably move into 
different districts according to the season, having their summer and winter stations. They are not 
numerous in Asia Minor, except in some parts of the great plain of the Haymana, and the 
country between it and Euphrates (Fırat), to the south of Mount Argeus, the neighborhood of 
which is said to be constantly exposed to their depredations.
153
 
In addition to these observations, Hamilton draws attention to differences between 
the Kurds and other peasants in the region. According to his statement, Kurdish 
women live in great liberty and show their faces to strangers contrary to other 
women in the region. Hamilton’s statements are very crucial to understanding the 
social life of Kurdish nomads in the 19th century.   
Georges Perrot, a French archaeologist, wrote one of the most contentful works on 
Central Anatolian Kurds in 1865 titled Kurds of Haymana (Les Kurdes de 
L’Haimaneh).154 In this work, Perrot describes the social and economic life of 
Kurdish people in Haymana as observed in his travels in the beginning of 1860. As 
he indicates, the Kurds of Haymana engaged in animal breeding in that time. Most of 
them did not know Turkish except for a very few words. For Perrot, the culture he 
encountered in Haymana was very unique and had to be documented in writing. This 
work is also important to obtain some knowledge on when the Kurds migrated to the 
                                                 
153William John Hamilton, Researches in Asia Minor, Pontus and Armenia: With Some Account of 
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region. Elderly people interviewed by Perrot claimed they had lived in Haymana for 
two or three generations. Even if they had lived for a long time in the region, their 
social relations with Turkish people were problematic. Marriages between Turks and 
Kurds were not well received and Perrot mentioned some examples supporting this 
fact. Perrot’s research also implies that Kurds had a more modernized lifestyle 
although they were simultaneously maintaining their traditions.155 
In 1877, another explorer, the English officer Frederick Burnaby, wrote up his 
observations about Anatolia in his work entitled On Horseback through Asia Minor. 
During his five-month visit to Asia Minor, he tried to understand Anatolian people’s 
perception of a probable war between the Ottoman Empire and Russia. Indeed, he 
tried to understand the thoughts of Anatolian people regarding whether the Empire 
would win the war. As a result of his research, he stressed that Anatolian people were 
pessimistic about the Empire. Burnaby met Kurdish people living near Çorum in 
black tents and some women had unveiled faces. According to him, these Kurds 
chose to live a nomadic life because of the Empire’s pressure about tax payment.156 
Near Yozgat, there were some Kurdish groups dealing with horse-trading.157 As in 
Ainsworth’s work, Kurdish people in Central Anatolia had a bad reputation in the 
case of committing crimes. In Sivas, the gaoler of the prison said to Burnaby that 
most of the prisoners were Kurds and Circassians convicted of horse and cattle 
stealing. 
At the end of the 19th century, a Scottish researcher, William M. Ramsay, published 
his travel notes from Asia Minor. Ramsay narrates his memoirs of different ethnic 
groups in the 1897 book entitled Impressions of Turkey: During Twelve Years' 
Wanderings. In the parts in which he mentions Kurds, there is at first a sense of 
antipathy. According to him, the Kurds of Haymana “made on him the impression of 
being ruder in manners, more niggardly and grasping, and less hospitable, than Turks 
or Turkmens.”158  However, when he visited a Kurdish family in the eastern part of 
Haymana, he abandons his prejudice towards them. There had been a Circassian 
district governor (kaymakam) who had committed violent acts towards the Kurds and 
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the owner of the house Ramsay visited attributed the recent quietness of the Kurds to 
this. Even after a long time among Turks, when Ramsay saw a man and woman 
walking together and laughing, he qualified this view as a “breath of Europe.”159 In 
contrast to other explorers, Ramsay made a comparison between the Kurds in 
Haymana and the East. He decided that the Eastern Kurds were more favourable.160 
Mark Sykes, another traveller who visited Anatolia and observed Anatolian people’s 
daily lives, presents substantial information about the pedigree of CAK. Mark Sykes 
was at the same time an English politician and had an important position in shaping 
Middle East policy in the 20th century. As a politician forming The Sykes-Picout 
Agreement, his travel in the Anatolian territories politically had a different 
meaning.161 This agreement prescribed the future distribution of Asia Minor. In other 
words, Sykes’s observations in the region were required to include useful 
information on social, economic, and cultural aspects of the people in Asia Minor to 
find the best way to shape its future status. Sykes classified Kurdish tribes according 
to their origin of migration and where they lived at the present time. According to 
him, most of these tribes were forced to migrate to CA during the Yavuz Sultan 
Selim era. He orders the names of eighteen different Kurdish tribes living in CA at 
the beginning of the 20th century.  
Sykes’ categorization of Kurdish tribes is based on his observations and interviews 
with “policemen, muleteers, mullahs, chieftains, sheep drovers, horse dealers and 
other people.”162 He classified Kurdish tribes in Anatolia into six categories: A, B, C, 
D, E, F. Categories E and F consist of CAK.  Although his research offers valuable 
information about Kurdish tribes, it also has some inaccurate findings on the topic. 
While the tribes are categorized, the categorization is only based on the expressions 
of local people. Also, his apparent orientalist approach towards people whom he met 
damages the quality of his work and its objectivity. He describes Kurds living in the 
eastern part of Anatolia as “thievish disposition, bloodthirsty, cowardly, and often 
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cruel.”163  He defines women of this region as ugly. Thus, his approach to the topic is 
very subjective. 
Table 3.2. : Kurdish tribes in CA at the beginning of the 20th century (based on 
information in Mark Sykes’ article)164 
        Name of Tribes Place of Origin Areas of residence at the 
Beginning of the 20th 
Century 
Ukhchicemi                   -                Sivas 
Urukchili                   -      Northwest of Sivas 
Milli Dersim or Karacadağ 
(Diyarbakır) 
      Osmancık (Çorum) 
Shayk Bezeini 
(Şeyhbizini) 
               Erbil          Boyabat (Sinop) 
Sheveli                Van               Çankırı 
Badeli            Gümüşhane               Yozgat 
Haji Banli (Khatun Oghli, 
Makhani, Omaranli) 
Dersim or Karacadağ 
(Diyarbakır) 
              Kayseri 
Barakatli                   -              Aksaray 
Tabur Oghli                   -               Kırşehir 
Shayk Bezeini                Erbil            Şereflikoçhisar 
Judi Kanli               Şırnak           Şereflikoçhisar 
Khalkani        Rowanduz (Iraq)                  Kulu 
Seif Kani                   -                  Kulu 
Nasurli                   -                 Gölbaşı  
Tirikan            Diyarbakır            near Ankara 
Atmanakin                 Siirt            near Ankara 
Zirikanli              Erzurum            near Ankara 
Janbekli                Bingöl          Cihanbeyli 
(Konya) 
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3.6. Central Anatolian Kurds in the 20th Century: Enforcement of Turkish 
Identity 
In the 20th century, the existence of Kurdish tribes in CA attracted the attention of 
both the Empire and the newly founded Republic. While attempts were made for 
Kurdish tribes and their members to adopt sedentary life, Kurdish tribes were treated 
as groups that could not only be adopted into “civilization,” but could also be 
Turkified through certain measures. Resistance of Kurdish tribes towards the 
centralization aims of the Empire continued during this century. Indeed, the 
perception of Kurdish identity and its reflection on officials did not sharply change 
from the Empire to the Republic. As is previously mentioned, while these nomadic 
tribes were seen as a threat to the state authority before the 20th century, they were 
still seen as a threat in this period, not only because of their being nomadic, but also 
as a result of their incompatibility in the new order depending on Turkification of the 
state elements.  
By the 1908 elections, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) came more to 
the forefront in Ottoman political life. As an actor gaining power day by day, the 
party took measures of a social engineering process to change the social structure of 
the Empire already under uncontrollable social and ethnic change. Through the 
documents belonging to this era dominated by the CUP, the first steps of the 
Turkification of the Kurdish population in CA can be examined. By 1913, a 
dissociation of the multi-ethnic structure of the Ottoman Empire gained momentum 
due to the CUP’s political agenda of trying to homogenize Anatolia. The success of 
this policy also required extending the dominating Turkish ethnicity to different 
groups.165 The CUP practiced an expansive settlement policy mostly linked with the 
assimilation of different ethnic groups in the Empire. According to a 1916 archival 
document, Talat Pasha, Minister of Interior Affairs, sent a telegram to the provincial 
officials of Konya, Kastamonu, Ankara, Sivas, and Kayseri and tried to get some 
information about CAK: How many Kurdish villages exist in their region? How 
many different populations do they include? Do they use Kurdish in their daily lives? 
How are their relations with Turkish people?166  After these questions, another 
                                                 
165 To see the CUP’s implementations to dominate Turkish elements in the Empire please look Taner 
Akçam, The Young Turks Crime Against Humanity, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2012; 
Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, Oxford University Press, London, 2011. 
166 Fuat Dündar, op.cit. 140. 
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telegraph was sent to the same provinces to learn whether Kurdish people in these 
villages knew Turkish.  
While Talat Pasha aimed to learn about the situation of existing Kurdish villages in 
the region, he also saw the region as a place of detention for Kurdish tribes. Kurdish 
tribes living in the Eastern part of Anatolia were therefore sent to CA under the CUP 
administration. In 1916, Talat Pasha sent a new order to the officials of Ankara, 
Konya, and Kütahya and commanded that members of Kurdish tribes coming from 
Diyarbakır, Sivas, Erzurum, and Elazığ be distributed into local villages, and that 
more than 5% of the members of these tribes could not be settled in the same 
village.167 Additionally, leading cadre were separated from their tribes people to 
weaken their ties with them.168 According to some research, the number of Kurds 
who migrated to Konya in 1916 was 50,000.169 This orderly redistribution indicates 
that Kurdish tribes were not only forced to adopt a sedentary life, but they were also 
forced to change their affiliations. It was not possible for them to sustain their culture 
in social surroundings where they were in the minority. These decisions caused CAK 
to live under the dominance of different ethnic groups that mostly consisted of Turks; 
contrary to previous forced settlements, they could no longer sustain their traditional 
life living as a Kurdish community. The groups that mostly settled in Konya and 
Ankara constitute today’s Kurdish villages in the region. Also after the Şeyh Sait 
Rebellion, some of the Kurds involved in this uprising were forced to migrate to 
Konya.170 CA’s prominence as a place of exile increased through deliberate decisions 
taken by the authorities. 
As ethno-political actors, Kurds became more of an issue in the homogenization of 
society in the Republican period. Even if the state declared its position of seeing 
Kurds as a part of a new society dependent on their “being Muslims,” their disparity 
with the Republic would be understood in a short period, when Atatürk declared 
Kurds a part of the new national border in 1919: 
Gentlemen, this border is not a line which has been drawn according to military considerations. 
It is a national border. It has been established as a national border. Within this border, there are 
Turks, Circassians, and other Islamic elements. Within this border there is only one nation which 
                                                 
167 Ibid. 144.  
168 Kemal Karpat, op.cit. 19. 
169 Müzeyyen Güler, “Kulu Ovası'ndan İskandinav Fiyordlarına Göç,” Sosyoloji Araştırmaları Dergisi 
1 (2007):  121.  
170 Ibid.  5. 
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is representative of Islam. Thus this border is a national boundary of all those who live together 
totally blended and are for all intents and purpose made up of fraternal communities.
171
 
From the beginning of the Turkish Republic, while the Kurds were tolerated - 
because of their being Muslim, contrary to Armenians, Greeks, and Jews - attempts 
were made to adopt them into the periphery of the state through regulations that tried 
to change them into “loyal citizens.” In other words, if the officials had not been 
hesitant about whether the Kurds’ Muslim identity would be enough for their 
“loyalty to the state,” they would not have taken some measures to control them. 
Understanding the state’s official discourse of seeing Kurds as a part of the national 
border and commenting on their “reactionary politics, tribal resistance, brigandage, 
provocation of foreigners, or regional backwardness,”172 requires examining the 
decisions taken by the state. 
Above all, it is obvious that the Republic aimed to learn about all aspects of Kurdish 
tribes to determine how policy towards these groups could be shaped. While on the 
one side sociologists such as Ziya Gökalp prepared detailed works173 on Kurdish 
tribes, the state officials and institutions ran reports on the situation of Kurdish 
populations living in Eastern Anatolia on the other. As a common point in reports 
prepared by the MP Abdulhalik Renda, Ministry of Interior Cemil Ubaydın and other 
officials, the Kurdish population densely living in Eastern Anatolia had to be 
Turkified through the implementation of a new population policy that would 
homogenize Anatolia.174 It required ethnic revision of the Anatolian population and 
therefore, as a starting point, the state tried to learn about the distribution of different 
ethnic groups. In 1927, a general population census was held and the official result 
reported a total Kurdish population of 1.184.446 out of a total general population of 
                                                 
171 “Suret-i umumiyede prensip şudur ki hududu milli olarak çizdiğimiz daire dahilinde yaşayan 
anasır-I muhtelife-i İslamiye yekdiğerine karşı ırki, muhiti, ahlakî, bütün hukukuna riayetkâr 
özkardeşlerdir. Bizce kat’I olarak muayyen bir şey varsa o da hududu milli dahilinde Kürt, Türk, Laz, 
Çerkes vesair bütün bu İslam unsurlar müşterekül-menfaadır.” TBMM, Gizli Celse Zabıtları, Türkiye 
İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, cilt 1, p. 73. (Taken from Mesut Yeğen, Müstakbel Türk’ten Sözde 
Vatandaşa: Cumhuriyet ve Kürtler (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2012),  50.; and  Bernd Jürgen 
Fischer, Balkan Strongmen: Dictators and Authoritarian Rulers of South Eastern Europe (West 
Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2007), 149. 
172 Mesut Yeğen, opt.cit. 2006, 222. 
173 Please see Ziya Gökalp, Kürt Aşiretleri Hakkında Sosyolojik Tetkikler (İstanbul: Sosyal Yayınlar, 
1992). 
174 In addition to these two reports, Hamdi Bey(1926), Ali Cemal Bardakçı(1926), İbrahim Tali 
Öngören(1930), Fevzi Çakmak(1931), Ömer Halis Bıyıktay(1931), and  Şükrü Kaya(1932) run 
reports on the Kurdish population. These reports would be an important starting point to implement a 
new settlement policy.  For more information please see: Hüseyin Yayman, Şark Meselesinden 
Demokratik Açılıma Türkiye’nin Kürt Sorunu Hafızası (Ankara: SETA Yayınları, 2011), 66-110.  
63 
 
13.542.795.175 As the first general population census during the Republican period, 
the 1927 census and the aim of its usage show how the state was concerned about 
ethnic groups living even in single settlement areas. As important places containing 
Kurdish populations, the districts of Polatlı and Haymana were also classified 
according to ethnic groups: 
Table 3.3. : Ethnic Distribution of Polatlı and Haymana in 1927176 
Ethnicity Haymana (in 124 districts) Polatlı (in 78 districts) 
Turks 27944 10838 
Kurds 14984 742  
Bosnians 172 312  
Tatars 1629 2557  
Alewis  62  
Muslim Coptics  12  
Circassians 762  
TOTAL 45491 14523  
 
As seen from these official documents, the state tried to learn about ethnic 
populations and their settlement routes by examining ethnic separation of these 
groups throughout the country. The questions asked in the population census attract 
extra attention because of their being so detailed. For instance, people’s mother 
tongue was one of the remarkable questions asked in the census. According to the 
ratio used by the state, 1184 out of 13. 648 people declared Kurdish as their mother 
tongue.177 However, demographic information belonging to Haymana and Polatlı 
given above is a result of a research done by the Prime Ministry and shows that 
except census results the state recorded Kurdish population as well as other ethnic 
groups in the region by considering every small districts. In other word, the state 
tried to learn more than people’s declarations about their mother tongue: their ethnic 
roots. According to these documents, Haymana and Polatlı contained nearly all major 
ethnic groups of the Republic, with Kurds as the second largest majority after Turks. 
                                                 
175 Soner Çağaptay, Türkiye’de İslam, Laiklik ve Milliyetçilik (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi 
Yayınları, 2009), 31. 
176 BCA, 272..0.0.65, 23.03.2007. 
177 Nüfus Sayımları 1927-1950 (Ankara: Başvekalet İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü, 1953), 8. 
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This reality of Kurds as the largest minority was the result of both exile and 
settlement policies that had been used towards Kurdish populations for centuries. 
Indeed, Atatürk had already been aware of the Kurdish population in Central 
Anatolia. In 1923, he declared his opinions on the Kurdish issue as follows: 
Kurdish problem, cannot be out of question for us, namely for the interest of the Kurds. Those in 
our national borders are only a Kurdish majority in limited places. Over time, by losing their 
population concentration, they have settled with Turkish elements in such a way that if we try to 
draw a border on behalf of the Kurds we have to finish with Turkishness and Turkey, for 
example in the regions of Erzerum, Erzinjan, Sivas and Kharput, — and do not forget the 
Kurdish tribes on the Konya desert.
178
 
As seen in Atatürk’s words, the heterogeneity of the Kurdish population through the 
country was shown as an indication of the impossibility of organizing them. 
However, the state still continued to see Kurdish populations as a threat to the 
building of a nation state. Even the “Kurdification of Turkish population” was seen 
as a potential threat for the Republic.179 In other words, the Republic believed that it 
had to Turkify the Kurds not only for the future of the nation-state, but also to 
prevent ethnically Turkish individuals from assimilating. CA, at this point, was 
shown as a destination for the settlement of Kurdish tribes from the Eastern part of 
the country. The underlying reasons for the settlement policy in the Republican era 
are recorded in a document of the Ministry of National Education in 1926. In this 
document, there was an attention grabbing thought that can be an important 
indication for understanding how CA was perceived by the Republic with regards to 
the Kurdish population. In the official document, the author points out that whenever 
the state sent Kurdish tribes to CA, the possibility of an uprising against the Republic 
diminished.180 Thus, there was a hidden motivation of state officials to develop a 
suitable policy towards Kurds who did not have a unique culture, language, and 
history. The state therefore aimed to Turkify Kurdish populations by forcing them to 
                                                 
178 Mustafa Kemal, Eskişehir-İzmit Konuşmaları (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1998), 82-83. “Kürt 
sorunu, bizim, yani Kürtlerin çıkarları için kesinlikle söz konusu olmaz. Çünkü, bizm ulusal 
sınırlarımız içinde Kürt ögeleri öylesine yerleşmişler ki, pek sınırlı yerlerde yoğun olarak yaşarlar. Bu 
yoğunluklarını kaybede ede ve Türklerin içine gire gire öyle bir sınır oluşmuş ki, Kürtlük adına bir 
sınır çizmek istesek, Türkiye’yi mahvetmek gerekir. Örneğin, Erzurum’a giden, Erzincan’a, Sivas’a 
giden, Harput’a kadar giden bir sınır çizmek gerekir. Ve hatta Konya çöllerindeki Kürtleri de göz 
önünde tutmak gerek”. English translation was taken from Edel Hughes, Political Violence and Law 
Reform in Turkey:Securing the Human Rights of the Kurds?,” The Journal of Conflict Studies 2 
(2006), accessed August 29, 2015. https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/jcs/article/view/4513/5324.  
179 To understand how the state was afraid of Kurdification of the state elements, please see Ziya 
Gökalp, op. cit.;  Tuğba Yıldırım, Kürt Sorunu ve Devlet (Tedip ve Tenkil Politikaları 1925-1947) 
(İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2011), 60.; Soner Çağaptay, op. cit.  36. 
180 Tuğba Yıldırım, op.cit.  42. 
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leave their areas of residence and adopt a sedentary life and the reorganization of the 
Law on Tribes aimed to enable the Turkification of Kurdish people.181 When this text 
is taken into consideration jointly with the subsequent Rule of Settlement in 1934, its 
role in shaping state policy and the underlying tools of motivation can be better 
understood.  
The Rule of Settlement in 1934 was the prominent legal implementation for creating 
a new society based on “Turkish-Sunni-Muslim” elements by ensuring the loyalty of 
“immigrants, refugees, nomads and itinerant gypsies” to Turkish culture. The 
assimilative aim of the settlement policy became more distinct in the declaration of 
the 1934 Settlement Policy. Most of the muhacirs and refugees coming from former 
Ottoman territories were settled in existing villages.182 The law, consisting of fifty 
articles, was introduced to the public as a “tool of adopting Turkish culture,” “land 
reform,” and “demolishing the feudal system”;183 however, it was very controversial 
because of its prescription for a fundamental change of the settlement policy. The 
rule classified territories into three regions: the first one would be arranged for 
providing a dense culturally Turkish population; the second would be reserved for 
those aimed to be adopted into Turkish culture; and the third consisted of areas 
prohibited for settlement due to military, economic, political, or public health 
reasons.184 Even if the borders of these regions were not specified in the rule except 
regarding the third classified territory (which spread from the eastern ends of the 
village Ilıca of the province Kars and the villages of Tokaltı, Serdarbulak, 
Karnıyarık, Şehrigerden and Yukarıniço of the province Ağrı, that also includes 
Mount Küçükağrı), the first region referred to areas with dense Kurdish populations 
in the East, while the second one indicated the western parts of the country 
dominated by a Turkish population.185 In other words, the rule aimed to increase the 
Turkish population in Eastern Anatolia while reducing the Kurdish population in this 
region by settling them in Western Anatolia. The state could succeed in this policy 
by linking the settlement rule with continuity. Thus, newly-settled people were not 
                                                 
181 Ibid. 64.  
182 Wolf-Dieter Hütteroth, op. cit. 34.  
183 İsmail Beşikçi, Kürtlerin Mecburi İskanı (İstanbul: İsmail Beşikçi Vakfı Yayınları, 2013), 100-109, 
127-132.  
184 Ibid. 110.  
185 Ibid. 110-111. 
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permitted to sell the properties given by the state for ten years.186 The state even 
controlled the distribution of Kurdish settlement in the West to prevent Kurds from 
becoming a majority.187 Considering all of these developments together, the Rule of 
Settlement in 1934 was successfully implemented from the standpoint of the state by 
closely following its regulations 
Beyond official documents, observations of travellers in the region during the 1930s 
regarding the Kurdish population provide additional valuable information about the 
era. Seyyah Kandemir listed Kurdish tribes in CA mostly living in the villages of 
Bala, Haymana and Cihanbeyli with the suggestion of taking these illiterate people 
under control to educate them.188 According to his observations, although these 
“loyal” Kurds were hardworking people, they still maintained a nomadic lifestyle 
even while they lived in villages. Depending on Kandemir’s classification, Kurdish 
tribes in the region could be classified as: 
Table 3.4. : Classification of Kurdish Tribes in CA (During the 1930s)189 
The Name of the Tribe Communities Belonging to the Tribe 
Rişvanlı Mısırlı, Karanlı, Çelikanlı, Halikanlı 
Şeyhbizin Horasanlı, Havadanlı, Herfodanlı, 
Jirdikanlı, Leranlı 
Cihanbeyli Dervişanlı, Gürekli, Tozonanlı 
Atımanlı Gizranlı, Jelikanlı, Davudanlı 
Mikailli - 
Seyfanlı - 
Koybanlı - 
Terkanlı - 
                                                 
186 “1934 İskan Kanunu”, Atricle 30. Koç University Migration Research Center, accessed August 29, 
2015. https://mirekoc.ku.edu.tr/sites/mirekoc.ku.edu.tr/files/tr_leg11.pdf.  
187 Soner Çağaptay, op. cit. 114. 
188 Seyyah Kandemir, Ankara Vilayeti (Ankara: Başvekalet Müdevvenat Matbaası, 1932), 246. 
189 Ibid. 246-47. 
67 
 
Besides the existence of these Kurdish tribes, CAK population was also rising due to 
new settlements. At this point, another element showing the state’s aim of Turkifying 
these groups occurred: changing toponomies. This implementation mostly impacted 
the names of villages in the East and Southeast of Turkey.190 However, Central 
Anatolian Kurdish villages were also effected by the state’s approach towards 
changing village names. For instance, 32 % of the names of villages in Konya, 
numerically 232, were changed due to this policy.191 Within this framework the 
names of 193 villages in Ankara, 76 in Çankırı, and 103 in Çorum were changed.192 
Even if not all names were changed solely because they carried Kurdish names, some 
of the changes were directly related to this. For example, the name of Kürtgökgözü 
village was changed by a decision of the Ministry of Interior, as was a Kürd Şeyh 
village in the same district.193 The Turkification of toponomy was directly related to 
the same policy in other areas. 
 
Map 3.4. : The villages exposed to changing toponomy.194 
In both the 1935 census and the one in 1965, the ethnicity of the population was 
recorded by asking the native language of people. Even if this method has some 
deficiencies, the results of these censuses provide the only sources dependent on 
empirical data. According to their results, the Kurdish population in the country rose 
                                                 
190 Please see Kerem Öktem, “The Nation’s Imprint: Demographic Engineering and the Change of 
Toponymes in Republican Turkey,” European Journal of Turkish Studies 7 (2008). 
191 Kerem Öktem, op. cit. 19.  
192 Harun Tunçel, “Türkiye’de İsmi Değiştirilen Köyler,” Fırat Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi 2 
(2000): 28. 
193 BCA, 5484/ 30..11.1.0, 19/8/1930. 
194 Harun Tunçel, op.cit. 30.  
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from 1,480,246 to 2,370,233 between 1935 and 1965.195 Nevertheless, further 
research in the 1990s trying to measure Kurdish population in the region shows a 
substantial Kurdish population not only in the Eastern part of the country, but also in 
CA. The Kurdish population in Central Anatolia was estimated as 243,000 in Ankara 
(6% of the total population), 3,500 in Çankırı (1.26% of the total population), 23,700 
in Çorum (3.89% of the total population), 19,900 in Eskişehir (3.10% of the total 
population), 43,300  in Kayseri (4.56% of the total population), 17,000  in Kırşehir 
(6.61% of the total population), 104,800 in Konya  (5.42% of the total population), 
6,100 in Nevşehir ( 2.1% of the total population) and 13,100  in Yozgat (2.25 % of 
the total population) in the 1990s.196 In general, the ratio of the Kurdish population in 
the region rose from 4.13% to 5.53%. Even if this appears as a slight change, the 
migration of Kurdish populations from CA to countries abroad should also be taken 
into account.  
While examining the history of CAK, the gap following the 1930s that continues 
through today is significantly realized. This gap not only arises from absence of eye-
catching issues, but it also arises from a lack of studies on them. That is why there 
cannot be clear examination about this period. However, it is understand from the 
results of the elections that CAK mostly tended to support center-right parties more 
than left-wing ones. For example, the Workers Party of Turkey (TIP) had been too 
infrequently supported in Haymana and Kulu in the 1965 and 1969 general elections. 
In 1965, the party received only 4 % of all votes in Haymana, while in Kulu the 
situation of the party was worse, with just 1.5 % of the votes. The center right parties 
kept their position for a long time. 
In the light of all this information, it is quiet obvious that beginning from the 16th 
century to the first half of the 20th century, Kurdish population in CA had been a part 
of structure of the region who both affected and being affected by changing 
dynamics. As a result of the state politics related to decentralization and the 
assimilation of the Kurdish population gaining momentum during the first half of the 
20th century, the term ‘Kurdish society’ began to refer only to the ones living in the 
East and Southeast part of Turkey. A lot of government officials used this discourse 
while ignoring the presence of the Kurdish Question. For example, former Prime 
                                                 
195 Servet Mutlu, op.cit. 5. 
196 Servet Mutlu, op. cit. 10-11. 
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Minister Mesut Yılmaz admitted that Kurds living outside of the Southeast region 
were thought of as assimilated ones: 
First of all, we do not know exactly how many Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin there are, 
maybe 8 million, maybe 15 million. But it is clear that about two-thirds live in other regions of 
Turkey, and are completely assimilated. Therefore, we are not talking about a Kurdish, but a 
Southeast problem. This goes beyond the extent of the ethnic definition.197 
Among politicians and bureaucrats, defining the Kurdish Question as an economic 
problem related to the backwardness of the southeast region was a very popular 
tendency. Also, the general atmosphere and latest agenda of the country impacted the 
attitudes of the politicians and media. After the PKK attacks occurred, politicians 
mostly chose to use the term ‘terror problem’ to define the question. However, civil 
society organizations introduced the public with different perceptions towards the 
issue. Thus, the question started to be discussed from different aspects. The presence 
of CAK who had been settled in the region has been overlooked because of the 
state’s perception of Kurds in Turkey as a regional phenomena with a security-
oriented perspective. Social, political, and cultural dynamics affecting the lives of 
CAK were not parts of social research until today. Nonetheless, a changing 
perception towards the Kurdish Question requires close investigation of the Kurds 
and has brought a new realization of social dimensions of the Kurdish population in 
other parts of Turkey. In light of information on the multi-dimensional factors of 
Kurdish settlement in CA, the current dynamics should be closely examined to 
understand social aspects of CAK providing patterns in their lives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
197 “The key lies in Bonn”, Der Spiegel, 22. 09. 1997. http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-
8781958.html. “Öncelikle, tam olarak orada yaşayan Kürt kökenli vatandaşların sayısını bilemiyoruz, 
belki 8 belki de 15 milyondur. Fakat üçte ikisinin diğer bölgelerde yaşadığı ve tamamen asimile 
olduğu açıktır. Bu sebeple Kürt sorunundan değil, Güneydoğu sorunundan bahsediyoruz. Bu da etnik 
tanımın ötesine geçiyor.” 
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CHAPTER IV 
SOCIAL COHESION OF CENTRAL ANATOLIAN KURDS 
 
This chapter seeks to present from the field patterns in the social, cultural, and 
political lives of CAK to be able to understand how these patterns and CAK' Kurdish 
identity is impacted by surrounding influences of Turkishness. The fieldwork held as 
a part of this study also enables us to see to what extent policies aiming to control 
ethnic contours of CAK discussed in the previous chapter continue to impact today’s 
atmosphere in the region. It should be noted that the aim of this field survey is not a 
generalization of findings enabling their adaption to all circumstances to provide the 
same results. Instead, it just tries to take a picture of the field in a strict time period 
by analyzing data acquired from interviews, as well as considering observations, 
activities, actions, treatments, connections, dialogs, and other documentable data. In 
light of the theoretical framework used for this study (and explained previously in 
Chapter I), the findings will be considered in three dimensions. Firstly, the dimension 
of recognition/rejection deals with the social bonds of CAK with other groups in the 
region and the evolution of these relations by paying attention to their experiences, 
feelings, expectations, preferences, and concerns about social relations. The 
dimension of belonging/isolation touches upon the issues of identity and language in 
order to examine determinant factors shaping shared values and ethnic contours of 
CAK. Finally, the dimension of legitimacy/illegitimacy addresses political and 
institutional actions comprising relations with political parties and state institutions 
to understand association levels of CAK in this category. The questionnaire formed 
for this research can be found at the end of the study. 
Before evaluating the information gathered from the field, the socio-demographic 
characteristics of informants should be examined. 
4.1. Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Informants 
The socio-demographic characteristics of informants indicate personal information 
regarding their gender, birthplace and birthdate, level of education, occupation, and 
household size. Information in this section was gathered at the beginning of 
interviews with the guarantee that none of it will be used to emphasize or disclose 
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their identity in any way. Data acquired from interviews was classified by using the 
Nvivo Qualitative Data Analysis Programme. Information taken from 15 individuals 
participating in face-to-face semi-structured in-depth interviews is useful to gather 
details about the backgrounds of people chosen as samples representing CAK for the 
study.  
At the beginning of the evaluation of socio-demographic characteristics, it should be 
noted that interviews were conducted with 4 women within the age group of 18-30, 4 
women within the age group of 30-60, 3 men within the age group of 18-30 and 4 
men within the age group of 30-60. All interviews were held in Ankara and its 
districts, Polatlı and Haymana. While two interviews were conducted in Haymana, 6 
took place in Polatlı, and 7 interviews occurred in the center of Ankara. However, 
because of the close regional proximity of Polatlı and Haymana, nearly half of the 
informants in Polatlı were originally from Haymana but have been living in Polatlı 
for a long time. In total, four of the informants are originally from Kulu and Kırşehir 
but live in the center of Ankara, while 11 of the informants are originally from 
Polatlı and Haymana and still live in the same districts or center. 
The average household size of informants is 4.0, including them. Conspicuously, 
there is no informant whose household size is larger than 5.0. The biggest household 
size is 5.0, contrary to the smallest one, which is 2.0. Additionally, all informants 
admit that they live as a nuclear family separated from their elders and other family 
members. From childhood memoirs of some informants, it is obvious that once they 
were living with their grandparents, uncles, aunts, and nephews. It should be stressed 
that choosing samples from city centers and districts may be the cause of having only 
nuclear families present in the study. There might be other results if samples were 
chosen among villages and hamlets. 
4.1.1. Birth Place and Migration 
Except for two informants interviewed in the center of Ankara from Kırşehir and 
Konya, all of the informants were born in villages belonging to Polatlı, Haymana, 
Kulu, and Çiçekdağı. Exceptionally, in fact, two people were born in Ankara, but 
their birth was officially recorded in their respective villages of Altılar and 
Yalnızağaç. All other thirteen informants’ birthplaces were appropriately recorded. 
Additionally, all of these informants had lived in a village during their childhood 
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until they migrated to the city center or districts with their family or on their own. As 
one male informant implies, “We attended the elementary school in Polatlı because 
there was no school in the village.”198 Education is the most common reason for 
migrating from villages. Economic reasons follow behind as the second most 
frequent cause of migration; as one of the informants claims: “…My father was 
looking for a job. My family was living a settled life in the village long before I was 
born. But because the financial conditions in the village didn’t allowed them to 
continue living there, they migrated here, to Ankara, for a better life.”199 
4.1.2. Education 
It should be noted that there are no illiterate informants among the sample of the 
study. The reason for this arises from the difficulty of contacting and communicating 
with illiterate people, which was experienced at the beginning of the fieldwork. 
When I first wanted to begin my field survey, I talked to some people around me 
who do not have proper education and most of whom were nearly illiterate people. 
However, some of them did not want to talk too much because they were exhausted 
and were confused by the questions. Even if I tried to adapt my question into a new 
form that they could understand, my attempts remained inconclusive. Illiterate 
people were therefore expelled from the sample after this experience. Regarding the 
education levels of the women interviewed, three women within the age group of 18-
30 and one woman within the age group of 30-60 are university graduates, three of 
them within the age group of 30-60 are primary school graduates, and one of them 
within the age group of 30-60 is a secondary school graduate. On the men’s side, one 
man within the age group of 18-30 and two men within the age group of 30-60 had 
graduated from university, one man within the age group of 18-30 and another man 
within the age group of 30-60 are high school graduates, and the other two 
informants within the age group of 18-30 graduated from secondary school.  
4.1.3. Occupation 
To have a look at the results of interviews held, one woman within the age group of 
18-30 and two women within the age group of 30-60 are housewives, so they don’t 
have any proper income independent from their husbands (all of them are married) 
                                                 
198 “Köyde okul olmadığı için ilkokulu geldik Polatlı’da okuduk.” 
199  “Babamın iş araması. Benim ailem aslında ben doğmadan önce köyde yerleşik yaşayan bir aile idi. 
Ama köydeki maddiyat oradaki hayat sürdürmeye el vermediği için, daha iyi bir maddi hayat içinde 
buraya Ankara’ya göçtüler.” 
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and their own insurances. Other than these three women - who can be defined 
officially as unemployed - one woman within the age group of 18-30 is still waiting 
to be appointed as a science teacher and is hopeful about the next appointment period 
because of her expected high points on the Public Personnel Selection Examination 
(KPSS).  She thinks that she cannot use her labor rights due to the corrupt 
institutional system, saying “You know there is a right called the right to labor 
among social rights and I can’t use my right to labor; this is bad for me. I graduated 
in 2013, I haven’t been able to be appointed for 2 years and this pushes me; I have 
complaints about this.”200 Additionally, another woman within the age group of 18-
30 was fired from the bank two years ago and is still searching for a new job. From 
her point of view, the problem of her unemployment is also related to a corrupt 
system in Turkey. As she states, "For instance, I'm an out-of-work banker now. I’ve 
been looking for a job for two years, but the age factor impedes me as does the 
public personnel selection examination. I was watching our president on the news 
last night and turned back as he was saying ‘Unemployed people in Turkey snub 
jobs.’ I am someone who makes updates on the Employment Agency every three 
days, but they never offered me a job I liked or didn’t like and that Agency never 
called me for a job.  In this case, I really want to know how unemployed people snub 
jobs.”201 From observations during the interview, it can be said that she is very angry 
and frustrated because of her situation. Another woman within the age group of 18-
30 is working as a researcher in a private company while a woman within the age 
group of 30-60 is working as a factory worker; the other woman within the same age 
group is working as a teacher in a public school.  
When looking at men in this category, there is no person who is unemployed or 
looking for a job. Each of them has a proper job which means they have proper 
income and insurance. Within the age group of 18-30, two men are working for their 
family members in family companies. Another man within this age category is 
working as a helper in a drugstore owned by one of his relatives. The fourth man 
                                                 
200  “Bir kere çalışma hakkı diye bir şey ya, sosyal haklar içinde çalışma hakkı diye bir durum var ya, 
ben çalışma hakkımı kullanamıyorum mesela, bu benim için çok kötü bir durum. 2013’te mezun 
oldum 2 yıldır atanamıyorum yani bu beni zorluyor, bu konuda şeyim var, bu konuda sitemlerim var.” 
201 “Mesela şu an işsiz bir bankacıyım. İki yıldır iş arıyorum işte yaşa takılıyoruz, KPSS diye bir 
saçmalığa takılıyoruz. Dün Cumhurbaşkanımızın haberlerde izliyorum, “işsizlerimiz iş beğenmiyor” 
diye bir cümlesine dönüyorum. Ben sürekli, üç günde bir İŞKUR’dan iş güncellemesi yapan bir 
insanım ama bana beğendiğim ya da beğenmediğim bir iş İŞKUR’dan gelmedi, ya da bir iş araması 
gelmedi. Bu durumda işsizler nasıl iş beğenmiyor ben çok merak ediyorum.” 
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within this age group is a lawyer and working for a company. To classify men within 
the age group of 30-60, one man is working as a stallholder in a place that he owns. 
Of the other two men within this category, one man is a retired manager of a public 
bank while the other one is a retired teacher.  
Gender, birthplace and birthdate, level of education, occupation, and household size 
are main categories describing personal information of informants and identifying 
the main features of the sample group chosen for this study. In the rest of this study, 
the cohesion/exclusion levels of CAK in their relations with other groups and 
understanding indicators of their affiliation between Turkishness and Kurdishness by 
examining patterns in their political, social, and cultural lives will be held in 
accordance with the theory of Paul Bernard on social cohesion. These patterns also 
help us understand sociological and political reflections of the contours of ethnic 
identity. The first dimension, recognition/rejection, will be useful to understand 
cohesion levels in social relations. 
4.2. The Dimension of Recognition/Rejection: Social Relations, Experiences, and 
Feelings of “Others” and “Us” 
As a part of the first dimension, domains belonging to social bonds, affiliations, daily 
life practices and other inter-relational tools affecting feelings and perceptions of 
people related to their groups and others provide valuable data in the case of 
evaluating social cohesion on the level of recognition/rejection. In this category, 
experiences pertaining to migration from urban to rural areas, results of first 
interactions with other groups in urban areas, the (un)sustainability of relations with 
relatives, and the possibilities and limitations in relationships with other groups will 
be touched upon to understand the level of communication in the region from the 
perspective of CAK and give clues about their social cohesion/exclusion from other 
groups. 
One of the prominent determinants in the case of our sample group arises from their 
living experience in villages until a certain period in their life mostly coinciding with 
their childhood.  Four female informants equally distributed in each age group and 
five men informants consisting of two within the age group of 18-30 and three within 
the age group of 30-60 had lived in villages during their childhood. Each informant 
migrated to districts and city centers due to educational needs and economic 
75 
 
conditions. As a male informant informs, educational needs most often reflect a lack 
of equipment: “We attended the elementary school in Polatlı because there was no 
school in the village. Of course, since there was no school in the village at that time. 
My father took us from the village to Polatlı and we studied there.”202 Technical and 
infrastructural inadequacies in the villages are unable to provide an environment 
suitable for education. Even if industrialization improved the quality of life in 
villages, educational needs are still among the most common two reasons for 
migration.203 At the second stage, economic problems also come to the forefront in 
the expressions of informants. After the division of territories among the next 
generations by means of inheritance, people become unable to make their budgets 
suffice with mere agricultural production. One of the male informants’ explanation 
making a connection between economic problems and patriarchal family structure as 
a reason for migration from villages is remarkable: 
There used to be a patriarchal structure. The society we grew up in had a patriarchal family 
structure. A father, his children, his grandchildren, all worked together. This grandfather used to 
earn their livelihood. But over time, people began to be liberalized as the level of education 
increased.  Children’s worldviews changed as they read. Lifestyles, standards changed, the 
demands changed. A patriarchal head could no longer provide for the family. Therefore, ruptures 
in the family started. We were losing the ability to support a family when the land was divided. 
Fragmented lands caused everyone to look for a job they could find by accident and they did 
find. Those who found one left the village. Hence the ruptures. People scattered, someone who 
managed to make a good life in the city was a model when he came to visit the village. You see, 
I left and I am comfortable. I got a job, I work. I am a worker at the factory and I pay my 
house’s rent with my salary. And I have spare income, said the village leaver and those who 
aspired left the village. This way, villages were abandoned gradually.204 
The migration issue in the case of CAK occurred as a phenomena not only from 
villages to districts or city centers, but also as another phenomena related to the 
frequency of migrations abroad, which tears CAK between village and city life in 
addition to affecting their social conditions in the long term:    
                                                 
202 “Köyde okul olmadığı için ilkokulu geldik Polatlı’da okuduk. Tabii o zaman okul olmadığı için 
köyde. Babam bizi köyden Polatlı’ya getirdi şehre orada okuttu.” 
203 Nüfus ve Konut Araştırması, TÜIK Yayınları, Ankara, 2011, p. 53. 
204 “Şimdi eskiden bir ataerkil yapısı vardı.bizim yetiştiğimiz Toplum ataerkil aile yapısına sahipti. Bir 
baba çocukları, torunları hep birlikte çalışırdı. Bu büyükbaba onların geçim ve maişetini sağlardı. 
Ama zamanla eğitim düzeyi arttıkça insanlar özgürleşmeye başladı. Çocuklar okudukça dünya 
görüşleri değişti. Yaşam tarzları, standartları değişti, talepleri değişti. Bunu artık ataerkil aile reisi 
karşılayamıyordu. Dolayısıyla ailede kopmalar olmaya başladı. Arazi bölündüğünde de bir aileyi 
geçindirecek kabiliyeti kaybediyorduk. Parçalanmış arazi dolayısıyla herkes şehirde işte hasbelkader 
yapabileceği bir iş aradı, buldu. Bulanlar köyü terk etti. Böylece kopmalar başladı. İnsanlar dağıldı, 
şehirde iyi bir hayat kuran, iyi bir düzen kuran biri köye gelip diğerlerine de örnek oluyordu. İşte ben 
gittim, rahat ettim. Bir iş buldum, çalıştım. Fabrikada işçiyim işte maaşımla evin kirasını veriyorum. 
Ama karşılığında gelirim var gibi şeyler söyleyince özenenler hep köyü terk etti. Bu şekil yavaş yavaş 
köyler terk edildi.” 
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People started to not be satisfied with what they produced. The village is something that has its 
very own cycle. You harvest, sell it if you can and if you can’t you turn wheat into flour and ean 
it; but that wasn’t enough for people or they didn’t want it to be enough. Many people I know, 
for instance, were people who aimed to go to Sweden to study at university and come back to 
Turkey and achieve great things; but when they got there - you know Volvo is a popular brand 
of Sweden - they stayed either in a factory of Volvo or in a cleaning job. They are neither 
Swedish nor villagers now. They're stuck in-between.205  
Actually, the tracks of CAK after their migration to foreign countries such as 
Germany, Sweden, Denmark, France, and so on created a perception in the minds of 
foreigners, too. As one of the informants claims, “They call Kulu ‘the little 
Sweden,’”206 which becomes important in this context when it is considered together 
with the reality of how Swedish prime ministers and other politicians have cared 
about this small district in each of their visits to Turkey; when the fact that 
approximately more than fifty thousand people from Kulu live in Sweden is 
considered, the explanation of the informant cannot be seen as an exaggeration.207 
The density of the Kurdish population in European and Scandinavian countries can 
be explained in two ways. First, as a result of the migration movements that started in 
the beginning of the 1960s, many Kurdish people, especially those who did not have 
proper jobs, applied to foreign countries to be accepted as workers. In addition, the 
ones who were not accepted in this context applied to European countries as refugees 
by asserting that they were under political repression of the state arising from their 
Kurdish identity and being exposed to economic discrimination in Turkey.208 After 
that period, during the 1970s and 1980s, the political and social environment of 
Turkey forced lots of Kurdish political figures to take refuge in European countries.    
Especially after the 1980 Turkish coup d'état, 30,000 people had to go abroad due to 
the prevalence of violent conditions.209 CAK were also among these people during 
these times because of their participation in political activities during that period. As 
one of the male informants expressed in his memoirs belonging to the 1970s, Polatlı 
                                                 
205 “Ya insanlar artık ürettikleriyle yetinememeye başladı. Köy çok kendi döngüsü olan bir şeydir. 
Ekin toplarsın, onu satabilirsen satarsın, satamazsan buğdayı una çevirir yersin ama insanlara yetmedi 
ya da insanlar yetinmek istemediler. Benim mesela tanıdığım çok kişi aslında İsveç’e gidenler 
örneğinde üniversite okuyup, Türkiye’ye dönüp büyük işler yapmayı hedefleyen insanlardı ama 
gittiklerinde hani, ya araba fabrikalarında Volvo çok meşhur İsveçliler için. Ya Volvo’nun bir 
fabrikasında ya da temizlik işinde kaldılar. Şu an ne İsveçliler ne hani köylüler. Öyle bir yerde sıkışıp 
kaldılar.” 
206  “Zaten Kulu ’ya küçük İsveç diyorlar.” 
207 “Swedish Prime Minister Reinfeldt due to Turkey”, Today’s Zaman, April 19, 2009; ” Türklerin 
çok olduğu ülke: Kulufonya”, Zaman, March 30, 2008.   
208 Müzeyyen Güler, Ibid., p. 7. 
209 “Meclis Araştırma Komisyonu Raporu”, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, vol. 1, November 2012, p. 
698. 
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and Haymana were under the effects of leftist groups and provided people for leftist 
organizations such as DEV-GENÇ and Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Organizations 
(Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları-DDKO). That political atmosphere also forced 
people participating in these kinds of movements to be accepted as political refugees 
in foreign countries. In other words, in the second half of the 20th century, CAK 
were subject to two-fold migration waves, one of which was from rural to urban 
areas and the second, emigration to European countries. 
CAK who migrated from rural to urban areas did not, however, break all of their 
connections with their villages. Particularly nine informants who were born and had 
lived in villages during their childhood express that their feelings towards their 
villages are still the same even if they are able to visit there only in summers for 
vocational purposes or during wedding ceremonies and funerals. One female 
informant touches on the issue as: “We go there every summer. We go if there is a 
funeral. When there is a wedding. There is no one left in the village now. They all 
moved to the cities.”210 Their short-term purpose of visiting the villages discloses the 
fact that they maintain their relations with rural areas on a traditional level. In 
another point, because of mass migration from rural areas to urban places, informants 
feel alienated from villages and the people living there. As one female informant 
stresses: “That is, 95% of my village is here, living in Polatlı. I mean, I feel at home. 
All our kith and kin are here; we see those who stay in the village as strangers, 
because we see the villagers much less often. We’ve lived here with acquaintances 
and relatives for almost 30 years.”211 In other words, the urban is a new 
determinative platform for CAK because of the fact that they have lived in urban 
areas longer and spend more time there than in rural areas; as a result, their ties with 
villages are weakened, which makes them feel alienated from their place of birth. It 
should be stressed that the same point of view towards villages is observed among 
informants born and raised in urban areas.  
Even if the testimonies of informants emphasize their stronger bonds with the urban 
contrary to the rural, another common pattern comes in sight under the question of 
                                                 
210  “Yazdan yaza gidiyoruz. Bir cenaze olunca gidiyoruz. Düğün olunca gidiyoruz. Ya kimse kalmadı 
köyde artık. Hepsi şehirlere yerleşti.” 
211  “Yani, köyümün %95’i burada. Polatlı’da yaşıyor. Yani, evimde hissediyorum. Çevremiz komple 
burada, köyde kalanlara bile yabancı bakıyoruz, Çünkü köydeki adamı daha az görüyoruz. Polatlı’da; 
eş, dost, akraba hep burada olduğu için 30 yıla da yakın da oldu hani.” 
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their adaptation to urban areas at the beginning of their migration. This issue is 
important to provide insight into the problems they faced during the process of social 
cohesion/exclusion. Consequently, problems of adaptation arose from language as 
well as differences related to issues of social and economic condition. Three male 
and three female informants within the age group of 30-60 each expressed that they 
had experienced language as the prominent problem after migration. As people 
whose native language was Kurdish and who had limited Turkish knowledge, some 
of them postponed starting school. A female informant describes this process as 
follows: 
For example, my first compliance problem was that I didn’t start elementary school at seven, I 
did at eight. When we came here, there was no vacancy in the nearby school where my brother 
enrolled. Because there was no vacancy for first graders, they didn’t accept me; the school a 
little further away from home could accept me, but since we didn’t speak Turkish and we had to 
commute by ourselves I couldn’t go to school that year. So to say, they didn’t send me to school 
because I knew neither the language nor the city; I lost a year, so that has an impact.212 
As it is seen, language problems influenced the quality of life after migration. Some 
informants said that the difference in language together with social differences 
isolated them from cities. It pushed them towards avoiding communication with local 
people who they viewed as totally different from themselves. A male informant 
stresses how the burden of city life affected his physical and psychological situation: 
... We had missed the village and the villager. We were homesick. When I first arrived in 
Ankara, I joined the line for the minibus. In the morning on the way to work one day, I joined 
the line for the train. And while I was waiting in that line, I was pondering exactly what you 
asked: ‘What the hell is this, am I going to live like this from now on? Am I going to wait in 
lines for buses every day,’ I was thinking to myself. And I couldn't take it. I resented it. ‘What is 
this, what kind of life is this?’213 
Economic and social differences in urban areas additionally negatively affected all 
informants. There was no interviewee who experienced migration and did not have 
problems during the adaptation process. As another adverse effect of this adaptation 
process, the Kurds who migrated to the center of Ankara and Polatlı after village life 
                                                 
212 “Mesela ben hiç unutmuyorum benim ilk uyum şeyi normalde ben ilkokula yedi yaşında 
başlayamadım sekiz yaşında başladım. İşte geldiğimizde evimize yakın olan okulun kontenjanı 
dolmuştu abim oraya yazılmıştı. Birinci sınıf kontenjan dolduğu için beni almadılar evden biraz daha 
uzakta okulda alınabilirdi ama Türkçe bilmediğimiz için kendi başımıza gidip gelme olayı sorun 
olduğu için o yıl okula gidemedim yani dili bilmiyorsun şehri bilmiyorsun gidip gelme sorunu olacağı 
için yani beni bir sene geç gönderdiler okula bir yıl benim kaybım oldu yani tabi ki o etki ediyor 
yani.” 
213 “...Köyü özlüyorduk.köylüyü özlüyorduk. Yani yaşadığımız yeri yadırgıyorduk... İlk  kez 
Ankara’ya geldiğimde bir gün minibüs kuyruğuna girmiştim. Sabah işe giderken bir gün tren 
kuyruğuna girmiştim. Ve o kuyrukta beklerken işte bu dediklerinizi sorguluyordum. Ya bu ne ya ben 
de bundan sonra böyle mi yaşayacağım? Her gün otobüs kuyruğunda mı bekleyeceğim diye 
düşünüyordum. Ve kabullenemiyordum. Zoruma gidiyordu. Ya bu ne ya böyle hayat mı olur?” 
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express that they had to face discrimination from people of other ethnicities arising 
from negative prototypes about the Kurds. As a male informant who migrated from a 
village of Haymana to Polatlı quotes about those days: 
Of course, in the past they would get uncomfortable and distance themselves when they found 
out we were Kurdish. Sometimes, they were okay with it. Here’s something I laughed at: a 
neighbor said “they called me Kurd from Haymana, but don’t go, they’ll eat you up.” They 
presented us as enemies. But a friend of mine, for instance, told me “I am sorry, I badmouthed 
you, but it turns out you are not that kind of person.’” That is, we’ve been through and seen 
these.214 
In addition to being exposed to these kinds of misperceptions about the Kurds, CAK 
also suffered direct assaults from people in their neighbourhood. As a male informant 
within the age group of 30-60 tells: “When we first came then, in the simplest term, 
they talked rudely about our clothing, appearances, haircuts or hair and even our 
speech. Mostly, we were mocked here many times. For instance, if you can’t even 
clearly express yourself, he insults you.”215 CAK also suffered an affront: “They 
used the word ‘filth Kurds’ very often, it was such a common phrase.”216 These kinds 
of discriminatory behaviours worsened relations among children and adults. As a 
female informant narrates, children also were acting as if they had negative 
perceptions towards the Kurds: 
I had come to Polatlı to finish elementary school. But I didn't speak Turkish, not a word. 
Language was a problem. My mother tongue was Kurdish. Tatars resided in our neighborhood 
mostly. We could never get along. I mean, they used to say something and we would blankly 
stare at them. And they used to stare when we did. In fact, they asked if we swore at them 
because we spoke Kurdish. I mean they did something in that sense. We didn’t play together. 
They wouldn’t let us among them. For instance, there were 3 kids playing with a ball once and I 
held the ball, as I was a child who wanted to play. They took their ball and left. And they would 
call our elderly “here’s the Kurd”. They wouldn’t get off with us.217 
                                                 
214  “Tabii eskiden Kürt olduğumuzu duyduklarında rahatsız olur, uzaklaşırlardı. Zaman zaman 
alışırlardı, ben buna çok güldüm mesela; bir komşu dedi ki, “ulan Haymanalı Kürt dediler dedi, ama 
gitmeyin yerler sizi” bizi düşman gibi gösterdiler. Ama bir arkadaşım mesela, adam geldi “ya 
hakkınızı helal edin, ben sizin için böyle şeyler söyledim ama siz gerçekten öyle insanlar 
değilmişsiniz.” Söylendiğini gördük, yaşadık yani”. 
215  “O zaman geldiğimizde mesela en basit bizim kılık kıyafetimize, fiziğimize, tıraşlarımıza, 
saçımıza ondan sonra konuşmamız onlara göre işte kaba şeklinde ifade ederler... Genelde burada çok 
dalga geçmelere uğradık. Mesela kendimizi ifade ederken bile net ifade edemiyorsun adam sana 
hakaret ediyor.” 
216 “Hani o pis Kürtler kelimesini çok kullanıyorlardı yani bu deyim çok kullanılıyordu.” 
217 “Ben ilk ilkokul okumak üzere Polatlı’ya gelmiştim. Ama tek kelime Türkçe bilmiyordum. Dil 
sorunu vardı. Ana dilim Kürtçe’ydi. Mahallemizde genelde Tatarlar otururdu. Biz onlarla hiç 
anlaşamazdık... Yani bir şey söylerlerdi biz onların yüzüne bakardık. Biz söylerdik onlar bakardı. 
Hatta bizim söylediğimiz Kürtçe konuştuğumuz için bana küfür mü ediyorsun  derlerdi. Yani o 
anlamda  bir şeyler yaparlardı. Birlikte oyun oynamazdık. Aralarına almazlardı bizi. Mesela top 
oynuyor 3 kişi ben de topu tuttum çocuğum ya topu tutum oynamak istedim. Toplarını alıp giderlerdi. 
Büyüklerimize de işte Kürt diye hitap ederlerdi. Yakınlık kurmazlardı.” 
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When all of these expressions are examined, it is obvious that nearly half of the 
people among all age groups suffered a form of discrimination from other groups in 
their new living spaces. ‘Regarded as an enemy,’ ‘discountenancing,’ ‘alienation,’ 
‘nationalism,’ and ‘racism’ are the words used by informants while describing the 
behaviors of non-Kurdish groups towards them during their initial migration. 
However, it has been pointed out that informants who migrated to the center of 
Haymana populated by Kurds were not exposed to discriminative practices too often. 
They felt more like being at home compared to the others experiencing 
discriminatory behaviors. Interestingly enough, a couple of informants emphasized 
that they were unluckier than the Kurds in the Eastern part in the case of being 
exposed to discriminatory behaviors because of being surrounded densely by non-
Kurdish elements: 
I cannot help but agree with you. I grew up in Ankara. My wife grew up in Diyarbakir. Most of 
the kids in Diyarbakır have Kurdish names so they don’t get bullied much at school, even if they 
speak with an accent or speak Kurdish. Here, there were people who would show disdain at the 
slightest speech with an accent. Many of our relatives experienced this, my father did too. That’s 
why they speak Turkish more smoothly than Turks. Our people speak a smoother Turkish than 
people from Çankırı, Çorum or Konya. Because they went through something different, they 
took offense at being mocked and they tried to learn it the best they could. A lot of people 
around me speak Turkish better than Turks.218 
In addition to the ethnic composition of the newly settled area, the age group is 
another independent variable affecting whether interviewees were exposed to 
discriminatory practices. While all informants within the age group of 30-60 were 
exposed to a kind of discriminatory practice (although it varies in extent), the 
interviewees within the age group of 18-30 were subjected to discrimination less 
often, both in numbers and intensity. Especially because the center of Haymana 
consists of people mostly claiming Kurdish origin, they did not face difficulties in 
adaptation arising from their ethnic identity. To sum up, CAK who migrated to 
neighborhoods consisting of non-Kurdish elements were subjected to discriminatory 
practices in their initial migration. These discriminatory practices decreased overtime 
time through an increase in direct communication among people. The more recent 
                                                 
218 “Ben ister, istemez katılıyorum. Ben Ankara’da büyüdüm. Eşim Diyarbakır’da büyüdü, 
Diyarbakır’da zaten çocukların çoğu zaten çoğu Kürtçe isim kullanıyor, onun için çok fazla okulda bir 
şey görmüyorlar. Kürtçe konuşsalar, şiveli konuşsalar dalga da geçilmiyor. Burada mesela, bizim 
sınıflarımızda biraz şiveyle konuşsa küçümseyen insanlar vardı mesela. Bunu etrafımızdan pek çok 
akrabamız yaşamış, babam yaşamış kendisi yaşamış. Onun için Türkçeyi daha düzgün konuşuyorlar, 
Türklerden daha düzgün konuşuyorlar. Çankırılı, Çorumlu, Konyalıdan daha düzgün Türkçe 
konuşuyor bizimkiler. Çünkü bir şey var, dalga geçilmesi ağırlarına gidip onu dile göndermişler onu 
en iyi şekilde öğrenmeye çalışmışlar. Etrafımdaki pek çok insan Türkçeyi Türklerden daha güzel 
konuşuyor.” 
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situation regarding the relations between Kurdish and non-Kurdish elements will be 
discussed in the next sections. 
Regarding the issue of CAK’ knowledge about their ties with the region, almost all 
informants - thirteen out of fifteen - have knowledge of the settlement of their 
ancestors and their original homeland. That is to say, their ancestors migrated to the 
region variously from the era of Yavuz to the 19th century. The most common period 
stated by informants is the 18th century. Tribes that migrated to the region came 
from around Adıyaman, Urfa, and Horasan. As one of the male informants states, not 
all of the tribes arrived to the region because of forced migration: 
A few families who left Ziyaret village in Suruç in Urfa divided into four villages here. And the 
villages are also pretty big. There are villages with populations of near 6 thousand people. Our 
80-year-old grandpas used to tell us tales as there was no TV or radio 50 years ago. These were 
told then. Our elderly used to say as follows and we would eagerly listen to them: “Mustafa, you 
know what I think. We came from the east about 200 or 210 years ago. It’s been a complete 200 
years,” they would say. It used to attract my attention too in those days. So it was a full 200 
years. What I am talking about was at the end of 1960s. So if we add 50 years, nearly 250 years 
ago we migrated from the east to here to dwell. That is, it’s not an exile or anything. We came 
here on our own desire and we had a decree from the padishah. I mean, we are not a clan that 
was exiled. We came to dwell.219 
Actually, this is the only example of voluntary migration given by informants. 
Looking at the rest of the examples related to the issue, it is clear that migrations to 
the region arose from the enforcement of the administration during the Empire. 
These tribes came from surrounding regions of Adıyaman, Urfa, and Horasan and 
were distributed throughout the region as is reported in detail in the third chapter. 
As an important domain in the case of the recognition/rejection process, social 
relations at the present time should be examined more precisely. Bearing in mind that 
the initial relations between Kurdish and non-Kurdish elements were somehow 
problematic and showed discriminatory elements, these groups have taken important 
steps in their relations in case of providing social cohesion over time. Especially 
female informants frequently take their relations with neighbors to the forefront and 
                                                 
219 “Urfa’da, Urfa-Suruç ziyaret köyünden kopup gelmiş birkaç aile burada dört köye bölünmüşler. 
Köyler de bayağı büyük yani burada bayağı büyük. Yaklaşık beş-altı bin nüfuslu köyler var... 50 yıl 
önceki 80-90’lık dedelerimiz bizde tv, radyo gibi şeyler olmadığı için mesel anlatırdı. Bunlar o zaman 
anlatılırdı. Şöyle derdi büyüklerimiz birbirine anlatırken biz de kulak misafiri olurduk. Derlerdi ki; 
“Ya işte Mustafa şöyle düşünüyorum. Biz işte tam 200 yıl-210 yıl olmuş doğudan gelmişiz. Falan tam 
200 yıl oldu” gibi söylentiler kulağımdaydı. O zaman benim de dikkatimi çekiyordu. Demek tam 200 
yıl önce gelmişiz. Bu dediğim olaylarda  1960’lı yılların sonları. Bu da olduğuna göre bir elli yılda 
koyarsak yaklaşık 250 yıl önce bizler doğudan buraya ikamet etme amacıyla gelmişiz. Yani herhangi 
bir sürgün falan değil. Kendiliğinden, padişahtan şey alınarak, ferman alınarak gelmişiz. Yani 
sürgünler sonucu gelen bir aşiret değiliz. İkamet etme amacıyla gelmişiz.” 
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put too much stress on how they developed openhearted relations through face-to-
face communication. However, as a common pattern in the minds of nearly all 
informants, categorical discrimination arising from misperceptions about the Kurds 
has a determinant role in relations between the Kurds and non-Kurdish population. A 
female informant attracts attention to the problem: 
What we hear, what I am talking about is that two parties have distorted senses of each other. 
“Kurds are like bla bla, you don’t look like a Kurd at all.” However, the problem there is this, 
you are trying to be the ideal person -though everyone has a flaw - but you just try to reach an 
ideal communication point. We should be kind to each other, we should not break our 
neighbor’s heart, neighborliness is holy, we treat someone without regarding their ethnicity. But 
what we get is, “You don’t look like a Kurd at all.”220 
As stated above, even if CAK and non-Kurdish groups developed good relationships 
over time, these relations draw strength from profit-based face-to-face 
communication in which identities are invisible. From explanations of informants, it 
is easy to say that because Kurdishness is still seen as a threat, CAK kept silent about 
their ethnic identity to not destroy these ‘unproblematic’ relations: “I haven't had 
such a problem so far. Neither have I, nor they. I have lived in this building nearly 12 
years. My neighbors are mixed. I mean, there are both Turks and Kurds. And others 
as well. Not at the moment, but maybe in big cities such as Istanbul. If I hit the 
streets and wave a PDP flag, it would be a problem I think. It’s okay as long as we 
keep quiet.”221 
Remaining silent and suppressing their ethnic identity in social relations, CAK and 
their Kurdishness cannot be realized as much as among the Kurds in the East. On an 
individual level, CAK can be accepted equally as a part of the community in which 
they live. Nonetheless, they cannot be equally accepted by other groups with their 
ethnic identity revealed. Deep-rooted prejudices about the Kurds that create a hidden 
tension between the groups become concrete in discourse of non-Kurdish people 
according to an explanation of a male informant: 
                                                 
220 “Bizim duyduğumuz şey, bu başta bahsettiğim şey, iki tarafın birebiriyle algısı sorunlu. “Kürtler 
şöyledir, siz hiç Kürde benzemiyorsunuz.” Hâlbuki orada sorun şu biz, ideal insan olmaya, ya da ideal 
insan herkesin bir kusuru vardır ama ideal iletişim noktasını yakalamaya çabalıyoruz sadece. 
Birbirimize karşı nazik olalım, komşumuzun kalbini kırmayalım, komşuluk hakkıdır, bir başkasına 
nasıl davranacaksak, etnik kimliğine bakmadan öyle davranıyoruz ama duyduğumuz şey ‘Siz hiç 
Kürde benzemiyorsunuz.’” 
221 “Yani bugüne kadar öyle bir sorunum olmadı. Benim de olmadı onların da olmadı. Yaklaşık 12 
yıldır bu binada oturuyorum. Komşularım karışık. Yani Türk de var Kürt de var. Başkaları da var. Şu 
anda yok ama benim yok ama İstanbul gibi metropollerde olabilir. Ben sokaklara çıksam ben Kürdüm 
desem HDP bayrağı sallasam sorun olur herhalde. Ses çıkarmadığımız müddetçe sorun yok.” 
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... We were staying in the same room and one day she came to me and said that she thought 
Kurds had tails. She was absolutely not lying, we asked how come. This girl, our lady friend, 
studied in Ankara, I asked how, what she meant by tail. She said she thought Kurds were 
monsters with tails. And I said “Aaaaaaah, if we are monsters, you have stayed with us for 6 
months, we talked and such together, changed clothes, etc. Did you see any tail, do I have a 
tail?”  That is, an educated person can say this, she tells me we are monsters with tails. It still 
seems to me that it’s old hearsay to feed Kurdophobia.222 
As implied above, deep-rooted prejudices about the Kurds prevent cohesion between 
the Kurds and others in social life. Unfortunately, only individual relations can break 
down the prejudices belonging to people communicated with, not with all Kurds. 
Thus, prejudices are still being kept in mind. As a female informant indicates: “But 
there were a couple of reactions I got in the neighborhood; after that they got used to 
it too and they appreciated saying: ‘What’d you know, Kurds can be good friends 
after all. So Kurds have good ones among them too, we thought all of them are bad.’ 
They said all of this openly.”223 
Because CAK were exposed to discriminatory behaviors in their relations, they 
prefer somehow staying in a circle formed by Kurds. As one expression admits: “We 
try to reside where Kurds are. We're trying to be together with people who are close 
to our culture.”224 This is one of the factors causing some ghettoization even in small 
districts. As an example of ghettoization, the Kurds in Polatlı have densely settled in 
the Esentepe neighbourhood since the 1960s.225 In other words, they created a safe 
zone for themselves. Contrary to this safe zone, Turkish nationalists consisting of the 
Turks, Tatars, and Balkan immigrants formed another zone called Menteşe 
neighbourhood. Struggles between these two neighbourhoods sometimes turned to 
physical violence and still continue. Consequently, it is one of the factors damaging 
cohesion of the Kurds with other groups; despite the cosmopolitan structure of the 
                                                 
222 “...İşte bir arada sohbet ederken dedi işte aynı odada kalıyoruz ben dedi Kürtleri dedi kuyruklu 
biliyorum dedi. Kesinlikle yalan yok içinde öyle söyleyince nasıl dedik yani sohbet ortamında. Valla 
bu kız Ankara’da, bu bayan arkadaşımız Ankara’da okumuş nasıl olur dedim ya nasıl yani kuyruklu. 
Valla dedi ben Kürtleri dedi kuyruklu canavar diye biliyordum dedi. Öyle yapınca bende ona 
“aaaaaaa” dedim öyle bir ses ile madem biz canavarız kızım dedim sen altı ayır bizimle kalıyorsun 
beraber oturduk sohbet ettik beraber yan yana giyindik bilmem ne yaptık var mı bir kuyruk dedim 
gördün mü?  Yani bunu bir eğitimli insan söyleyebiliyor bana yani Kürtler kuyruklu canavar diye 
bizim kuyruğumuz varmış diyor. Halen bana göre kulaktan dolma işte hani eskiden söylenilmiş daha 
da hani Kürt düşmanlığı beslemek amacı ile söylenmiş sözler.” 
223  “Ama ilk mahallemde bir iki tepki aldım ondan sonra onlar da alıştı, demek ki Kürtlerden de iyi 
arkadaş olunuyormuş diye daha takdir ettiler. Demek ki Kürtlerin içinde de iyiler varmış biz hep kötü 
biliyorduk diye kendileri açık açık söyledi yani”, being good people is still seen an exceptional 
situation in case of the Kurds.” 
224 “Kürtlerin olduğu ortamda oturmaya çalışıyoruz. Kültürümüze yakın insanlarla bir arada olmaya 
çalışıyoruz.” 
225 Dr. Hecibram Mikailî, “Polatlı Kürtleri”, Bîrnebûn, Winter 1997, vol. 1., no. 1, p. 5. 
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district, the Kurds mostly prefer spending their time with other Kurds. To lend an ear 
to a female informant, she mentions the difficulty of communicating with people 
coming from other cultures: “Our family is so sincere. I feel more comfortable in 
environments where Kurdish is spoken. My friends in the east say the same. We used 
to gather and speak Kurdish. I expressed myself more comfortably. I felt like I 
belong to them. I would have a westerner as a friend but we are so different 
culturally that I couldn’t communicate with them properly.”226 
Even if communicating with non-Kurdish people is somehow difficult, the Kurds 
still come together with their relatives and maintain their cultural aspects even in the 
districts and the city center. From the expressions of informants, it is obvious that 
Kurds mostly come together with their relatives during wedding ceremonies and 
funerals. Relations based on traditional aspects remain the most common way to see 
each other, even if it is infrequent. In other words, they still maintain traditional 
forms of celebration and mourning. As a male informant extrapolates: 
We have lost nothing from our general custom. We dance the Kurdish halay and hold weddings. 
Even though it used to be forbidden, we would dance the Kurdish halay but the song would be 
Turkish. Now, thanks to God, we sing and dance Kurdish. Sometimes, there are weddings in the 
streets, in Haymana and Polatlı in particular. Kurdish halay is danced, folk songs are sung, 
especially at funerals, weddings, and in times of illness; so always we have a connection, 
togetherness. They come together at weddings or funerals even if they are crossed with each 
other or have daggers drawn.227 
Although CAK prefer to come together with their relatives and other Kurds, it does 
not mean that they are a closed community opposed to all kinds of inter-ethnic 
relations. Marriages are the most common way of inter-ethnic relations, which bring 
strictly different cultures together. Even if consanguineous marriages are common in 
the families of nearly all informants, there was no informant expressly opposed to 
inter-ethnic marriages. Even a female informant whose family is not supportive of 
                                                 
226  “Bizim aile çok içtendir doğaldır. Kürtçe konuşulduğu ortamlarda daha rahat hissediyorum. 
Doğudaki arkadaşlarım da onu diyordu, böyle bir araya geliyorduk Kürtçe konuşuyorduk. Kendimi 
daha rahat ifade ediyordum. Kendimi onlara aitmiş gibi hissediyordum. Bir batılı oluyordu, batılı bir 
arkadaşım oluyordu ama yani o kadar farklıyız ki, kültürel olarak farklı her şey farklı onlarla iletişim 
kuramıyordum.” 
227 “Bizim geçmişten örf adet ve göreneklerden hiçbir şey kaybetmedik. Kürtçe halay çeker, düğün 
yaparız. Eskiden ne kadar yasak olsa da biz yani halayımız yine Kürt halayı olurdu ama Türkçe 
söylerdi sazlar, şimdi şükür Kürtçe söylüyoruz, Kürtçe oynuyoruz. Bazen mesela şimdi mesela 
özellikle Haymana’da, Polatlı’da sokaklarda düğünler oluyor. Kürtçe halaylar çekiliyor, türküler 
söyleniyor... Özellikle cenazelerde, düğünlerde ve hastalıkta olsun her zaman yani öyle bir bağımız 
var, birlikteliğimiz var. Birbirine küs de olsa, hiç konuşmasa bile, kanlı bıçaklı olsalar düğünlerde 
cenazelerde bir araya gelirler.” 
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this kind of marriage and the most distant among informants explains, it can be 
accepted even if not preferred: 
Kin marriage is very common; they don’t intermarry, I’ll tell you that. Our people, they call the 
Kurds around Kırşehir desert Kurds. The priority is being a desert Kurd: they first ask where he 
is from, which village. But if he is a Turk, they don’t really welcome him well, but they know 
enduring is silence. I have an uncle and an aunt who married Turks. It's kind of hard but we still 
allow them among us.228 
Except two informants, the rest insist that inter-ethnic marriages are a problem 
neither for them nor for their families. Another female informant just adverts that it 
may create a problem while impressing Kurdish identity upon her children: “Rather 
than being Kurdish or not, it’s enough for me that she is okay with me naming our 
kids Kurdish names and letting our kids speak Kurdish along with Turkish. In this 
sense, it may be more advantageous that she is Kurdish.”229 To sum up, inter-ethnic 
marriages did not matter to almost any of the informants, except two female 
interviewees within the age group of 18-30. In general, they mentioned that it is not 
important for them whether their children will marry Kurds or Turks.  
As aforementioned above, CAK occasionally come together with their relatives on 
special days. At this point, it is observed in the field that there is not a strong 
solidarity or colloboration among CAK, which results from a lack of organization in 
urban areas. Certainly there are some fellow countrymen associations especially at 
the district-level. However, in the case of ones’ belonging to CAK and their 
hometowns, these associations are not active enough to bring CAK together with 
their relatives and other Kurds from the region. While conducting an interview with a 
representative from The Association of Social Cooperation and Solidarity for 
Haymanaians (Haymanalılar Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Kültür Derneği), it was learned 
that there were previously some initiatives to bring CAK living in urban areas to the 
rural areas by organizing regular spring festivals in the rural areas. Nevertheless, they 
had to end these traditional occasions because of their disfunctionality and lack of 
sphere of influence. As a member of the Board of Directors of the Association 
propounds, the administration had to cover the expenses of the occasions on their 
                                                 
228 “Yani akraba evliliği çok yaygın, dışarı kız vermiyorlar öyle söyleyeyim...Bizimkilerde şöyle bir 
şey var, bizim Kırşehir çevresine çöl Kürtleri derler. Öncelik çöl Kürt’ü olmasıdır mesela, hani hangi 
köyden, çevre köyden mi ilk onu sorarlar. Ama hani Türk olursa, ya onu çok şey yapmazlar yani, iyi 
karşılamazlar ama içlerine atmayı da bilirler. Çünkü Türklerle evlilik yapmış amcam var, hani halam 
var. Biraz zor oluyor ama yine de içimize alıyoruz.” 
229  “Kürt olup olmamasından ziyade, benim çocuklarıma Kürtçe isim koymam onun için sorun 
olmasın ya da çocuklarımı hani Kürtçe öğrenmesi Kürtçeyi de Türkçeyle birlikte konuşması onun için 
sorun olmasın benim için yeter. Bu anlamda Kürt olması daha avantajlı olabilir.” 
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own because of the unwillingness of people to contribute money. According to him, 
they could not enroll people for the association because of disinterestedness towards 
their hometown. This man complains a lot about Haymanaians in Ankara because of 
their perception of the Association as a place that gives scholarship. Even if the 
Association is not providing such kind of financial means, people were interested in 
the activities of the Association until they realized it is not providing financial aid. It 
is obvious that there is a need for an organized and comprehensive organization 
beyond functioning as a fellow countrymen association. As a newly established 
umbrella organization, The Association of Culture and Solidarity of Central 
Anatolian Kurds (KOMKURD-AN, Orta Anadolu Kürtleri Kültür ve Dayanışma 
Derneği) was founded to fill this gap. 
KOMKURD-AN was founded by a group of Kurdish people among Ankara, 
Kırşehir, and Konya with the aim of transferring Kurdish culture and tradition to the 
next generations of CAK to counter assimilation. In the founding declaration, it is 
stressed that the organization comprehends all people no matter which political view 
they have because of their aim to create a place for common struggle. Nevertheless, 
executives of the Association declared their support of the PDP in the June 7 
elections, a party that is identified as the political party having the same goals with 
the Association. Because it is newly established, the association does not have a 
proper detailed activity schedule. Nonetheless, executives explained that they will 
bring CAK, especially young people, together by organizing events such as movie 
and documentary screenings, annual conferences, as well as supporting academic 
studies on CAK to fill the gap of which they are also aware. As one of the executives 
of the Association stresses, CAK had been exposed to state politics of assimilating 
their Kurdishness. He drew attention on the issue that CAK living in the center of 
Ankara mostly work in unqualified jobs, such as sellers in markets and taxi drivers, 
which arises from being unofficially blocked from other working sectors if they are 
not well educated. Additionally, the executive gives an anecdote that he recently 
experienced to show how people exhibit discriminatory behaviours towards Kurds. 
When the executives of the Association were looking for a space for rent to serve as 
a work place, two owners refused to let their places when they heard the name of the 
Association. He also insisted that CAK were exposed to these kinds of 
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discriminatory behaviours more often than Kurds in the eastern part of Turkey, who 
live in an atmosphere formed by the Kurds.  
Along with the executive’s personal experiences and observations on discrimination 
of CAK, as it is aforementioned, misperceptions and prejudices towards CAK harm 
mutual relationships between Kurds and non-Kurdish groups in the region. Other 
than a female informant within the age group of 18-30 and another one within the 
age group of 30-60, all informants faced some kind of discriminatory behaviour or 
were exposed to discourse on it. While eight informants personally experienced 
discriminatory implementations in social life, five of them witnessed discriminatory 
behaviours or discourses directed to other people. The Kurds especially suffer from 
misperceptions of Kurds during hiring procedures. A male informant gives an 
example about prejudices of Kurds in the business life: 
This was the subject of a conversation, they were talking freely as nobody knew I was Kurdish; 
people couldn’t badmouth Kurds in the presence of someone from Diyarbakır. They can’t 
anticipate that you can be Kurdish or that there are Kurds in your family. They think it’s okay 
when the person is from Kırşehir. They start to badmouth Kurds. One day, in my friend’s house, 
there was another friend. He was the head of a paint company, some officer. He said something 
by the by, he said “Kurds come here sometimes, but I don’t employ them, I discriminate against 
them,” and I reacted to this. That was a quite tense situation.230 
3 male and 6 female informants stressed that they reacted when they experience or 
witness discriminatory behaviours contrary to one male and one female informant 
within the age groups of 18-30, who declared that they just got angry in such cases. 
Another male informant who is very emotional emphasizes that he revolts against 
discriminatory behaviours that he cannot stand anymore. Just one female informant 
within the age group of 30-60 declares that she would take legal action in such cases. 
Consequently, emotional and personal reactions are preferred against legal 
procedures. 
Although discriminatory behaviours are common towards the Kurds in the region, it 
did not result in common self-hiding mechanisms among CAK about their identities. 
Other than two informants (one male within the age group of 18-30 and one female 
within the age group of 30-60), interviewees do not hide their identities in social 
                                                 
230 “Bir sohbette konusu geçmişti, kimse benim Kürt olduğumu bilmediği için benim yanımda rahat 
rahat konuşuyorlardı, insanlar bir Diyarbakırlının yanında Kürtlere rahat rahat atıp tutamıyorlar. Senin 
girdiğin ortamda, senin Kürt, senin ailende Kürt olduğunu tahmin edemiyorlar. Kırşehir falan filan 
deyince, çok fazla şey yapmıyorlar. Kürtlere atıp tutmaya başlıyorlar. Bir gün işte bir arkadaşımın 
evinde onun başka bir arkadaşı vardı. İşte, kendisi bir boya firmasının müdürüydü, bir şeyiydi, yetkili 
bir isimdi. İşte, “Kürtler geliyor bazen onlara iş vermiyorum falan filan, onları ayırıyorum falan” diye 
sohbet arasında gelişmişti, tepki göstermiştim. Bayağı gerilmiştik, öyle bir şey olmuştu.” 
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relations. These two informants said that they hide their Kurdishness in just special 
time periods and cases; as a female informant explains: “We were hiding it 
sometimes during our elementary school times, but we don’t need to now. We were 
limiting ourselves back then because we were fresh from the village, considering 
whether we would get a reaction. But, if that were to happen now, I would stand 
against limiting myself.”231 In addition, what one male informant says seems to show 
he hides his Kurdishness just when he has to face racist people, with whom he cannot 
argue. Overall, the Kurdishness of informants however becomes visible in their 
social life when discriminatory actions occur. 
To sum up, CAK needed to migrate from rural to urban areas due to educational and 
economic reasons, which subsequently initiated the challenging process of their 
adaptation to urban life. After their migration, they faced problems maintaining 
social bonds with their relatives because of weakened ties arising from difficulties of 
coming together. During the adaptation process in urban areas, they were exposed to 
discriminatory behaviours arising from negative perceptions about Kurds that 
prevent cohesion between Kurds and Turks, as well as experiencing language 
problems. Because negative perceptions about Kurds still exist, CAK were alienated. 
Although social relations between Kurds and other groups are now stronger than 
before, they still cannot develop powerful social bonds with other groups as well as 
they can among themselves. 
4.3. The Dimension of Belonging/Isolation: The Issues of Identity and Language 
As the second dimension in the case of measuring social cohesion of CAK, domains 
of identity and mother tongue indicate how people balance between their identity and 
sense of values and majority groups’ without causing either assimilation of their own 
identity or total isolation of themselves from the majority group. Questioning how 
they define themselves and the groups to which they belong, how they differentiate 
themselves from other groups, what Kurdishness means to them, how they approach 
contours of ethnicity in their preferences, and how language impacts their identity is 
important to understand social cohesion/exclusion in this category. 
                                                 
231  “İlkokula filan giderken bazen saklıyorduk ama şimdi gerek duymuyoruz. O zamanlar biz yeni 
köyden gelmiştik acaba bir tepki gösterilir mi diye kısıtlıyorduk kendimizi. Ama şimdi olsa o 
kısıtlamaya karşı gelirim kendim.” 
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To begin with the domains of social cohesion related to the dimension of 
belonging/isolation, the issue of how people define themselves is very crucial to 
show their relation with identity. In the case of CAK discussed here, this issue 
changes from person to person. Ten informants equally distributed in two genders 
define themselves as Kurds, while the rest (two females within the age group of 30-
60, one female within the age group of 18-30 and two males within the age group of 
18-30) define themselves differently, such as “in the middle of Turkishness and 
Kurdishness,” “both Kurdish and Turkish,” “ethnically Kurdish but Turkish in 
general,” “Kurdish but a citizen of the Republic of Turkey” and “ethnically Kurdish 
but feeling Turkish.” In other words, they do not use a proper definition to describe 
their identity. Like Kurdishness, Turkishness seems to form an important part of their 
identity. According to an explanation of a female informant, Turkishness can have an 
even greater impact on the identity of a Kurdish person in the region: “I am Kurdish 
now, but as a Kurd, I am someone with complete Ataturkist thought. Do I feel 
Kurdish? I understand, but I can’t speak. Did I make any effort for this? I didn’t. Is it 
hard to live among Kurds? It is. Does it have advantages? I think generally I feel like 
a Turk.”232 As another domain in this context, informants’ perception of Kurdishness 
and what Kurdishness means to them are other important issues determining their 
definitions of identity. Informants describe the Kurds as a different group of people, 
especially in the case of their language tradition. Nonetheless, as some informants 
stressed, Kurdishness was mixed with Turkishness as if forming an interwoven 
building stone. Interactions between Kurdishness and Turkishness, with Turkishness 
somehow dominating Kurdishness in the region, become concrete in these sentences 
of a male informant: 
In fact it is a little different to be a Kurd in CA: we accept being assimilated, our language is 
lost; I think the generation after ours won’t speak Kurdish, not more than 30 sentences. What's 
that, because of what we talked about, we talk about Turkish Kurdish. Both our economic 
concerns and new generation, well how can I put this, they don’t see being Kurdish as an 
identity, they’ve started to see it more like the race of their fathers. It has started to lose its 
respect. I live among Kurds, speak Turkish; I don’t have much to do with Kurdish. It’s like a 
fancy language; if you come across 3-5 Kurdish friends then you can speak Kurdish a little bit 
and have fun, otherwise Kurdish is not spoken much. It seems to be that the ones after us won’t 
speak it at all, that’s the case in our village.233 
                                                 
232  “Ben şu an Kürdüm ama Kürt olarak tamamen Atatürkçü düşünceye sahip bir insanım. Kendi Kürt 
gibi hissediyor muyum? Anlıyorum ama konuşamıyorum. Bunun için herhangi bir çabam oldu mu? 
Olmadı. Kürtler arasındaki yaşam zor mu zor. Güzellikleri var mı var. Genel olarak ben kendimi 
sanırım Türk gibi hissediyorum.” 
233 “Kürt, İç Anadolu bölgesinde Kürt olmak aslında biraz ayrıcalıklı, asimile olduğumuzu kabul 
ediyoruz, dilimiz kayboldu, bizden sonraki nesil herhalde 30 cümlenin üzerinde Kürtçe bilmez. O da 
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For the case of CAK, it seems that Kurdishness has different connotations because of 
its existence under a majority ethnicity with other subsequent ethnicities in the region 
for centuries. Interactions between Kurdishness and Turkishness impact how 
informants define and perceive Kurdishness. It is obvious from the explanations of 
informants that approximately one third of informants stress they are under the effect 
of both Kurdishness and Turkishness. Because a considerable amount of the Kurdish 
population has been living under the effect of Turkishness for centuries, it is not 
surprising that informants describe themselves as being influenced by both ethnic 
groups. As a female informant within the age group of 18-30 implies, language is the 
most prominent element under the effect of Turkishness, which can be considered the 
majority ethnicity in the region. It is also one of the factors differentiating the 
Kurdish population in the region from the Kurds in the Eastern part of Turkey: 
Here’s the thing, living in CA is a little different. I can find myself very different from my 
friends from Diyarbakır. In terms of language and customs, there is a point at which the 
language started to turn into Turkish; among CAK the most important element of culture is the 
language and it started to meld into Turkish, a common language and a common culture are 
emerging.  Turkish-Kurdish marriages, in my opinion, are more common among CAK because 
there is a mixed environment now. Therefore I can compare it to many regions and I can relate it 
to geography. For instance, Kırşehir Kurds and, say, Haymana Kurds are different from one 
another. I know this but it doesn’t occur to me until now that there are still many differences 
between Kurds. We can find many similarities with, say, Adıyaman Kurds, maybe because our 
ancestors migrated from there and there are things that they preserved. But for another instance, 
we may not find common ground with a Diyarbakır Kurd. This is something, I think, that the 
time Kurds and Turks have spent together caused.234 
Although informants insist that Turkish influenced Kurdish spoken in the region too 
much and even somehow Turkified it, Burhan Sönmez, a Kurdish author from 
Haymana, argues the exact opposite. From his perspective, based on his observations 
in the region, Kurdish spoken in the villages of CA is more original and unaffected 
                                                                                                                                          
nedir, Kürtçe konuşmadığımızdan, Türkçe konuştuğumuzdan dolayı. Hem ekonomik kaygılarımız, 
hem de yeni nesil pek, yani ne diyeyim, nasıl diyeyim, Kürtlüğü bir kimlik olarak görmüyor, daha çok 
böyle bir işte babanın ırkı gibi görmeye başladı. Çok fazla saygı duyulmamaya başladı. Kürtlerin 
içinde yaşıyorum Türkçe konuşuyorum, Kürtçe pek işim olmuyor. Şey olmuş, fantezi dili olmuş, 3-5 
Kürt arkadaş bulursan, 3-5 Kürtçe konuşup eğlendikleri bir şey gibi, çok fazla Kürtçe konuşulmuyor 
artık. Bizden sonrakiler hiç konuşmayacak gibi geliyor bana, bizim köyde öyle.” 
234 “Şöyle bir şey var, ben biraz daha Orta Anadolu’da olmak biraz farklı bir şey ben kendimi 
Diyarbakırlı arkadaşımdan çok farklı bulabiliyorum. Dil bakımından, gelenek görenek bakımından 
dilin de Türkçeleşmeye başladığı bir nokta var orta Anadolu Kürtlerinde bence kültürün en önemli 
öğesi Türkçeleşmeye başladığında şey oluyor hani ortak bir dil kuruluyor, kültürler de 
ortaklaşabiliyor. Türk-Kürt evlilikleri benim tahminimce Orta Anadolu Kürtlerinde daha yoğun çünkü 
artık böyle bir mix bir ortam oluşmuş. Dolayısıyla çoğu bölgelere benzetebilirim, coğrafyaya 
bağlayabilirim. Atıyorum Kırşehir Kürtleriyle ne bileyim bir Haymana Kürtleri birbirinden farklı 
bunu biliyorum, şu an aklıma gelmez ama Kürt’le Kürt arasında da çok fark var. Atıyorum bir 
Adıyaman Kürt’üyle çok ortak nokta bulabiliriz, belki atalarımız oradan göçtüğü için hala bunları 
korudukları, sakladıkları şeyler var. Mesela Diyarbakır Kürt’üyle de ortak nokta bulamayabiliyoruz. 
Hani bu bence, hani Türklerin Kürtlerle birlikte yaşadığı coğrafyada geçirdiği süreyle oluşturduğu bir 
şey.” 
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contrary to Kurdish commonly spoken in the Eastern part of Turkey. The region 
created a safe zone for the Kurdish language because CAK had to preserve their 
cultural aspects to ensure that they did not have another struggle towards 
assimilation. Nonetheless, he accepts that under the current situation Kurdish 
language is under the effect of Turkish influences in urban areas. The effect of 
Turkishness makes more sense with the fact that all informants claimed that their 
elders were defining themselves as totally Kurdish. In other words, while CAK were 
living in rural areas, they were feeling less effects of Turkishness. To sum up, there 
may be other results when investigating current situations in villages beyond the 
scope of this study. 
As an interesting detail, some informants also complain about misperceptions 
dependent on perceiving Kurds as a single unit and instead differentiating themselves 
from the Kurds in the Eastern part of Turkey. A male informant complained about 
associating the Kurds with The Kurdistan Workers' Party-PKK (Kürdistan İşçi 
Partisi-PKK). Another female informant also said that she got annoyed of Kurds’ 
support for the PKK and the association of the PKK with all Kurds. From the male 
informant’s perspective, CAK are more willing to get along well with the state 
because Kurdish identity is secondary for them:  
To be honest, CAK see themselves as a minority, but I see us as Turkish. Because one Kurd 
feels like a minority among 5 Turks, that’s true. There is an image, sometimes a rumor, 
sometimes an opinion, that Kurds are bad and all. Typically, Kurds are uncomfortable with this, 
since this viewpoint of Kurds generally has to do with the PKK after these incidents in the East. 
Even people that don’t have anything to do with that are stigmatized as well. Turks say,“They 
are Kurds, they support PKK,” every time.  There is a prejudgment, even if someone lacks any 
connection to the PKK, because he was stigmatized once. There are times when we go through 
adversity, but because we do not have a structure, and we built our relations on getting along - I 
am speaking for my own society - we sometimes laugh away things like this, we sometimes 
don’t mind. This is also something religiously serious. Islam does not accept racism so it would 
be accurate to say that Kurdish identity is of second priority for us.235 
Although CAK’ perceptions about the PKK are not asked to informants directly, 
three informants insisted that they did not have a positive view of the PKK and its 
                                                 
235 “Vallahi, İç Anadolu Kürdü kendini azınlık gibi görür ama Türkiyelidir diye düşünüyorum ben. 
Çünkü 5 tane Türkün içinde bir Kürt kendini azınlık hissediyor, o bir gerçek. Biri imaj var, bazen 
söylenti, bazen görüntü, Kürtler kötüdür, şudur. Genelde bu Doğu olaylarından sonra Kürtlere bakış 
tarzları genelde PKK üzerinden yürüdüğü için Kürtler de bundan rahatsız. Hiç işi olmayan adamlar da 
bu damgayı yedi. Türkler en basit bir şeyde, bunlar “Kürt’tür, PKK’lıdır.” PKK’yla alakası olmasa da 
o damgayı yediği için bir önyargı var. Sıkıntı yaşadığımız zamanlar oluyor ama şey bir yapıya sahip 
olmadığımız için, genelde iyi geçinme üzerine bir şeyimiz olduğu için, ben kendi topluluğum için 
söylüyorum yani böyle şeylere bazen gülüp geçiyoruz, bazen değer vermiyoruz. Dinsel de bunun ağır 
bir şeyi var, Müslümanlık çünkü ırkçılığı kabul etmiyor, onun için bizim için Kürt kimliği aslında 2. 
sırada dersek daha doğru olur.” 
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armed struggle. In conjunction with this issue, Kurds are defined by informants as 
peaceful people, who avoid conflicts: ‘bravery,’ ‘respectfulness,’ ‘being gentle to 
family elders,’ ‘hospitality,’ and ‘reliability’ are the main qualities of Kurdish people 
from the eyes of informants. No informant used negative adjectives to define Kurds. 
However, three informants underlined that every ethnic group contains good and bad 
natured people separate from its own aspects. As a male informant emphasized, the 
Kurds are perceived as patriotic people, who have been deceived by politicians: “For 
instance, Kurds and Turks warred back to back in the past and there was no 
discrimination like this, no alienation; polarization happened. They lived together. 
Political speeches nowadays are all for schemes, profit, and political interest.”236 
Thus, except for their different languages, both groups arguably have similar life-
styles that make them closer in their social lives. Nevertheless, two female 
informants within the age group of 30-60 thought that CAK became different in the 
case of moral values observed in daily life, such as crossing legs in front of family 
elders, smoking cigarettes near them, or treating them in a respectful manner. 
According to these two informants, the Kurds are quite careful to obey moral values, 
contrary to the Turks. Another female informant, despite these two informants, said 
the exact opposite:  
Let me tell you this. I’ve lived in Dikmen for 6 years and in the same building and my neighbors 
were Turkish. Now I live here with my mother, her neighbors are all Kurdish. Not a single Turk 
resides in this building. Not in Block A nor in B. All of them are Kurdish. If you ask the 
difference between them, I have still not gotten used to it here. In Dikmen, everyone lived in 
their own house happily and comfortably, no one disturbs one another there. But here, women sit 
on the pavement in the middle of the street, they bluster and kids squabble... It’s a literal street 
ambience, nothing else. Conflicts in the building, clamor during day and night - I mean there is 
no respect, and people don’t respect one another. No one even knows what respect means.237 
Even if informants see the Turks and Kurds as two groups interwoven together, the 
perception of the state’s different attitude towards these groups finds voice in a male 
informant’s statement: “The difference between the two is a bit like the state’s 
naughty boy, I mean it is viewed as that. It's like as if you do something wrong, the 
                                                 
236 “Yani mesela geçmişte Kürtler Türkler sırt sırta savaşmış böyle bir ayrımcılık olmamış, 
ötekileştirme, kutuplaşma olmamış, hep bir arada yaşammışlar. Şimdiki siyasi söylemler oyun, çıkar, 
menfaat siyasi çıkarlar için.” 
237 “Ben şöyle aktarayım; ben Dikmen’de yaşadım 6 yıl boyunca ve aynı binada yaşadım ve tüm 
komşularım Türk’tü. Şu an burada annemle yaşıyorum, annemin Kürt komşuları; hepsi Kürt. Tek bir 
Türk yok bu binada. A blokta da yok B blokta da yok. Hepsi Kürt. Aradaki farkı sorarsan ben buraya 
hala alışmış değilim. Mesela ben Dikmen’de kendi evimde herkes huzurlu bir şekilde kendi evinde 
kimse kimseyi rahatsız etmez, kimse kimsenin sesini duymaz. Ama burada; buranın kadınları sokak 
ortasında kaldırımda oturuyorlar, bağıra çağıra konuşmalar, çocukların didişmesi. Tam bir sokak 
havası, başka hiçbir şey değil. Bina içindeki çatışmalar, gece olsun gündüz olsun bağırış çağırış, yani 
bir saygı yok, insanların birbirine saygısı yok. Saygının ne demek olduğunu bilen yok.” 
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state pulls your ear like a punishment. It’s not like this when you’re Kurdish. Being 
Kurdish is very different. They directly try to destroy you, assimilate you and even 
kill you.”238As aforementioned in previous parts of this study, CAK were exposed to 
discriminatory behaviors not only just from the state, as this informant says, but also 
from other groups in their social lives. Despite all discriminatory experiences, the 
fact comes in view as a general pattern that informants construct their identity by 
seeing themselves as a part of Turkey. Even people who define themselves totally as 
Kurds and detach themselves from Turks see the Kurds equally with other ethnic 
groups as a part of Turkey. A female informant says: “No. Never have I myself felt 
like a minority. I think this is something offensive, after all there are many Kurds 
living in the East or Southeast. They live in CA as well, which my friends find very 
strange; they ask, ‘Are there Kurds in Kırşehir?’ But I’ve never myself felt like a 
minority. I was born here, grew up here, this land belongs to me as well.”239 
Moreover, some informants said that they were aware that some Kurdish and Turkish 
nationalists tried to antagonize the Turks and Kurds against each other and make the 
Kurds perceive themselves as a minority. To sum up, informants are inclined to 
believe and feel that they themselves totally belong to this country.  
A strong interaction between Turkish and Kurdish identity arises in preferences of 
being together with Turks and Kurds in social life. However, as is understood from 
interviews, there is not a common pattern in this case. While some informants prefer 
to work and be friends with Kurds in their life - because they feel more comfortable 
with them - approximately two thirds of informants counter this argument by 
declaring that Turkishness or Kurdishness does not have any effect on their 
preferences. Even more politicized Kurds do not differentiate between people in 
social relations. As a female informant implies:  
For example, in the site I reside now, my 2 neighbors in the building, how can I put this... The 
site is composed of 32 households. Maybe six of them are Kurds. The rest are Turks, but there 
have never been any problems. That is, I had an emergency at 3 o’clock in the morning, I had 
someone who got sick and I could have very easily knocked on any of my neighbors’ doors. If I 
knock on my Turkish neighbor’s door and tell them that my mother is sick and I live with her 
                                                 
238 “İkisi arasındaki fark Türkler biraz şey devletin böyle yaramaz çocuğu gibi o şekilde gibi 
görülüyor. Sanki bir kabahat işlesen kulağını çekiyor ceza gibi, kenara oturtturuyor. Kürt olduğunda 
böyle olmuyor. Kürtlük çok farklı oluyor. Direk seni yok etmeye, işte asimile etmeye, yeri geliyor 
öldürmeye.” 
239  “Yok. Asla, asla yok hayır ben asla bir azınlık olarak hissetmedim. Bu bence kırıcı bir şey, sonuçta 
Doğu’da, güneydoğuda yaşayan bir sürü Kürt var. İç Anadolu’da yaşayan var, arkadaşların çok 
tuhafına gidiyor, “Kırşehir’de Kürt var mı aa?” diyorlar ama ya ben asla kendimi azınlık olarak 
hissetmedim. Burada doğdum, büyüdüm, topraklar da bana ait.” 
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and I need a car urgently, they would all come running and help. The Kurd-Turk conflict may be 
defended politically and we argue different things politically, but like I said, interpersonal 
relationships are something else. I would succor no matter what, and they surely would too, even 
if it’s 3 am.240 
Regarding preferences of being with Kurds or other ethnic groups, it is understood 
from informants that they are more distant from other emigrated groups, such as 
those from the Balkans and Caucasia. As understood from the thoughts of 
informants, Balkan emigrants and Circassians do not have good relations with Kurds, 
contrary to the Turks and Tartars. In other words, Kurds and these emigrated groups 
were not in contact too often because of these groups’ being more nationalist. A 
female informant says she is bothered by the attitudes of the Circassians when they 
are talking about Kurdish demands for education in their mother tongue. According 
to her statement, the Circassians say that if they do not demand mother tongue 
language education, neither should the Kurds. Another male informant suggests that 
their nationalist attitudes damage relations between these groups, as below: 
Among these, the actual Turks are closer to us. That is, immigrants to Turkey, Bosnians, they 
are the real nationalists. There is no problem with actual Turks. They are closer to us. Because 
we have intermarried with them. We have mixed up with them. Their customs are closer to ours, 
especially the Laz. Their customs are identical to that of Kurds’. But there are ones that we call 
muhajir (immigrant) and Bosnians that have later immigrated to Turkey. They're more 
nationalist.241 
The issue of Kurdish naming is another case that contributes to the issue of 
belonging. Other than one informant, who prefers a religious name rather than a 
Kurdish one, all informants have positive thoughts about giving a Kurdish name to 
their children. Among informants who already have children, five of eight informants 
declare that they gave a Kurdish name to their children. More then two thirds of 
informants experienced, observed, or heard that giving Kurdish names to children 
created problems in public institutions and other areas. Informants with Kurdish 
                                                 
240 “Yani benim mesela şuan oturduğum sitede benim oturduğum kattaki iki komşum üst komşularım 
yani nasıl diyim sitede 32 haneden oluşuyor. Belki altı tanesi Kürttür. Geri kalanı Türk ama hiçbir 
zaman yani bir sorun olmadı. Yani gecenin üçünde benim acil bir işim oldu sorunum oldu hastam oldu 
bir şey oldu yani çok rahatlıkla gidip herhangi bir komşumun kapısını çaldım. Türk komşumun 
kapısını çalsam işte benim annem hasta annemle yaşıyorum işte acil arabaya ihtiyacım var desem 
hepsi koşarak gelir yani hani o Türk Kürt olayı belki siyasal anlamda savunuluyor, farklı şeyleri 
savunuyoruz siyasi anlamda ama insani ilişkilerde diyorum ya gecenin üçü de olsa oda koşar bende 
koşarım kesinlikle.” 
241 “Bunlar içinde gerçek Türk olanlar bize daha yakın. Yani sonradan Türkiye’ye göç eden 
muhacirler, Boşnaklar asıl milliyetçiliği yapanlar onlar. Gerçek Türklerde bir sorun yok. Onlar bize 
daha bir yakın. Çünkü biz onlara kız verdik onlar da bizden kız aldı. Karıştık gittik. Bize daha yakın, 
örf adet görenekler. Hele de Lazlar. Örf adet görenekleri bizim Kürtlerden hiç farkı yok aynı. Ama o 
muhacir dediğimiz, Boşnak dediğimiz sonradan Türkiye’ye göç edenler var. Onlar daha çok 
milliyetçilik yapıyor.” 
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names had also frequently faced problems in the past. Even if there is a general 
perception that these problems stayed in the past, informants express that such 
problems still exist and are more likely to continue in the future. A female informant 
gives a recent example on the issue: "Our sister Berivan, for example, is a teacher. 
She uses the alias ‘Perihan.’ Why? Because the name Berivan is a Kurdish name. 
Official records say she is Perihan but we call her Berivan. There are a lot of people 
like that around me. Moreover, my aunt has changed her name; her name was also 
Berivan and she made it Berna. Yes, she had experienced various problems so she 
changed her name to Berna; it wasn’t long ago, she did it around 2 years ago.”242 
Although there is awareness regarding the risks of discrimination because of having 
Kurdish names, informants view giving their children a name from their native 
language as a right. 
The issue of native language, is also seen as the most important aspect of 
Kurdishness for CAK.  However, increasing levels of education resulting from 
migration from rural to urban areas decreased Kurdish knowledge, especially among 
youth born in urban environments. The rate of Kurdish speaking and comprehension 
among Kurdish-origin people in the region has decreased significantly in the last 
forty years.243 All of the informants who took part in this study declared that they 
speak Turkish very well in comparison to Kurdish, which used to even be the native 
language of some of them during their childhood. Nevertheless, now 15 informants 
speak fluently in Turkish in contrast to Kurdish. As a female informant’s statement 
exemplifies “Turkish in daily life, unfortunately. I forgot my own language; every 
now and then I talk to my mom and father and I can reply when they ask me 
something, but I cannot speak Kurdish as fluently as I speak Turkish. This saddens 
me a lot.”244 As another male informant mentions, they speak a ‘primitive level’ of 
Kurdish without being able to speak fluently. Kurdish is now just used among people 
who are middle aged and is used solely for communication with their family 
members. Seven informants within the age group of 30-60 and one female informant 
                                                 
242 “Berivan abla, öğretmen mesela. Perihan adını kullanıyor. Neden? Berivan ismi Kürt ismi olduğu 
için. Resmi olarak kayıtlarda Perihan diye geçiyor ama biz Berivan diyoruz. Çevremde böyle çok kişi 
var. Hatta yengem ismini değiştirdi, onun adı da Berivan’dı o da Berna yaptı. Evet, çeşitli sıkıntılar 
yaşıyordu o yüzde Berivan adını değiştirdi Berna yaptı ve daha yeni oldu 1-2 yıl içinde filan oldu.” 
243 Nuh Ateş, “Orta Anadolu’da Kürt Gerçeği ve Kurumlaşma”, Bîrnebûn,  Summer 2001, no. 13, p. 
28. 
244 “Günlük hayatta Türkçe maalesef. Kendi dilimi unutmuşum arada sırada annemle konuşuyorum, 
babamla konuşuyorum, onlar sorduğunda cevap verebiliyorum ama Türkçeyi akıcı konuşabiliyorum 
ya, Kürtçeyi konuşamıyorum. Bu da beni bayağı bir üzüyor.” 
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within the age group of 18-30 say that they use Kurdish whenever they come 
together with their family members.  
As mentioned in previous sections, informants who were born and spent their 
childhood in rural areas initially had problems when they migrated to urban areas 
arising from difficulties in communication with Turkish people. Even if their native 
language was Kurdish, they had to forget it to learn Turkish for their education. As 
one male informant expresses “Because we’ve learned Turkish by killing Kurdish, 
we can no longer get our tongues around Kurdish. Turkish is more comfortable since 
we speak Turkish for everything in some situations. I can't express myself in Kurdish 
anymore.”245 All informants within the age group of 30-60 were raised in an 
environment in which all elders and family members spoke Kurdish as a native 
language. However, as a common pattern, those within the age group of 18-30 were 
exposed to Turkish and Kurdish at varying rates during their childhood, but Turkish 
gained an edge over Kurdish after starting to attend school. One of the reasons that 
this age group does not know Kurdish properly is the lack of speaking practice in 
their childhood resulting from the attitudes of their parents. A male informants tells:  
My parents taught me Turkish for me to avoid troubles and ostracisation due to the political 
conditions of that time. I've learned Kurdish on my own effort. Maybe others are like me too; 
those who learned Kurdish later in life or those who can understand but can’t speak. And there is 
this group of people, we can understand but can’t speak. They know themselves, their Kurdish 
identity, but they feel more like Turks or in between.246 
From the expressions and feelings of informants during interviews, it can be 
observed that speaking Turkish properly  is one of the main concerns of informants 
for their children. A female informant says about teaching Kurdish to their children,  
“When one speaks Kurdish, his Turkish regresses; it’s better he speaks just 
Turkish.”247 Another female informant claims that her father had the same concern 
during her childhood: “Usually it was spoken Kurdish, but my father suggested that 
we speak Turkish because we were going to school, for us to get better grades.”248 In 
                                                 
245 “Zaten Kürtçeyi öldürerek Türkçe öğrendiğimiz için artık biraz da dilimiz de dönmüyor artık. Bazı 
şeylerde, her şeyi de Türkçe konuştuğumuz için Türkçe daha rahat. Kürtçe ’de kendimi ifade 
edemiyorum artık.” 
246 “Ailem okula başlarken zorluk çekmeyeyim diye, dışlanmayım diye, dönemin siyasi koşulları 
gereğince de bana önce Türkçeyi öğretti. Ben Kürtçeyi kendi çabamla öğrendim. Belki dışarıdan 
benim durumumdakiler genelde böyle işte, Kürtçeyi sonradan öğrenenler ya da anlayıp 
konuşamayanlar. Bir de öyle bir kesim var anlıyoruz ama konuşamıyoruz. Onlar kendilerini evet 
Kürtlüklerini biliyorlar ama kendilerini daha Türk ya da arada hissediyorlar.” 
247 “Ya şimdi Kürtçeyi konuştuğu zaman Türkçesi bozuluyor direkt Türkçe konuşması daha iyi.” 
248 “Genellikle Kürtçe konuşulurdu ama okula gittiğimiz için babam bize Türkçe konuşmamızı tavsiye 
ederdi. Notlarımız daha güzel olsun diye.” 
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other words, speaking Turkish more than Kurdish did not arise merely from pressure 
in schools, but also emerged from internal pressures of parents to not cause their 
children to be excluded from society.  
Another platform, through which informants maintain their relations with the 
Kurdish language, is the media. TRT Kurdî is the most popular TV channel among 
informants followed by Rudaw, Mezopotamya, Sterk, and Zarok TV. Even if it is not 
broadcasting in Kurdish, IMC TV was also mentioned in the answers of informants. 
According to responses, four female informants - distributed equally within the age 
groups of 18-30 and 30-60 - declared that they do not follow Kurdish TV or 
newspapers. 
As another issue, the lack of being able to communicate in Kurdish disconnected 
younger people from their elders and resulted in their inability to understand them. 
Nearly all informants tell their memoirs of one of their elders who do not know 
Turkish and have problems in their life because of it. This is not just an issue of 
language; it also inhibits people from handing down traditions and personal memoirs 
to the next generation. As a male informant expresses: 
Now, because my grandparents don’t know Turkish, I can’t produce memories about them in my 
memory. That is, how do you remember a person? You recall them from what they said and the 
things they said to you get imprinted on your mind and you recall them. You know what people 
say, ‘My mother used to say this, my father that, my grandpa this.’ I don’t say this, because I 
didn’t understand what they were saying; so, yes, there was an incapability to establish a bond 
between us. He spoke Kurdish at home, I didn’t know what he thought on which subject; one 
shares their thoughts with those around them even while watching news on TV, but that was not 
possible for us. My grandma had no means to share her thoughts on events, so I don’t recall 
anything she said; it is a very vague memory for me even though I was as old as 14 when my 
grandma died. I remember how she walked and moved around the house, but I don’t have 
anything about what she thought, what kind of attitude she had, whether she was kind or rude, if 
she was wise or enlightened, because we never communicated.249 
It is beyond doubt that even if informants give high importance to speaking Turkish 
very well, they also want their children to learn Kurdish to be able to be aware of 
                                                 
249 “Şimdi dedemin, babaannemin Türkçe bilmemesiyle kaynaklı benim onlarla ilgili hatıra 
belleğimde anılar oluşmuyor. Mesela bir insanla nasıl hatırlarsa mesela, söylediklerinden hatırlarsın, 
onun sana söylediği şeyler zihnine kazınır, onlar sen aklında tutarsın. İnsanlar derler ya, “annem şöyle 
derdi, babam böyle derdi, dedem böyle derdi” benim öyle bir şeyim yok çünkü dediklerinden hiçbir 
şey anlamıyordum, öyle bir bağ kuramama olayı vardı bizde. O Kürtçe konuşuyordu evde, hangi 
konuda ne düşündüğünü bilmiyordum mesela, insan aynı evde oturduğun kişi bir haber programını 
bile izlerken kendi düşüncelerin onunla birlikte söyler, paylaşır evinde oturan insanlarla, öyle bir 
imkân yoktu. Olaylara karşı düşüncesini paylaşabilme imkânı yoktu, onun için benim hatıramda 
onların söylediği bir söz yok mesela çok silik geliyor bana hâlbuki babaannem öldüğünde 14 yaşında 
filandım, yaşım da vardı. Babaannemin yürüyüşünü, evde nasıl hareket ettiğini hatırlıyorum ama ne 
düşündüğünü, nasıl bir tavrı olduğunu, kaba ya da nazik bir insan mıydı, bilgili bir insan mıydı, aydın 
bir insan mıydı, bunlarla ilgili hiçbir şeyim yok, çünkü iletişime geçmişliğimiz yok.” 
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their Kurdish identity. Because members of the last generation do not know Kurdish 
properly as aforementioned, some informants within the age group of 30-60 regret 
not being able to teach Kurdish to their children. One of the male informants says: 
Well, I haven’t. But I regret it. I didn’t think, I wish I had taught them. And I didn’t have the 
environment to teach it. I would want their mother tongues to be Turkish even if I spoke Kurdish 
to them. That's why I didn't speak at first and then I had no chance. I didn't think. It became a 
routine. We couldn’t help it. I mean, I didn't have any bad intention, but when I look at the 
events of the last years, when I see the reactions of some groups towards Kurds and Kurdish, I 
wish that I had taught my children Kurdish just as an act of defiance.250 
When it comes to the issue of native language education, CAK identify two 
important related problems. First, some informants mix up learning Kurdish as one 
part of their education or being educated in Kurdish instead of Turkish. Even if the 
difference between these two situations is explained, some informants are still 
confused. It is obvious that informants prefer that their children learn Kurdish as a 
second language, rather than as a native language. In other words, they do not 
support the idea of education in Kurdish. Also, speaking Kurdish in public spaces is 
another issue because of discriminatory behaviors to which Kurds were exposed. 
Predominantly informants admit that they used to refrain from speaking Kurdish in 
public spaces because of negative reactions towards them. Additionally some of 
them say that they continue to refrain from speaking Kurdish in public spaces.  
In light of this information in the dimension of belonging/isolation, it is evident that 
CAK are exposed to Turkishness, which shapes the contours of their ethnic identity. 
A pattern towards describing themselves in the middle of Turkishness and 
Kurdishness shows how they have been affected by the majority ethnicity in the 
region. Even if they differentiate Turkishness and Kurdishness on traditional issues - 
one of which is language - it is obvious that Kurdish spoken in the region was even 
influenced a lot by Turkish and even informants whose native language was Kurdish 
in their childhood declared they are now more fluent in Turkish. Despite being a 
group exposed to ethnic discrimination because of their names and language, CAK 
have a strong sense of belonging to the country and region. In other words, despite 
all the problems they experienced, they see themselves as a part of the region. 
                                                 
250 “Valla öğretmedim. Ama pişmanım. Keşke öğretseydim diye düşünmüyordum. Hem öğretecek 
ortam da yoktu. Hani kendi imkanlarımla onlarla Kürtçe konuşsaydım ben aslında ilk andillerinin 
Türkçe olmasını istedim. O yüzden konuşmadım  ilk başta sonra da imkanım olmadı. Düşünmedim. 
Öyle bir alışkanlık oldu gitti. Şey yapmadık. Yani herhangi bir maksadım yoktu ama şu son yıllardaki 
olaylara baktığımda bazı halkın değil de bazı belirli kesimlerin Kürde ve Kürtçeye karşı tepkilerini 
görünce keşke  ben de çocuklarıma  Kürtçe öğretseydim inatlaşma gibi bir şey oluyor.” 
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4.4. The Dimension of Legitimacy/Illegitimacy: Associations with Political 
Parties, State Institutions, and Other Organizational Structures 
The last dimension within the context of social cohesion is about relations with 
political and institutional foundations. Questioning CAK about their political and 
institutional belongings helps gather information about their political choices, 
perceptions towards state institutions, and their experiences regarding interactions 
with them, which is quite important to understand associations of CAK on the 
political/institutional level. Actually, as is declared in the introduction chapter, this 
issue was the topic about which informants had the most difficult time speaking, due 
to the dominating political atmosphere both before and after the general elections. It 
should be admitted that if this research were conducted at another period, the results 
might be different than the existing ones.  
As the first domain of this dimension, informants were asked regarding their 
membership in any political parties, non-governmental institutions, unions, and 
foundations. In light of informants’ expressions, other than two women within the 
age group of 30-60 and one male within the age group of 18-30, there are no 
informants who have affiliations with any kind of institutions. Two female 
informants are members, respectively of the Republican People’s Party (RPP) and 
the Education and Science Workers' Union (Eğitim-Sen), and the male informant is a 
member of the Justice and Development Party (JDP). The female informant who is a 
member of the RPP says that she resigned from the party because of a concern about 
her children’s futures as they look for jobs after graduation. The female informant 
who is a member of Eğitim-Sen admits that she is a member of the union just 
because circumstances demand it. The male informant says he wants to resign from 
the JDP, as he is not supporting it anymore. In other words, informants do not have 
strong associations with any organizations. 
All informants who took part in this study declared that they vote in general and local 
elections. Informants’ expectations from political parties were categorized with 
preference for ‘equality,’ ‘justice,’ ‘transperancy,’ ‘honesty,’ and finally economic 
welfare. However, it is obvious that two thirds of informants are of the opinion that 
politicians do not keep their promises most of the time. Thus, it can be said that they 
do not trust political parties even though they vote for them. A male informant 
reasons: “I don’t expect too much, and parties don’t give us anything either. We vote 
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just because we want to see some people in the parliament. But I am sure it will not 
change anything. Political parties all sound the same, I don’t attach importance to 
them because I’ve never seen that they’ve changed anything.”251 Additionally, it 
should be said that while they are voting, the ideology of the party comes into 
prominence during general elections more than in local elections. Interestingly, a 
male informant says he voted for the National Movement Party (NMP) in the last 
local elections because of the well-being and trustworthiness of the candidate, even if 
the ideology of the party is quite distant from his values. A female informant within 
the age group of 18-30 exemplifies more pragmatic expectations during local 
elections: “I think rationally when I vote, especially while voting for local elections. 
It might be seen as pragmatism or pessimism by some but why would I approach a 
mayoral election ideologically? Whoever cleans the street I pass through, for 
example, will get my vote. Or I vote for whoever abolishes the tuition fee.”252 
Pragmatism in local elections is less frequently observed than in general elections. In 
these elections, the ideology of political parties becomes more important. 
Additionally, expectations from the parties are more abstract and general in these 
elections. As aforementioned, ‘equality,’ ‘justice,’ ‘transparency,’ and ‘honesty’ in 
addition to economic welfare seem to be quite important for informants.  
Informants were also asked whether being represented in the Assembly is important 
or not. According to answers to this question, people feel like they are more 
represented after the PDP’s entry into the Assembly as a party with 80 
representatives. It is observed that the PDP’s vote gathered in the last election creates 
excitement among informants. Eleven informants declare the PDP as the party to 
which they feel closest among all other parties. Beyond these informants, one female 
within the age group of 30-60 did not want to answer this question, one male 
informant within the age group of 18-30 admits he feels closer to Kurdish-Islamist 
parties without giving a name, one female informant within the age group of 18-30 
does not feel close to any political party, and one female informant within the age 
                                                 
251 “Çok fazla beklentim yok, partilerin pek bize verdiği bir şey de yok. Gider, işte sırf oyumuzu 
kullandığımız, birilerini orada görmek istediğimiz için. Ama bir şey değişmeyeceğine eminim yani. 
Siyasi partiler, hep aynı şeyleri söylediğine fark, hayatta farklı bir şey değiştirdiğini görmediğim için 
önemsemem yani.” 
252 “Ben oy verirken rasyonel düşünürüm, özellikle yerel seçimlerde. Belki biraz pragmatizm ve 
bazıları tarafından kötü de algılanabilir ama bir belediye seçimine neden ideolojik yaklaşayım? Benim 
geçtiğim sokağı kim temizliyorsa atıyorum ona oy veririm. Ya da ben üniversite harçlarını kim 
kaldırırım diyorsa ona oy veririm.” 
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group of 30-60 feels closest to the JDP even though she voted for the RPP in the last 
election. In other words, it is seen in the field that informants favor the PDP even if 
most of them - other than three informants - admit that they had not voted for 
Kurdish parties before. One male informant indicates: 
I have voted for Recep Tayyip Erdogan for 3 election periods. Because of his statements 
regarding Kurds. For his resolution process, and approach towards the Kurdish problem, I’ve 
voted for AKP for 3 periods of election. But when I look again at the last two periods, it’s not 
convincing anymore. His abolishment policy and promised pledges are not working and he even 
thwarts his own resolution process. Because it’s not convincing for me anymore, the only party I 
find myself close to is Peoples' Democratic Party-PDP (Halkların Demokratik Partisi-HDP).253 
The PDP is seen as more sincere than other political parties regarding its 
representation of the Kurds. Its discourse is seen as associative for all groups in 
Turkey. One male informant exemplifies it:  “Because I believe it represents all the 
people, the oppressed and the sufferers, I was quite touched by that aspect of the 
party. I mean, I chose PDP because it claims it represents people who have been 
oppressed religiously, economically, educationally, and I believe them.”254 Another 
male informant associates PDP’s associative discourse with the excitement created 
among people during the AK Party’s first period. It is obvious that even if people do 
not trust political parties too much, they are hopeful about the PDP’s future and 
believe that it will do a good job in the Assembly. One male informant gives an 
example about the associative power of PDP as follows: 
PDP is like a savior party, it’s a party of peace that will fix everything; that is, the people view it 
that way. A lot of people who don’t defend PDP follow their work closley and they defend their 
good sides. “I hope they can go on doing that.” That’s what he says, the man is enrolled under 
grey wolves. I've seen it with my own eyes. And there is this guy, a member of the Turkish 
Educational Union, but he listens to what the man says and defends admirably, but he might not 
defend that party. But the party leader is listened to, because he is believed; we already hope that 
he will shine his own light as Erdogan did once.255 
                                                 
253 “Mesela ben 3 dönem Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’a oy verdim. Kendisine bu Kürt söylemleri için. 
Yapacağı işte çözüm süreci, Kürt sorununu çözeceğine dair söylemlerinden dolayı, 3 dönem ben AK 
Parti’ye oy verdim. Ama son iki dönemde bakıyorum inandırıcı değil artık. Kandırma politikası, 
verilen sözler yerine gelmiyor hatta kendisinin başlattığı çözüm sürecine karşı geliyor. Bana göre 
inandırıcılığı kalmadığı için ben artık tek yakın olarak gördüğüm HDP.” 
254 “Bütün insanları, ezilenleri, mağdurları temsil ettiğine inandığım için o yönü beni çok etkiledi. 
Yani dini yönden baskı görenleri,ekonomik yönden baskı görenleri,eğitim yönünden baskı 
görenleri,toplumda ezilen kitleleri temsil ettiğini iddia için ben de buna inandığım için HDP’yi 
seçtim.” 
255 HDP içinde böyle sanki bir kurtuluş partisi her şeyi düzeltecek bir barış partisi yani halk bu göz ile 
bakıyor. Benim bir sürü HDP yi savunmayan insan onların çalışmalarını çok yakından takip ediyor ve 
güzel yani savunuyorlar. İnşallah bunu devam ettirebilirler. Bunu söylüyor yani adam ülkü ocaklarına 
kayıtlı. Buna kendi gözlerimle şahit oldum yani. Adam öyle Türk Eğitim-Sen üyesi ama adamın 
konuştuğu şeyleri savundukları şeyleri hayranlıkla dinliyorlar belki o partiyi savunmuyor. Ama 
doğruluğuna inandığı için dinleniyor zaten hani inşallah olur diyor hani böyle bir zamanlar Erdoğan’ın 
parlaklığı gibi inşallah onun ışığı olacak yani.” 
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One female, who sees the PDP as the representative of the Kurds in the Assembly 
and who voted for them for this reason, makes the statement: 
What makes PDP close to me is that you know Kurds’ oppressed identity, well I don’t know, 
I’ve really wanted Kurdish deputies to sit at parliament with their Kurdish identity. Ever since I 
was little, since I voted. It’s a beautiful thing that they obtained 80 chairs in this election. You 
know what they say, I can’t stand anymore seeing Kurds get oppressed and marginalized. Let 
Kurds voices be heard, too. There is a Kurdish fact in the Southeastern and Eastern Anatolia. 
Turkey should accept this now, not ignore it. You know, they should help those regions either. 
You know what they say, ‘we’ve built this number of schools and that number of hospitals’. 
None of my teacher friends wants to be appointed to the East or Southeast. Why is it so? Why? I 
want to these issues to be debated in the Parliament. Hence I sympathize with PDP. 256 
Favoring the PDP in the region can also be observed during meetings and other 
events. As a part of this study, before the general elections, the 16th Central 
Anatolia’s Haymanian People’s Hıdırellez Festival (16. Emin Şahiya Xıdırelyas A 
Gelên Anatolya Ya Navîn A Haymana) was participated in to observe people’s 
reactions to the PDP, since the festival is organized by PDP and previous parties in 
line with it. First, people regularly participating in the organization say that the 
crowd at the festival site showed people’s increasing demands of the party. 
Especially younger people participating in the festival were very fervent in their 
support of the party. MP candidates of the party in Ankara participated in the 
festival. During a speech, one of the MP candidates said that CAK had shown the 
biggest resistance of assimilation. The candidate claimed that even if they could not 
often vote for Kurdish parties because of their frequent fears about suffering the rage 
of the state, those trying to assimilate them would be surprised when they saw the 
results of the election. Every speaker insisted that CAK should show how they resist 
assimilation. It was evident that the issue of assimilation is used in the region as a 
part of propaganda towards CAK. 
As aforementioned, the popularity of a Kurdish party in the region was not a 
common situation before. Only the People's Labor Party (HEP) achieved successful 
results as a party in the 1991 elections when it established an electoral alliance with 
the Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP). In other words, informants did not 
                                                 
256 “HDP’yi daha yakın kılan, Kürtlerin ezilmiş kimliği vardır ya, yani ne bileyim, hiç olmazsa o 
mecliste Kürt kimliğiyle oturan milletvekillerinin olmasını ben çok istedim. Küçüklüğümden beri, oy 
kullandığımdan beri, ne güzel bu secimde de 80 tane milletvekili çıktı. Ne derler, Kürtlerin artık ben 
ezilmesine, ötekileştirilmesine dayanamıyorum. Kürtlerin de sesi çıksın. O Güneydoğu’da ve Doğu 
Anadolu’da bir Kürt gerçeği var. Artık Türkiye bunu kabullensin, görmezden gelmesin. Hani, oralara 
da yardımlar gitsin. Hani deniliyor ya bilmem kaç tane okul yaptık, şu kadar şey yaptık. Yani bir kere 
öğretmenim, hiçbir arkadaşım, Doğu’ya ya da Güneydoğu’ya atanmak istemiyor. Neden yani? Niye? 
Ben bu sorunların, mecliste tartışılmasını istiyorum. Onun için HDP’ye sempati duyuyorum.” 
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previously feel close to Kurdish political parties. However, it is somehow obvious 
that the National Movement Party (NMP) - as a Turkish nationalist party - has 
always been the party from which informants felt most distant. Other than two 
female informants within the age group of 30-60, every informant felt distance from 
the NMP. Two other female informants within the age group of 30-60 declare that 
they felt most distant from the PDP and JDP parties. It should be noted that the 
female feeling far away from the PDP defines herself as a Turk and Atatürk 
nationalist. The female informant’s feeling far away from JDP reflects her being 
fired from her job for supposedly being a supporter of the NMP.  However, regarding 
the issue of the NMP, informants are troubled with the party’s discourse and its 
perception about Kurds. One male informant within the age group of 18-30 implies: 
The one I feel the most distant is NMP, Nationalist Movement Party. It’s a party whose policy is 
based completely on Kurdophobia. It has no other idea, movement or opinion on any other 
subject. It’s a party that has spent its entire existence to treat Kurds as enemies, so I really hate 
it. There are many nationalist people around me, usually I don’t start a topic about politics in 
order not to upset them but I will show strong reaction when they do.257 
The NMP’s presence in the parliament and its discourse towards Kurds created a 
negative impact on informants. As a male informant indicates, Kurds also see the 
PDP as a representative of Kurdish identity countering the NMP’s discourse: 
I never felt so thus far but especially for last two periods, the period that independent deputies 
got into parliament and for this period PDP getting into parliament, I now feel so. Why are you 
going to say? Because NMP’s statements and approach, its emphasizing Turkish nationalism 
seems to me as racism. I am against both Kurdish and Turkish nationalism. I'm against all kind 
of racism. I believe and see PDP as a representative of the Kurdish people in the parliament.258 
The PDP’s success in recent elections throughout the country as well as in the region 
is exciting for CAK. Voting rates for the party in Kurdish populated districts such as 
Haymana (18.52%) and Kulu (28.07%) prove increasing demands towards the party 
compared to the results of previous elections in which Kurdish parties could not gain 
a significant portion of election rates. Even if the PDP’s entry into the parliament as 
a party is quite new, informants do not follow its activities, meetings or events very 
                                                 
257 “...En uzak hissettim MHP, Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi. Tamamen Kürt düşmanlığı üzerine bir 
siyaset yürüten bir parti. Başka hiçbir konuda; fikri, zikri, düşüncesi olmayan bir parti. Bütün varlığını 
Kürtleri düşmanlık ederek geçirmiş bir parti, onun için nefret ediyorum, hiç sevmiyorum. Etrafımda 
da çok milliyetçi insan var genelde de o insanları üzmemek adına fazla siyasetten konu açmıyorum 
ama onlar açtığında da sert tepki gösterilirim...” 
258 “Bugüne kadar hiç hissetmedim ama özellikle son iki dönemdir, geçen dönem bağımsız 
milletvekilleri, özellikle de bu dönemde HDP’nin meclise girmesiyle hissediyorum. Neden 
diyeceksin? Çünkü orada bir MHP’nin söylemi ve tutumu Türk milliyetçiliğini vurgulaması ırkçılık 
gibi geliyor. Ben hem Türk milliyetçiliğine de Kürt milliyetçine de karşıyım. Tüm ırkçılıklarına 
karşıyım. HDP’yi orada Kürt halkının bir temsilcisi olarak görüyor ve inanıyorum.” 
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actively. They follow its agenda on the TV and in newspapers, rather than joining 
actively or being a member. However, as a result of this fieldwork, it can easily be 
said that CAK favor the PDP contrary to other political parties. 
Another prominent domain showing CAK’s cohesion occurs in their relations with 
administrative units. Informants answered the question regarding their trust for state 
institutions by stressing that they did not, in fact, trust state institutions in general. 
However, some of them also orally stress that the lack of trust does not arise because 
of their Kurdish identity. Instead, it is because of the unsystematic structure of the 
state institutions. One female informant exemplifies this situation: 
I don’t think I am alienated here because I’m Kurdish, I just think there should be some 
improvements in public services but as I say, this has nothing to do with me being a Kurd, it a 
general problem. I can get things, maybe because I know how to demand, by pushing for them. 
Even if it takes months, I can get it by my effort. Maybe a Turkish friend goes through worse 
difficulties than I do because he is not demanding. I don't think it's anything to do with 
identity.259 
Among state institutions, as a common pattern, informants have more confidence in 
health institutions than in other ones. Seven informants declared that they trust in 
health institutions, even if they have so many problems. Justice, police, army, 
education and government institutions that provide services throughout the whole 
country are only mentioned as trustworthy institutions once. Overall, however, 
informants do not see these institutions as trustworthy ones. In other words, health 
institutions can be claimed as the only institution in which informants trust. There is 
no other trusted institution mentioned multiple times by informants. Actually, the 
other institutions are seen as ones that cannot be trusted. One male informant within 
the age group of 30-60 tells why he trusts health services:  
At this point, the thing I trust most is health. There is no discrimination. No matter who they are, 
everyone receives equal and quality service. The most standing-out thing this government has 
ever done, by the eyes of the public, health sector improvements. Citizens who had social 
security used to be unable to be treated. We couldn’t have our children treated, we couldn’t go 
into the hospitals. Now my children can go into hospital until the age of 18 without me even 
knowing it. Or I can go to the ER and get treated. You could only be treated with money in the 
past. You are nothing if you don’t have money. No IOU’s either, we’ve been through a lot. Now 
health sector is working like a clock.260 
                                                 
259 “Ben buralarda Kürt olduğum için dışlandığımı düşünmüyorum, sadece kamu hizmetlerinin 
sağlanmasında biraz yol alınması gerektiğini düşünüyorum ama dediğim gibi bunun benim Kürt 
olmamla alakası yok, genel bir sorun. Türk arkadaşım da benden belki de biraz ben talep etmeyi 
bildiğim için, bir şeylerin yakasına yapışıp onu alabiliyorum. Aylarca sürse bile bir çaba sonucu onu 
alabiliyorum. Belki, bir Türk arkadaşım benden daha beter sorunlar yaşıyor talepkar olamadığı için. 
Bunun kimlikle alakası olduğunu düşünmüyorum.” 
260 “Şu anda geldiğimiz noktada benim en güvendiğim sağlık. Ayrımcılık yapılmıyor. Kim olursa 
olsun herkese eşit mesafede, çok da güzel hizmet vermiyor. Şu anki, geçmişteki hükümetin de yaptığı 
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As well as state institutions, local institutions such as municipalities, district 
governorates and other ones are also seen as untrustworthy. Especially municipalities 
are seen as institutions that function and provide services according to people’s 
political behaviors: 
Everything has now been politicized. We see the municipalities doesn’t these famous give social 
aid to people who are not politically on their side. My neighbor doesn’t receive any, for 
example. Because my neighbor is a modern person but he has two kids who go to high school 
and college and they don’t receive a penny. He is extremely poor. But when he applies to the 
municipality or social cooperation office, he comes back without any aid or payment, without 
any support. He lives off of his relatives’ aids and he earns a livelihood by working below 
minimum wage despite being ill. I see that. He is at next door. How can we trust municipalities 
and all now? If you do not have a strong reference, you can’t even receive social aid from them. 
You need to have a strong reference.261 
Another issue that comes to the forefront is the disfunctionality of complaint 
mechanisms when people using these public services face problems. Because people 
do not trust institutions, they are unaware of the application methods to report their 
complaints.  Other than one male informant stressing that he uses the Prime Ministry 
Communications Center (BIMER), informants declare that they use individual 
methods, such as talking with other staff and executives to solve their problems. 
Informants do not find the public and local services they use successful and 
encounter negative behaviors when they request services. However, as understood 
from the expressions of informants, these problems arise from laziness and the 
unsystematic structure of public and local services. In other words, these problems 
impact people regardless of their ethnic belonging. 
To sum up, informants do not individually have strong affiliations with any kind of 
political or institutional organizations. They have expectations from political parties 
such as equality, justice, transparency, honesty, and economic welfare. Even if most 
of them did not support any kind of Kurdish political parties before, they supported 
the PDP in the latest election, because they view them as defenders of Kurdish 
                                                                                                                                          
en büyük halkın gördüğü, vatandaşın gördüğü en büyük nokta bu sağlık. Gerçekten ben mesela, 
vatandaşın BAĞKUR borcu var tedavi olamıyor. Ama çocukları, eskiden çocuklarımızı tedavi 
ettiremiyorduk, hastanelere giremiyorduk. Şimdi çocuklarım 18 yaşına kadar bana uğramadan 
hastaneye gidebiliyorlar. Ya da ben direk gidip acile tedavi olabiliyorum. Eskiden paranla tedavi ol 
yani. Paran yoksa sen hiçsin. Senet ver yok, çok şeyler yaşadık. Şu an sağlık çok güzel.” 
261 “Yani artık he şey siyasallaşmış. Belediyelerin kendilerinden olmayan insanlara bu meşhur sosyal  
yardımlarını yapmadığını görüyoruz. Benim komşuma yapmıyorlar mesela.çünkü komşum modern bir 
insan ama beş kuruş yardım geliri olmayan  lise üniversite eğitimi gören iki tane de çocuğu var.tabiri 
caizse  ekmeğe muhtaç bir insan. Ama belediye ya da  sosyal yardımlaşmaya gittiğinde beş kuruş 
almadan hiç destek ve yardım almadan sürekli eli boş geliyor. Akrabalarının yardımıyla geçiniyor ve 
hasta hasta asgari ücretin altında fiyatlara çalışarak geçimlerini sağlıyorlar. Bunu görüyorum. Hemen 
kapı komşum. Belediyelere  falan artık nasıl güveniriz. Eğer sizin kuvvetli bir referansınız yoksa 
onlardan sosyal yardım dahi alamazsınız. Kuvvetli bir referansınızın olması lazım.” 
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identity and rights. Other than health services, as a common pattern, informants do 
not trust public and local institutions due to their unsystematic structure. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 
This study has aimed to examine patterns in the political, social and cultural lives of 
CAK and whether these patterns and CAK' ethnic contours have been impacted by 
surrounding influences of Turkishness. The purpose of the study necessitates 
researching the historical roots of relations between CAK and administrative units, as 
well as other groups living in the region, to follow both continuities and distinctions 
present in policies and implementations towards the designated region. Furthermore, 
experiences, feelings, and opinions about relations with other groups and the state 
units in the region play a pivotal role in examining the social cohesion of CAK. 
First, it should be admitted that the phenomenon of adaptation of CAK to the region 
is not a unique characteristic of Ottoman administration. It occurred during the 
Republic as a part of the Kurdish Question and became more of an issue because of 
problematics in forming an “unprivileged, classless society” separate from the 
distinctive features of social groups depending on their ethnicity. Before getting into 
this subject, the significance of the background of the settlement issue should be 
stressed to understand the process of how the establishment of the Kurdish 
population in the region developed. Research proving a Kurdish presence in CA 
extends prior to the 11th century, which makes the presence of CAK a long-standing 
phenomenon in the region. There is very little knowledge about the methodology of 
the first settlements in the region occurring as a result of wars. However, especially 
after the 16th century with the changing structure of the Empire, the matter of forced 
migration became the main motivation for Kurdish settlement in the region. As is 
explained in-depth in Chapter III, the centralization aim of the administration was 
reflected in the formation of policies - in this case provisional decrees and special 
resolutions - but the Celali Rebellions somehow caused confusion throughout the 
Anatolian lands of the Empire for almost two centuries. The systematization of the 
settlement policy began in the 19th century through the introduction of new laws. 
One of the aims of these laws was to adapt Kurdish nomadic tribes to sedentary life 
for social and economic reasons. Even if it could not be achieved completely, 
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through the establishment of the Republican regime and during the CUP 
administration immediately prior, the issue of CAK was affected by the ethnicity 
engineering project aimed to homogenize communities by bonding them around 
Turkishness and being a Muslim. CA came to the forefront as a place where tribes 
from the East were forced to migrate in accordance with the aim of homogenization. 
All of these main points are given in detail in previous chapters. 
It is not difficult to say that Kurds in CA are different than Kurds living in the East 
and Southeast regions - their natural habitat - and those in the West, who migrated to 
the region not so long ago. CAK have been living in a place that is not their 
homeland for a long while. Consequently, how they develop relationships with other 
social groups and units is important to examine as well as whether their ethnic 
contours are affected by regional units. These issues are important, but have never 
been asked before by scholars in a broad manner. In accordance with this purpose, 
field work as a part of this study is formed on the classification of Paul Bernard’s 
measuring cohesion in social, cultural, and political aspects under three dimensions 
named as recognition/rejection, belonging/isolation, and legitimacy/illegitimacy. In 
terms of the dimension of recognition/rejection, existing social relations, 
experiences, and feelings were examined regarding CAK’ creation of an environment 
depending on tolerance and respect for diversity. In very general terms, explanations 
of informants as a part of this study show that relations of social groups are not close 
enough to create broader cultural concordance and establish unproblematic social 
connections between CAK and other social groups. After they migrated to urban 
areas from rural areas mostly due to educational and economic needs, they could not 
maintain their relations with their relatives as well as they previously had when 
living in a rural environment. As another related problem occuring at that point, they 
also suffered from not being able to get in contact with people in their new living 
areas. This problem, which makes familiarizing with other people difficult, arose 
from differences in their language and life styles. The situation of informants within 
the age group of 30-60 exemplifies how, as Kurdish people, their limited Turkish 
knowledge alienated them and their families from other social groups. Because of 
this, they could not explain themselves in daily life experiences and they were 
exposed to misunderstandings. Especially informants who migrated to urban areas 
during their childhood had to face the difficulties of being different in their 
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educational life as well as amongst their families. It should be noted that, according 
to explanations of informants, an adaptation problem preventing social cohesion 
from the perspective of CAK was less felt in neighborhoods consisting of Kurds 
rather than other ethnic groups. Ghettoization in particular areas of urban settlements 
is pretty common both in cities and districts, because as some informants stated, they 
feel secure and more confident amongst other Kurds rather than Turks and other 
groups.  
It is obvious that CAK were exposed to two-sided discrimination: while the first 
aspect was the categorical discrimination arising from widespread prejudices about 
Kurds, the second one arose from their physical aspects, such as appearance, speech 
and way of dressing. In the case of suffering from discriminatory behaviors, CAK 
within the age group of 30-60 had harsher experiences than informants within the age 
group of 18-30. As a result of these discriminatory behaviors, all informants were 
unable to develop proper social relations in their lives.  
It is important to mention the issue of social relations at the present time to 
understand the existing atmosphere about interrelations and whether there has been 
an improvement or lapse over time. In many aspects, interactions between CAK and 
other groups are going well on the grounds of mutual respect and solidarity. 
Especially in the case of female informants, they admit developing sincere relations 
with their neighbors belonging to other ethnic groups. However, as it is understood 
from explanations and examples, after they are adopted into an urban life-style, 
exposure to discrimination due to their physical aspects no longer occurred. In other 
words, they are not subject to discrimination arising from their own actions. 
However, a categorical discrimination towards Kurds depending on prejudices and 
misperceptions is still in use and apparent for almost all male and female informants. 
That is why some informants prefer to make their Kurdish identities invisible in 
public spaces. Even if their Kurdishness is known, a negative perception towards 
Kurds is verbalized by non-Kurds around them by stressing some excuses such as 
“Kurds have good ones among them, too” or externalizing Kurds from their life by 
even “dehumanizing” them, as one informant says.  
Despite all of these negative aspects in social relations, inter-ethnic marriages and 
cooperation in business life are positive elements contributing to the development of 
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building relationships on the basis of mutual respect. In these cases, approximately 
all informants have positive thoughts and experiences. In the case of inter-ethnic 
marriages, some informants within the age group of 30-60 express that in contrast 
with themselves, their parents and other elder family members are more distant from 
accepting inter-ethnic marriages. Frankly, younger generations are more used to the 
reality of this subject than older ones.  
The dimension of belonging/isolation deals with shared values and a sense of identity 
between different social groups and individuals and whether they engage them and 
make them feel safe in relations. Protection of ethnic contours as well as developing 
shared values is the key point in this dimension. Looking at the issue of how CAK 
define themselves, it is obvious that informants feel the effects of both Kurdishness 
and Turkishness on their personalities. It is exemplified in definitions of informants 
indicating that they are ‘in-between’ Turkishness and Kurdishness. While 
Kurdishness has a stronger influence on their identity, Turkishness is also effective in 
that case. When discrimination towards CAK is considered with informants’ feelings 
indicating that they are still in a position of being excluded in social relations, the 
effects of Turkishness on their identity can be seen as a paradox. Nevertheless, it 
should be taken into consideration that they have been exposed to elements of 
Turkishness from the beginning of their childhood. When this is taken together with 
the fact that CAK live in a sphere under the strong effects of Turkish identity, their 
remaining between Turkishness and Kurdishness is quite understandable. Obviously, 
the most prominent factor they feel is the effect of Turkishness on language. As a 
result of increasing levels of education among young people, knowledge of Kurdish 
has significantly decreased even to the point of functioning more as a second 
language rather than a native one. This situation has severed all ties between 
generations by causing younger people and their elders to no longer understand each 
other. Moreover, informants within the age group of 30-60 tell that even if their 
native language was Kurdish when they were a child, because they “learned Turkish 
by killing Kurdish,” as one male informant stresses, they are now more fluent in 
Turkish than in Kurdish. Except one female informant within the age group of 18-30, 
there is no other young person who can speak Kurdish properly. One of the reasons 
for this harsh forgetting is dependent upon the interiorized domination for speaking 
proper Turkish among the parents of informants, which arises from the problematical 
111 
 
politics of the state towards making diverse ethnicities and their elements invisible in 
public spaces. It is seen in the explanations of some informants that they still view 
speaking Turkish in a proper way, without an accent, as a more important issue than 
learning Kurdish. At this juncture, it should be remembered that after Kurdish started 
to be offered as an elective course in 2012, no course was opened in the region due to  
a lack of demand. 
While some elements belonging to the Kurdishness of CAK are under the effects of 
Turkishness, informants still attach an importance to maintaining their Kurdish 
ethnicity. It is clear in the interviews that informants define Kurdishness with 
positive adjectives and themselves feel close to their identity.  Additionally, they feel 
they belong to Turkey as equally as Turks and other groups. In light of this 
information, it can be said that while CAK have developed a sense of “loyalty” to the 
country, they have not been able to protect some elements of their ethnic contours, 
above all their native language. The one issue that comes into prominence at this 
point is that informants complain about associations of Kurdish ethnicity with armed 
conflict, precisely the PKK. Even more politicized informants do not want to be 
identified with it. At this point, it has to be said that informants were not asked any 
questions related directly to the PKK. The first reason arises from the sensitive 
characteristics of the period of field research. However, it should also be added that 
there are a few examples of PKK support from the region. According to related data, 
of 8,011 deceased PKK militants between 1984-2012, 77 militants were registered in 
the Central Anatolian provinces.262 These provinces and numbers of militants are 36 
from Konya(Kulu and Cihanbeyli), 21 from Ankara, and 20 from Aksaray, Çorum, 
Eskişehir, Karaman, Kayseri, Kırşehir and Yozgat.  These results also show that even 
if there are  common complaints about the organization, there was also small-scale 
active support for it. 
The third dimension named legitimacy/illegitimacy refers to relations with public 
and local institutions and whether they provide satisfaction and a sense of trust that 
each group has an equal right to use them. As a result of first domain questioning 
whether informants have organizational commitment to any political parties, unions, 
                                                 
262 I would like to thank Dr. Güneş Murat Tezcür from the University of Central Florida for providing 
details of his research to me. For more information about the research please see: Güneş Murat 
Tezcür, “Ordinary People, Extraordinary Risks: Participation in an Ethnic Rebellion,” American 
Political Science Review, (Accepted for publication on July 17, 2015). 
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non-governmental institutions, and foundations, it is understood that except for three 
informants, those interviewed do not want to be involved in these kinds of structures. 
Even if they do not prefer it, all informants are aware of their political rights and vote 
in general and local elections. Their expectations from political parties, such as 
equality, justice, transparency, honesty and economic welfare come into prominence. 
CAK have more pragmatic expectations in local elections, contrary to general 
elections, in which their voting behavior is shaped by ideological closeness. Even if 
almost all informants are using their right to vote, it is obvious that they do not trust 
political parties as a common pattern.  
As a rising phenomenon in Turkish politics, the PDP attracts the attention of 
informants. The PDP’s entrance into the Assembly as a party with 80 representatives 
makes them feel like they are more represented now. As a significant majority of 
informants, eleven respondents tell that they feel closer to the PDP nowadays, even if 
eight of them used to feel close to other parties.  The party is seen as representing all 
oppressed and suffering people in Turkey. Additionally, the existence of Kurdish 
deputies with their Kurdish identities in parliament is another important motivation 
for informants to support the PDP. According to their explanations, it is obvious that 
informants feel distance from the NMP, mostly because of its perspective about 
Kurds and the Kurdish Question. It is seen as a party based on Kurdophobia. Thus, 
informants supporting the PDP see this party as a defender of Kurds against the 
NMP. However, it should be said that sympathising with Kurdish political parties 
and individual candidates had not been a common behaviour in the region until 
recently. While examining results of previous general elections, support towards 
Kurdish political parties in Cihanbeyli and Kulu can be easily recognized. By the 
1995 General Elections, these parties received approximately 20% of votes in these 
cities. When it comes to Haymana, the results change according to existence of the 
parties or individual candidates. Individual Kurdish candidates could not get more 
than 2% of the votes, while Kurdish parties received approximately 6% of the votes 
from the second half of the 1990s to the beginning of the 2000s. In Polatlı, different 
from previous examples, Kurdish political parties could not get significant support 
and gained  approximately less than 2% of votes. 
When it comes to the issue of sense of trust towards public and local institutions, it is 
obvious that informants are not satisfied with any kind of public or local institutions 
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other than health institutions. In other words, neither political nor public and local 
institutions are providing sufficient service or trust. Informants stress that they 
cannot benefit from public and local institutions as they would like due to the 
unsystematic structure that dominates these institutions. They seem to have more 
confidence in health services, even if it also has many problems. Municipalities, 
district governorates and other local services are also criticized for providing services 
according to the political position of the demander. It also should be said that even if 
people are complaining about public and local services, other than one male 
informant, informants do not know how to make an official complaint. To sum up, it 
is obvious that they are not satisfied with services, but it is not because they are 
exposed to discrimination; instead, the cause of the situation is related to the 
unsystematic structure of public and local services.        
Regarding a policy suggestion for providing cohesion between Kurds and other 
groups, it is obvious that negative perceptions and prejudices about Kurds should be 
removed from people’s minds to pave the way for healthy communication. Before 
anything else, a new constitution based on equality of each and every ethnic and 
religious group in Turkey and the right of mutual respect should be established. It is 
obvious that there are common prejudices towards different ethnic and religious 
groups in Turkey, such as Armenians, Greeks, Alewis, etc. Thus, implementation of 
cohesion among these groups requires a new constitution providing an atmosphere 
suitable for it. In other words, it should be seen that cohesion is not just a problem for 
CAK; it is a deep-rooted problem that has to be solved. In addition to a constitutional 
guarantee for this issue, politicians and governors also have to take an important step 
towards changing people’s attitudes about different ethnic groups. One of the reasons 
for misperceptions about Kurds arises from the negative discourses of politicians and 
their impact on the masses. Even if changing perception is a quite difficult and long-
term process, it should be immediately applied. 
As aforementioned, cohesion is a two-way process in which each individual or group 
should protect their own aspects. In the case of CAK, it is obvious that younger 
people are faced with the danger of not knowing the Kurdish language, which used to 
be the native language of their elders. As a first policy recommendation in this 
subject, the Kurdish language should be promoted as an elective course for Kurdish 
children in schools. As the German philosopher Heidegger says, “Language is the 
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house of being.” Because it is the most important aspect of identity, the protection of 
different languages should be taken under legal assurance. Moreover, private 
Kurdish language courses should also be supported by governmental incentives to 
become more widespread. Bearing in mind that states should be respectful of 
diversity, it is an obligation more than a necessity. 
As a final word, it is clear that there is a huge gap in studies related to CAK and their 
social, cultural, and political situation. There should be further research conducted 
regarding these people who have been so often ignored. It is expected that this study 
will provide a good start for emerging and future academic works on CAK.  
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QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
SORULAR 
Kişisel Bilgiler 
Cinsiyet 
Doğum tarihi (Yaş) 
Doğum yeri 
Eğitim durumu 
Mesleği/şu anda yaptığı iş 
Medeni hali 
Hane halkı sayısı (Hane halkındakilerin eğitimi, mesleği, yaşı) 
Göç(Kırsal-Kentsel Yaşam) 
Köyde yaşama deneyiminiz oldu mu? Ne kadar süre yaşadınız?  
(Köyden göçenlere) Köyden kente göç etmenizin sebepleri nelerdi? Köyde 
kimliğinizi daha iyi koruyabiliyor muydunuz?( (adet, düğünler, eğlenceler, cenazeler 
vb. açısından) Köyünüzü sıklıkla ziyaret eder misiniz?  
Köyden kente göçtükten sonra kültürel, ekonomik, politik ve sosyal açıdan uyum 
problemleri yaşadınız mı? 
Köyden kente göçtükten sonra yaşamaya başladığınız yerde ağırlıklı olarak 
komşularınız kimlerden(etnik açıdan) oluşuyordu? Onlarla ilişkilerinizde sorun 
yaşadınız mı? 
Şehir hayatını mı yoksa köy hayatını mı tercih edersiniz? Neden? 
(Kentte yaşıyorsa) Yaşadığınız kentte kendinizi evinizde hissediyor musunuz? 
Kendinizi misafir, yabancı gibi hissettiğiniz zamanlar/mekânlar/durumlar oldu mu? 
Başka kentlerde/bölgelerde akrabalarınız var mı? Nerede? Ne sebeple gittiler?  
Aşiret kültürüne dair ne biliyorsunuz? Bu kültürü sürdürdüğünüz noktalar var mı? 
Ailenizde bununla alakalı anlatılar var mı? 
Kimlik 
Kendinizi etnik açıdan nasıl tanımlarsınız? 
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Sizin için Kürt olmak ne anlama geliyor? Kürtleri diğerlerinden farklı kılan nedir? 
Aileniz / Büyükanne-babanız kendilerini nasıl tanımlar/dı? 
Kendinizi / ailenizin kendisini bu şekilde tanımlamasında nelerin etkili olduğunu 
düşünüyorsunuz? [Nereli olduğu, Doğduğu/yaşadığı yer, eğitim süreci, komşuluk 
ilişkileri, askerlik, göç deneyimi, karşılaşılan ayrımcılık deneyimi, siyasi/ideolojik 
tutum ve fikirleri vb.]  
Aidiyet hissettiğiniz topluluğu [..] tanımak isteyen birine öncelikli olarak nelerden 
bahsedersiniz? 
Türklerle benzediğiniz ve benzemediğiniz özellikler nelerdir? 
Türkiye’de kendinizi ev sahibi olarak görüyor musunuz? Azınlık olarak mı 
hissediyorsunuz?  
Kürtlerle bir araya geldiğinizde kendinizi daha rahat mı hissedersiniz? Bu hissinizin 
sebebi nedir? (Ailenizle, akrabalarınızla, bölgede yaşayan diğer Kürtlerle iletişimde 
bulunma sıklığı?) 
Çocuklarınıza Kürtçe isim koydunuz mu/koymayı düşünür müsünüz? 
(Evet ise) Çocuklarınıza Kürtçe isim koyarken/koymayı düşünürken ilerde sıkıntı 
yaşayacağını düşünüp tedirgin oldunuz mu/olur musunuz? Resmi işlemler sırasında 
çocuğunuza koyacağınız isim sebebiyle bir sıkıntı yaşadınız mı/yaşayacağınızı 
düşünüyor musunuz? Sizin haricinizde çevrenizde bu konuda sıkıntı yaşayan birini 
gördünüz ya da duydunuz mu? 
Yanınızda birini çalıştırırken o kişinin sizinle etnik mensubiyetine dikkat eder 
misiniz? (Evet ise: Kürt kökenli birisini başka bir etnik aidiyeti olan biri karşısında 
tercih etmenizin sebepleri nelerdir?) 
Yeni bir yere taşınırken komşularınızın Kürt olup olmadığına dikkat eder misiniz? 
Anadil 
Günlük hayatınızda hangi dilde kendinizi daha rahat ifade ediyorsunuz? Kendinizi 
daha rahat ifade ettiğiniz dilin haricindeki dili(Türkçe/Kürtçe/diğer) daha çok hangi 
alanlarda(aile içi/akrabalar/arkadaşlar/işyeri/okul vs.) kullanıyorsunuz? 
Çocukluğunuzda aile içinde hangi dil/diller kullanılırdı? Akrabalar arasında, büyük 
anne-büyük babalarla Türkçe dışında başka bir dil konuşan büyükleriniz var mıydı? 
Hangi dil/ler? 
Bu dil/diller size aktarıldı mı? Siz anadilinizi çocuklarınıza öğretiyor musunuz/ 
öğretmeyi planlıyor musunuz?  
Siz ya da aile üyeleriniz bu Kürtçe kullandığınız için herhangi bir sorun yaşadı mı?  
124 
 
Ailenizde ya da çevrenizde Türkçe bilmeyen bir birey oldu mu? Varsa o bireyin 
yaşadığı sıkıntılara şahit oldunuz ya da işittiniz mi? 
İş hayatında, okulda, sokakta, markette vs. Kürtçe konuşmaktan çekinir misiniz? 
Kürtçe konuştuğunuz için hiçbir tepkiyle karşılaştınız mı? İş hayatında Kürt 
olduğunuzun bilinmesinden tedirgin olduğunuz durumlar oldu mu? 
Kürtçenin okullarda anadil olarak öğretilmesi hususunda ne düşünürsünüz? Destekler 
misiniz yoksa karşı mı çıkarsınız? Sebepleriniz nelerdir? 
Kürtçe radyo, TV, gazete takip eder misiniz? Ediyorsanız bunlar hangileridir?  
Sosyal Yaşam 
Yaşadığınız yerdeki Kürt olmayan kesimlerle ilişkileriniz nasıldır? (benzerlikler, 
farklılıklar, hoşlanılan, sevilmeyen durumlar)  
Komşularınız arasında kimliğinizi rahatça ifade edebiliyor musunuz? Bu konuda, 
ayrımcılık olarak düşünülebilecek tavır/söz/davranışla karşılaşıyor musunuz? 
Geçmişte de böyle miydi?  
Bölgedeki Kürtlerle ilişkileri: düğün, cenaze, eğlence vb. alışkanlıkları devam 
ettirebiliyor musunuz, bu noktada ihtiyaçlarınız nelerdir, bir araya gelebileceğiniz 
etkinlikler düzenleyebiliyor musunuz? 
Akrabalık bağlarınız önemli midir? Ne sıklıkla bir araya gelirsiniz? Bir araya 
geldiğinizde Kürtçe konuşur musunuz?  
(Bekar birisine) Evlenmek istediğinizde eşinizin Kürt olmaması sizi rahatsız eder 
mi? Kürt olmayan birisiyle evlilik hakkına ne düşünürsünüz? Aileniz ve çevreniz 
sizce böyle bir durumda nasıl tavır alır? 
Çocuğunuz Kürt olmayan birisiyle evlenmek istese ne tepki verirsiniz? 
Aile üyeleriniz, akrabalarınız ve çevrenizdeki insanlarla Kürtlerin sosyal-siyasal 
durumu hakkında tartışmalar yapıyor musunuz?  
Ayrımcılık 
Kamuda iş başvurusunda siz ya da bir yakınınız ayrımcılığa uğradı mı?  
(Etnik kökeninizden dolayı ayrımcılığa uğradıysa) Ayrımcılığa uğradığınızda 
herhangi bir tepki gösterir misiniz? Evet ise, nasıl gösterirsiniz? 
Kürtlere yönelik ayrımcılık uygulandığına dair bir haber duyduğunuzda(TV, gazete, 
radyo, internet) ne tepki verirsiniz? (korku, acı, huzursuzluk vb.) 
İş hayatında, sosyal hayatta ya da komşularınızla yaşadığınız yerde Kürt olduğunuzu 
sakladığınız durumlar oldu mu? 
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Türkiye’de yaşayan Kürtlerin ekonomik açıdan daha dezavantajlı olduğunu 
düşünüyor musunuz? Sizce bunun sebepleri ne olabilir? 
Siyasal  
Herhangi bir STK’ya, sendikaya, vakfa ya da siyasi partiye üyeliğiniz var mı? Üye 
olup olmamada tereddüt yaşadınız mı? 
Genel/yerel seçimlerde oy kullanır mısınız? Oy kullanırken beklentiniz nedir? 
Oy kullanırken adayın özelliklerine mi, partiye mi oy verirsiniz?  
Mecliste temsil edildiğinizi düşünüyor musunuz? (birey/grup olarak) 
Sizi/ aidiyet hissettiğiniz grubu/toplumu temsil edecek bir lidere ya da partiye ihtiyaç 
duyuyor musunuz; böyle bir lider/partiden ne beklersiniz? 
Yerel ve ulusal düzeyde politika yapan Kürt siyasal partileri hakkında bilgileriniz 
nedir?( Faaliyetlerini biliyor mu, ne düşünüyor, desteklemeyi ve faaliyetleri içinde 
yer almayı düşünür mü?) 
Kurumsal 
Türkiye’de hangi devlet kurum(ların)a en çok /en az güveniyorsunuz: hukuk, meclis, 
ordu, hükümet, emniyet? 
Yerel düzeyde hizmet aldığınız kurumlardan hangisine en çok/en az güveniyorsunuz: 
eğitim kurumları, sağlık kurumları, belediyeler? 
Kamu hizmetlerinden yeterince faydalanabiliyor musunuz? Kurumlarla ilişki düzeyi 
nedir? Diğer kurumlarla iliskiler (Büyüksehir ve ilçe belediyeleri, muhtarlık, SYDV, 
kaymakamlık, polis, asker; bunlardan herhangi birisiyle bugüne kadar hiç iliksi 
kuruldu mu, bu ilişkide karsılasılan sorunlar, iliski kurma biçimine dair bir örnek 
veya bir anı, ayrımcı uygulamalarla karşılaşıldı mı?) 
Devlet kurumlarıyla, politikalarıyla ilişkili bir sorun yaşadığınızda, sorunu çözmek 
için nasıl bir yol izliyorsunuz? (kabullenme ve itiraz etmeme; ailenin, akrabaların 
desteği; mahkemeye başvurma; jandarma/polis/kolluk kuvvetlerine başvurma; bir 
siyasi partiye başvurma; belediyeye başvurma; dernek, sivil toplum örgütü, cami’ye 
başvurma) 
[erkekler için] Askerlik yaparken kimliğinizden dolayı farklı muamele gördünüz 
mü/ayrımcılığa uğradınız mı?  
